e. radars used as national technical means (NTM) of verification.

"Deploy" as used in Article VI of the ABM Treaty means to site or locate at a particular location. Initiation of the construction of a prohibited radar would constitute a violation of the Treaty.

The United States has detected construction of a large phased-array radar in the interior of the USSR near Krasnoyarsk. It is not located within the permitted ABM deployment area, and it is not located at an agreed ABM test range. The radar is over 700 kilometers from the USSR's nearest border-the border with Mongolia. The Krasnoyarsk radar is not directed outward toward the Mongolian border but, rather, looks inward toward the Soviet Union's northeast border4,600 kilometers away. It thus overlooks a large portion of the Soviet Union and from there toward Alaska and beyond. The radar is of a type previously characterized by the Soviet government as a radar for the early warning of missile attacks.

The Soviets claim that the Krasnoyarsk radar is for space tracking and NTM. The claim is not credible. To place that claim in perspective requires comparing the Krasnoyarsk radar's capabilities with the requirements for those missions and with existing Soviet capabilities.

There are two fundamental tasks a radar designed for tracking of space objects should perform: (1) early satellite detection; and (2) accurate satellite tracking. If the role of the Krasnoyarsk radar were primarily satellite tracking, it should be appropriately designed and oriented to improve the accuracy of the existing system of Soviet satellite tracking radars. It is not so designed or oriented. Its contribution to tracking was analyzed for many different cases of possible U.S. and Soviet satellite launches and orbits. In no case that we have analyzed did the radar at Krasnoyarsk contribute significantly to the satellite tracking accuracy that was already available from existing Soviet radars. Indeed, in most cases it contributes very little or nothing to existing Soviet space tracking capabilities. The Krasnoyarsk radar's orientation is far from that optimal for space tracking; it cannot be used to track current Soviet spacecraft during their initial (“insertion") portion of flight. Its most useful area of space coverage is already largely within the view of other more appropriately designed radars. In sum, it is not plausible that the Krasnoyarsk radar is for space tracking. In fact, we think the Soviets would certainly not build an expensive and ineffectively designed radar for this purpose to gain only a marginal increase in space-track capability.

To perform in an NTM role a radar should have the capability to monitor testing or deployment of U.S. systems limited by treaty. The capabilities, location and orientation of the Krasnoyarsk radar preclude this function.

The radar under construction near Krasnoyarsk in Siberia is disturbing for both political and military reasons. Politically, the radar demonstrates that the Soviets are capable of violating arms control obligations and commitments even when they are negotiating with the United States or when they know we will detect a violation. The 1972 ABM Treaty prohibits the Soviets from siting an ABM radar, or siting and orienting a ballistic missile detection and tracking radar, as the Krasnoyarsk radar is sited and oriented.

Militarily, the Krasnoyarsk radar violation goes to the heart of the ABM Treaty. Large phased-array radars (LPARS) like that under construction near

Krasnoyarsk were recognized during the ABM Treaty negotiations as the critical, long leadtime element of a nationwide ABM defense.

The Krasnoyarsk radar is well located for ballistic missile warning, attack assessment and ABM target acquisition and tracking. Its location provides better impact prediction data for much of the central USSR (for example, for ICBM sites) than locations along the northeastern coast. It could have major significance if it is part of a large scale future Soviet ABM deployment. This new radar closes the final gap in the combined HEN HOUSE and new large phased-array radar warning and tracking network. Together, this radar and the five others like it form an arc of coverage from the Kola Peninsula in the northwest, around Siberia, to the Caucasus in the Southwest. Its orientation and function indicate it is for ballistic missile detection and tracking-not space object tracking and NTM as claimed by the Soviets.

Finding

The U.S. Government judges that the new large phased-array radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk constitutes a violation of legal obligations under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 in that in its associated siting, orientation, and capability, it is prohibited by this Treaty. Continuing construction and the absence of credible alternative explanations have reinforced our assessment of its purposes. Despite U.S. requests, no corrective action has been taken. This and other ABM-related activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

2. Mobility of ABM System Components

The ABM Treaty explicitly prohibits the development, testing, or deployment of mobile land-based ABM systems or components, including ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, and ABM radars. The term "mobile" used in the Treaty describes components which can be readily transported from one place to another as well as components designed to be moved frequently during their service life, even if these components are not mobile in the sense of having wheels or being self-propelled. If readily transportable components were developed, it was feared that they could be used to deploy rapidly a nationwide-ABM system which is prohibited by the Treaty.

In evaluating whether an ABM component is "mobile" the ability of that component to be easily moved is more important than how many times a party has in fact moved it. Whether or not a component is mobile depends on how much time is necessary to relocate it and reestablish a fully operational capability. Judgments of the mobility of Soviet ABM components can be made without the component ever in fact being moved.

The testing or deployment of even a single mobile land-based ABM component would constitute a violation of the ABM Treaty.

The Soviet ABM program includes development and testing of interceptor missiles, the launchers for those missiles and associated radars. The Soviets have tested ABM components that are apparently designed so that they could be relocated in months rather than in terms of the years required to deploy fixed landbased systems.

