-In the defense and space group, an offer to engage in a dialog on managing the transition to a more stable basis for deterrence though increased reliance on defensive systems, rather than offensive nuclear arms, and an "open laboratories" initiative to assure each side of the defensive nature of the other side's strategic defense research.

The American negotiators have presented these proposals in the spirit of last November's Geneva summit. At the summit, General Secretary Gorbachev and I promised to seek 50-percent reductions in offensive nuclear arms, appropriately applied, as well as an interim INF agreement.2 Much to our disappointment, until recently the Soviets have shown no interest in seriously following up at the negotiating table.

In the past 2 weeks, however, the Soviet negotiators at Geneva have tabled new proposals. I am hopeful that these proposals signal the beginning of a serious Soviet effort to join with us in actually reducing offensive nuclear arms. If the Soviet Union is now genuinely seeking progress, we may have reached a turning point in our efforts to build a safer and more peaceful world. I deeply hope that this is indeed the case.

We approach these negotiations with realism and determination. While we clearly cannot accept these Soviet proposals without changes, we are studying Soviet ideas on reductions very carefully to see how they might help to move us toward our goal of deep, equitable, and verifiable arms cuts. At the same time, we believe that if progress can be made in one of the three NST negotiating areas, it should not be held up-as the Soviets are still insisting-pending agreement in another area.

We know there is much hard bargaining ahead, but for our part, the United States is determined to do everything we can to achieve these deep reductions. If recent events indicate that the Soviet Union is now ready to work together with us in this urgent endeavor, we can begin now to ensure a safe and more stable peace for future generations.

113. Press Statement by the Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (Kampelman), June 26, 19861

The fifth round of the negotiations on nuclear and space arms has just ended. We hope it has in some areas opened the way to a serious dialogue which will narrow our differences and lead to agreement.

The U.S. began the round with proposals on the table in all three of our negotiations groups. Our proposal of November 1 for a 50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear arms2 remains on the table and, in accordance with the November 21 agreement of President Reagan and General Secretary Gor

2 Documents on Disarmament, 1985, pp. 866-870.

'ACDA files. The statement was made after the close of Round V of the talks. 2 Documents on Disarmament, 1985, pp. 794-796.

bachev,' the U.S. has been seeking such reductions and early progress in areas of common ground. In this round, the Soviets did introduce a new option calling for lesser strategic arms reductions.

Our proposal of February 24 for the complete elimination of longer-range intermediate-range nuclear missiles is on the table along with an earlier Soviet proposal. We hope to see a more determined Soviet effort in the next round to join us in seeking to bridge our differences.

In the defense and space area, we have in this round received modified Soviet proposals responsive to some of our concerns which we hope will turn out to be constructive.

The latest Soviet proposals, introduced just a few days ago, are now being seriously considered and studied by us. It is appropriate that I now recall for you President Reagan's comments on this question in his speech at Glassboro. While repeating his firm commitment to conducting treaty-compliance research strategic defenses, he said:

We cannot accept these particular proposals without change, but it appears that the Soviets have begun to make a serious effort.

If both sides genuinely want progress, then this could represent a turning point in the effort to make ours a safer and more peaceful world. We believe that possibly an atmosphere does indeed exist that will allow for serious discussion.5

I do not want to minimize the very real and important substantive differences that remain between us. But at least in some areas we may now have fresh opportunities for serious and constructive discussion.

The American delegation is now planning to return to Washington for a period of active consultation and to participate in the preparation of a constructive response to the Soviet proposals. Our next round here in Geneva begins on September 18.

114. Press Statement by the Soviet Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks, June 26, 19861

On 26 June, Max Kampelman, head of the U.S. delegation at the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons, made a statement for the press in which is summed up the results of the recently completed fifth round of talks. The evaluations he expressed do not correspond to the actual state of affairs at the talks, and, therefore present it in a distorted form.2

3 Ibid., pp. 866-870.

4 Document 21.

5 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 22, No. 25 (June 23, 1986), p. 838.

Moscow TASS International Service in Russian, June 26, 1986; FBIS Daily Report, June 27, 1986, vol. III, p pp. AA1-AA2.

2 Supra.

The fact is that for the whole round there were no changes in the position of the U.S. delegation to facilitate the achievement of mutually acceptable accords on questions of preventing an arms race in space and halting it on earth. The U.S. side simply did not contribute any kind of positive proposals. It continued to block progress at the talks, adhered to its former unconstructive positions, which cannot serve as the basis for an agreement, and evaded a businesslike review of the proposals of the Soviet side. In particular, this concerns the problem of mediumrange nuclear weapons, on which the United States continues up to the present to adhere to its position of 5 years standing, which long ago became obsolete. In all three groups at the talks the USSR delegation has undertaken new and serious steps aimed at achieving very rapid progress. In the group on space weapons, in the group on strategic weapons and in the group on medium-range nuclear weapons, the Soviet delegation put forward proposals that were detailed, balanced and took account of the interests of both sides and that could form a good basis for solving, in the very near future, the problem of ending the arms race in all spheres and of radical reduction of nuclear weapons.

Thus, on the questions of strategic offensive weapons, the Soviet side fully keeps on the negotiating table its proposal for 50 percent reductions in the corresponding nuclear weapons of the USSR and the United States. We give preference to such a radical solution and we are ready to try to reach an agreement on it immediately, now.

