remarks to Working Group C on 20 June, ridiculed the time-frames incorporated into Article X.

It is most regrettable when one delegation resorts to bad humour sharply to attack a major proposal of another member of the Conference, and then fails even to propose an alternative. Those who criticize have the responsibility to make a counterproposal. But no such counterproposal has been forthcoming. Indeed, the formally-stated Soviet position that challenge inspection should, in the final analysis, be voluntary has remained unchanged since 1982. However, during less formal working group discussions, the Soviet Union has appeared to move away from its 1982 position by voicing support for the approach contained in document CD/CW/WP.136, presented by the German Democratic Republic and Poland on 18 April. Yet, it remains vague and non-committal in its formal statements in plenary meetings. My delegation is left to wonder what the real Soviet position is.

There are other aspects of the Soviet position that remain unclear as well. On at least two occasions in Working Group C, Soviet representatives have associated themselves with the approach contained in the United Kingdom Working Paper of 10 February 1984, CD/431.15 This paper is based on the principle that "Every State Party should be under a stringent obligation to accept challenge onsite inspection." Can one conclude from Soviet statements that the Soviet Union can accept this principle?

The United States delegation is not alone in lacking a clear picture of the Soviet position on challenge inspection. As one example, it should be recalled that on 27 March the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wegener, requested the Soviet delegation to clarify its views on several issues, including challenge inspection.16 I will look forward to responses to those questions as well as to the ones I have raised today.

In his statement to the press on 19 June, Ambassador Issraelyan called upon the United States to demonstrate its genuine interest in chemical disarmament by making new proposals. While it was not said so explicitly, there can be little doubt that the United States was supposed to change its position on challenge inspection. The United States delegation is not going to negotiate with itself. Rather than simply to criticize the United States position, we expect the Soviet Union to make clear what the Soviet position really is.

I have said it many times, and I will say it again: Article X was not presented as a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. The United States is prepared to consider seriously any alternative proposals that will provide the same level of confidence. But we will not accept an ineffective approach to challenge inspection.

Unfortunately, much of the debate about challenge inspection has dealt with formulas and their political acceptability. Some States have lost sight of the concept of effectiveness. In order to make progress on challenge inspection there needs to be discussion of how to ensure effectiveness, while at the same time minimizing the risk of abuse of the challenge provision. The Chemical Weapons Committee needs to evaluate all of the various proposals in these terms.

15 Ibid., pp. 70-74.

16 CD/PV.351, pp. 20–23.

Today I have described where the chemical weapons negotiations stand and what must be done in order to complete them. I have stressed the need for a strategy and have outlined its key points. I have commented on the four issues which we believe to be the key issues now in the negotiations.

In closing, I want to stress once again the importance that President Reagan and Vice-President Bush attached to the acceleration of the efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable agreement when I met with them on 5 June. The President has instructed the United States delegation to continue to seek mutually acceptable solutions to the outstanding issues in the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban. We intend to do our best to fulfil these instructions.

117. Newspaper Article by Members of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces: Comprehensive Test Ban, June 29, 19861

The Soviets have recently made a new strategic arms control proposal at Geneva, and they have also continued to press the United States to agree to a Comprehensive Test Ban—that is, a prohibition on any underground tests of nuclear weapons. The administration has stated that it is examining the arms control proposal but has rejected the CTB.

Some who advocate a CTB maintain that a ban on testing would generally lower the reliability of nuclear weapons and thus advance the cause of peace by making all such weapons less usable. Other CTB advocates believe the contrary—that testing is not really needed to ensure weapon effectiveness. Still others see a CTB as important chiefly as a symbolic step toward the eventual abolition of all nuclear weapons.

Not only do these arguments in part contradict each other, but none holds much water. The hard truth is that for the foreseeable future the stability of the strategic balance and the security of this nation and the West will depend upon the deterrence provided by nuclear weapons. Neither good intentions nor a single technical fix (whether it be a CTB or, for that matter, deployment of space-based ballistic missile defense) will lead to nuclear weapons' becoming obsolete within any relevant time frame.

That day, if it ever comes, can only be brought about by Western strength and by the Soviets' gradual acceptance that the perpetual expansion of their power is a hopeless goal. Today, however, nuclear weapons reflect the political chasm between freedom and totalitarianism. As long as this political competition exists, a strong military posture will be required to deter Soviet aggression and expansionism. In particular, although we may be able to reduce our degree of reliance on nuclear weapons and improve their safety-and although we may

17 Document 99.

The Washington Post, June 29, p. C7. The article was written by Brent Scowcroft, chairman, and John M. Deutch and R. James Woolsey, members. Senator Simon responded to this article on July 8 (Document 123).

hope for reasonable arms control and subdued rhetoric-such weapons will be required for an indefinite period to preserve the peace. Our allies appreciate the contribution Western nuclear weapons make to peace and stability today, perhaps better than we do.

In light of this, it would be a serious mistake for the United States to abandon nuclear testing now. First, limited testing permits the development of weapons that are far less sensitive to the explosion of their conventional explosive components as a result of a terrorist incident or an accident. Even if the actual conventional detonation of a nuclear weapon is highly unlikely in such cases, the resultant scattering of nuclear material would be devastating.

Second, testing is required to replace high-yield weapons with new loweryield ones—a change made possible by the more accurate delivery systems of today. These sorts of modernization of nuclear weapons contribute to strategic stability.

Finally, experts from the U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories largely agree that, over time, some testing is required to ensure reliability of the nuclear stockpile. Lack of confidence in the stockpile would impair our ability to rely on nuclear weapons for deterrence. And reduced confidence in reliability under a CTB might well be of greater disadvantage to the United States than to the Soviets. With our greater reliance on quality than on quantity, our confidence in our weapons might well deteriorate much faster than the Soviets' confidence in theirs.

Moreover, there is substantial debate about how to verify a CTB treaty. A threshold about one-tenth of the current 150-kiloton limit could probably be verified adequately with seismic stations outside the adversary's territory. An even lower threshold could be verified with cooperative measures that permitted each nation to have seismic stations in the other. But some cheating is possible at the level of very small nuclear detonations. Moreover, at these very low levels the borderline between nuclear tests and directed energy experiments becomes difficult to define. The inevitable political debate over verification of a CTB would add little to our understanding or to strategic stability.

The argument is often advanced that a CTB will slow the spread of nuclear weapons to other nations. It is true that American and Soviet nuclear testing provides for nonnuclear states a convenient political rationalization for pursuing nuclear weapons development. But the reasons that lead a state to acquire nuclear weapons are fundamentally grounded in that state's perception of its own security interests, not in the behavior of the United Sates or the Soviet Union. South Africa today, for example, is is unlikely to avoid nuclear weapons development because of a U.S.-Soviet CTB. Adherence by the superpowers to a CTB will change the rhetoric of some nations about nonproliferation but will have at best a marginal impact on the reality of what they do.

A reasonable policy for this nation to follow would be, first, to ratify the Threshold Test Ban Treaty signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 19742 Following that, the United States and the Soviets could enter into

2 For the text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1974, pp. 225-227.

negotiations to lower this limit to a level consistent with each country's technical requirements and its ability to verify, with high confidence, compliance with the lowered threshold. This would exert a long-term pressure toward lower yields and less reliance on nuclear weapons without the attendant problems described above. Finally, both the Soviets and the United States should renounce the use of nuclear explosives for so-called peaceful uses.

This set of proposals will fully please neither side in our current domestic debate nor does it comport with the current Soviet proposal. But it offers a reasonable approach toward dealing with this difficult issue while we devote principal attention to the main show-maintaining a deterrent and pursuing stabilizing strategic arms limitation agreements.