However, at this round of the talks the U.S. side has continued stubbornly to stand on its old proposals of 1 November, last year, which only announce the aim of 50 percent reductions but which in fact envisage a sharp increase, by several thousand units, in the number of nuclear charges the United States has at its disposal at the present time.3

Taking this into account and in the interests of getting out of the impasse that has been created by the actions of the United States, the Soviet side, during the past round, put forward an intermediate option for reducing strategic offensive armaments providing for somewhat less than the 50 percent formula, but nevertheless for equivalent deep reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the sides. Such reductions could be implemented provided an accord is reached on not quitting the ABM Treaty for a minimum of 15 years. We regard it as a step toward implementing reductions of 50 percent in the corresponding nuclear armaments of the USSR and the United States.

Major proposals were submitted by the Soviet side on issues also relating to verification. We are in favor of a strict and adequate verification of the fulfillment of the undertaken commitments, if necessary right up to on-site inspection. Indeed it has become clear that the U.S. side is only talking of verification. In practice it has been in every way avoiding an objective examination of this issue too.

We are forced to note with regret that all the efforts made by the Soviet delegation to move the negotiations out of their present deadlock have not yet

received support from the U.S. delegation, and all the responsibility for the absence of positive results at the negotiations on nuclear and space armaments lies fully with the U.S. side.

115. Pakistani Paper Submitted to the Conference on Disarmament: Proposal Regarding an International Instrument To Supplement the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, June 26, 19861

1. It is evident that the need to prevent an arms race in outer space is not the exclusive preserve of the two major space Powers or of those countries that possess the capabilities to utilize outer space. The non-aligned, neutral and developing countries also have a major interest in preventing the weaponization of the zone, so that it may be preserved for peaceful and equitable uses.

2. The present and planned activities of the space Powers will not only entrench the inequitable use of outer space but also compromise its declared status as a zone of peace. The introduction of anti-satellite weapons, missile defence systems, in any guise, early warning or space-tracking radars and surface to air missiles usable in an ABM mode, would substantially erode the existing international agreements relating to outer space, in particular the Outer Space2 and Anti-Ballistic Missile3 treaties. More importantly other arms control and disarmament agreements between the two major Powers, related to the ABM treaty, may also not survive. The consequences are likely to be grave for stable relations between the two major Powers as well as for global security.

3. The entire international community has a manifest interest in seeking to amplify and improve the contemporary legal régime relating to outer space, in keeping with existing and anticipated requirements. Concentrated efforts should be made, especially through multilateral negotiations, to strengthen these juridical norms.

4. Along with other relevant bilateral and multilateral forums, the Conference on Disarmament should be enabled to commence early negotiations on comprehensive international agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space, as well as to promote multilateral co-operation in the peaceful and equitable uses of this zone.

5. Pending the realization of these global arrangements, the Conference on Disarmament should evolve interim confidence-building measures along the lines of existing proposals such as the establishment of an International Space Agency; the adoption of a moratorium on the development, testing and deployment of ASAT weapons; and establishment of the immunity of space objects. In the same context, the Conference should call upon the space Powers to share

CD/708.

2 For the text of the Outer Space Treaty, see Documents on Disarmament, 1967, pp. 38-43.

3 Ibid., 1972, pp. 197–201.

information regarding their current and prospective activities in space and to indicate their understanding of and adherence to relevant treaty obligations.

6. In consonance with the foregoing considerations, the delegation of Pakistan would propose, as an interim measure and until the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space, the adoption of an international instrument to supplement the ABM treaty with a view to ensuring that the selfrestraint accepted by the two Great Powers in the ABM treaty is not negated by acts of omission or commission by either or both of these Powers or by other technologically advanced States. Such an instrument should incorporate the following five elements:

(a) Recognize and reconfirm the importance of the United States-USSR ABM treaty in preventing the escalation of an arms race, especially in outer space;

(b) Note the commitment of the two Powers to continue to abide strictly by the provisions of this treaty, in particularly its Article V under which they have undertaken not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components of such systems that are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based;

(c) Provide a clear interpretation of the research activities permissible under the ABM treaty, not only for the two parties but also for other technologically advanced States, so as to facilitate an impartial interpretation of ambiguous aspects of the treaty such as the definition of "research" and the "use of other physical principles";

(d) Include a commitment by other technologically-advanced States not to take their own research beyond the limits accepted by the United States and the USSR; and

(e) Include a mechanism to provide for the redress of such activities that are contrary to the limitations contained in the ABM treaty.

7. The delegation of Pakistan hopes that this proposal will be given early and appropriate consideration in the CD and, in particular, by the Ad Hoc Committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

116. Statement by the U.S. Representative (Lowitz) to the Conference on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons, June 26, 19861

Mr. President, in my statement today I want to review the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. As we have passed the mid-point in the 1986 session of the Conference, it is timely to assess the current status of our work and to consider suggestions for accelerating the negotiations. Several issues that are particularly important at this stage of the negotiations also deserve our attention. It is sobering to realize that negotiations to ban chemical weapons have been under way in bilateral or multilateral form for 10 years without the conclusion of a convention. It is even more sobering to realize that during this same period the threat to international security posed by chemical weapons has gotten much

'CD/PV.365, pp. 2–8.