118. Statement by the Canadian Representative (Delworth) to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe: NATO Proposals, June 30, 19861

This negotiation is still spinning its wheels on the sands of political indecision, and time is passing quickly. We are halfway through this session which we have all called critical in the search for mutually acceptable solutions based on the common ground identified so far.

We can no longer afford to repeat old arguments, valid though some of them may be. We need to reassess our respective positions, taking into account the interests and perceptions expressed by others here.

Initiatives now seem called for, to unblock the road ahead towards an agreement which, in accordance with the mandate, will begin a process meaningful for building confidence and security as well as for the confidence- and security-building measures.

In speaking on behalf of the sponsors of SC.1,2 the 16 delegations which together made the first initiative at this conference, I can say that we have therefore decided that we would be prepared to make moves in the following areas of the negotiation:

Notification of ground force activities has often been described as the core of the agreement we have to adopt; the definition of the thresholds for ground force activities is a key element of this measure. Three approaches to this problem have been presented: One puts the emphasis on structures; another on manpower; a third one on "mobility and firepower", which in practical terms means equipment. An attempt to combine these three approaches was recently made by the neutral and non-aligned states. We think that this is the right way to proceed, and we would like to declare our readiness to proceed, and we would like to declare our readiness to draft on the basis of the proposal tabled by the Austrian delegation on June 13. We hope others will take a similarly positive view.

ACDA files. Ambassador Delworth spoke on behalf of the 16 NATO countries. 2 For an account of this proposal, see Documents on Disarmament, 1984, pp. 42-44.

We must, however, make it clear that this formula as it stands is far from ideal from our point of view. The attempt to equal out existing disparities in force structures between participating states—that is, to achieve an understanding for CDE purposes of what a division is-is useful. Our concern, however, is to find a solution that would include all formations of ground forces that have a militarily significant capability, regardless of what participating units may be called. We believe amendments will be required to this end.

The level of the threshold is an essential issue. Our approach is to emphasize structures, and the number of troops is only one element in this approach. It has been contended that our proposal would result in an excessive number of notifications per year. We do not think that the figures which were mentioned in support of this objection are accurate. But we are ready to consider raising the numerical element of the threshold beyond the figure of 6,000 troops. We seek increased confidence through militarily significant and verifiable confidenceand security-building measures which cover the whole of Europe. We envisage a reasonable number of notifications which would constitute a step beyond the confidence-building measures of the Helsinki Final Act.3 What we foresee is not 300 notifications per annum, not even 100. We believe it is a common objective that the number of notifications not be unnecessarily burdensome. We have to build constructively upon this common ground and agree to a comprehensive threshold which would correspond to this shared goal without entering into a numbers game.

Moreover, we are prepared to make another move. Understanding of mobilization practices through notification would contribute significantly to greater stability and confidence-building. However, we have heard concern expressed on our proposal relating to notification of mobilization activities. Some countries whose defence capabilities almost exclusively rely on the recall of reservists have argued that such a measure would affect their security interests.

We are willing to consider whether we could meet this preoccupation, but we would expect similar consideration of our concern in other areas such as constraints where provisions have been advocated which, in turn, would unacceptably affect our security interests.

I would like to stress that all this would constitute a significant departure from the position established in SC.1/amplified. The moves we are prepared to make are presented in order to encourage our negotiating partners to match them, inter alia, by contributing to solving the issue of air activities on the basis of existing common ground.

On observation, we continue to believe that agreement to observe all notifiable military activities from their beginning to their end would be a substantial improvement over the provisions contained in the Final Act. But, this ambitious aim has raised many logistical and financial objections. It is our view that observation should assist participating states in meeting the overall objectives of the confidence-building process: It must enable the observers to assess the scope

3 The arms control portions of the Final Act may be found in Documents on Disarmament, 1975, pp. 304–308. For the complete text, see Department of State Bulletin, vol. LXXIII, No. 1888 (September 1, 1975), pp. 323–350.