The concern is that by using mobile components the Soviets could deploy a large number of ABM launchers by the early 1990s, if they make such a decision soon. Such deployments could have significant adverse impacts on the military balance.

Finding

The U.S. Government judges that evidence of Soviet actions with respect to ABM component mobility is ambiguous, but that the USSR's development and testing of components of an ABM system, which apparently are designed to be deployable at sites requiring relatively limited site preparation, represents a potential violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. This and other ABM-related Soviet actions suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

3. Concurrent Testing of ABM and Air Defense Components

Under the ABM Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that they would not give missiles, launchers, or radars, that were developed for other purposes, e.g., for air defense, the capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory nor to test them in an ABM mode.

Subsequent to the 1972 signing of the ABM Treaty, the U.S. obtained data indicating that the Soviet Union might be developing an ABM capability with non-ABM components by conducting tests involving the concurrent operation of non-ABM and ABM components. The U.S. then expressed its concern about these tests to the Soviet Union and the tests of that kind appeared to stop. However, after another relatively brief period, the U.S. again obtained data that raised concern. Following renewed detailed discussion with the Soviets, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed in the 1970s to prohibit concurrent testing of air defense components and ABM system components at the same test range. However, even after this agreement, concurrent operations appeared to

resume.

Both the U.S. and the USSR understood that air defense radars, when operated for air defense purposes or to ensure the safety of the range or as instrumentation radars for permitted purposes, would not be in violation of a prohibition on concurrent testing.

The many occasions when Soviet ABM and SAM radars were operating at about the same time, as well as the fact that these activities have persisted over the past decade, are themselves a basis for concern. This concern is heightened by the unsatisfactory response of the Soviets to U.S. requests for explanations and corrective actions. For these activities not to be violations one must accept that on each and every occasion SAM radar operation was for defense or safety of the range or as instrumentation equipment for permitted purposes. We have strong circumstantial evidence of improper Soviet concurrent testing of SAM and ABM radars.

Finding

The U.S. Government judges that the evidence of Soviet actions with respect to concurrent operations is insufficient fully to assess compliance with Soviet obligations under the ABM Treaty. However, the Soviet Union has conducted tests that have involved air defense radars in ABM-related activities. The large number and consistency over time, of incidents of concurrent operation of ABM and SAM components, plus Soviet failure to accommodate fully U.S. concerns, indicate the USSR probably has violated the prohibition on testing SAM components in an ABM mode. In several cases this may be highly probable. This and other such Soviet activities suggest the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

4. ABM Capabilities of Modern Surface-to-air Missile (SAM) Systems

The ABM Treaty sets forth two separate prohibitions on SAM systems—not to give such systems capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles and not to test such systems in an ABM mode.

When the ABM Treaty was negotiated, the potential ABM capability of air defense systems was a major concern. Clearly, the phrase "capabilities to counter" as used in the ABM Treaty was intended to have the ordinary meaning of "blocking" or "stopping" a reentry vehicle. In the context of the ABM Treaty giving a SAM system "capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles" meant giving them actual ABM capabilities.

Since virtually any air defense missile system has some level of ABM capability, the Treaty was not intended to preclude an incidental or insignificant ABM capability, but rather a meaningful or significant capability. Such a determination must ultimately be a factual determination taking into account the military significance of whatever ABM capability is present.

The U.S. believes that a SAM would be tested in an ABM mode if, for example, while guided by a radar, it was flight tested against a target vehicle which has a flight trajectory with characteristics of a strategic ballistic missile flight trajectory.

The key Soviet SAM system of concern is the SA-X-12, although concerns have existed about other Soviet air-defense systems. The SA-X-12 can engage tactical ballistic missiles in flight. Such a system with Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile (ATBM) capabilities could have many of the features one would expect to see designed into an ABM system, possibly giving it capabilities to intercept some types of strategic ballistic missile RVs. The SA-X-12 system is also mobile, further increasing our concerns.

Finding

The U.S.Government judges that the evidence of Soviet actions with respect to SAM upgrade is insufficient to assess compliance with the Soviet Union's obligations under the ABM Treaty. However, this and other ABM-related activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

5. Rapid Reload of ABM Launchers

The ABM Treaty limits the number of deployed ABM interceptor launchers and deployed ABM missiles, but does not limit the number of interceptor missiles that both sides can build and stockpile. The capability of the 100 deployed ABM launchers permitted by the Treaty could therefore be increased by stocking more than one interceptor missile per launcher and providing each launcher with a reload capability. The Treaty prohibits the development, testing or deployment of "automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload" of the permitted launchers.

The two categories of Soviet actions relevant here are discussed on the following page.

Reload and Refire Activity: Galosh

The test launchers for the Galosh ABM interceptor missiles, which are deployed around Moscow, are at the Sary Shagan Missile Test Range. Galosh interceptor missiles are loaded into above-ground launchers apparently using conventional equipment.

The Soviets demonstrated a reload and refire time for the Galosh of much less than a day.

Reload Activity: A Different ABM Interceptor at Sary Shagan

The only known test launchers for the high acceleration interceptor missile, similar to the U.S. Sprint missile developed for the inactive Safeguard ABM system, are at Sary Shagan.

Like the Galosh, the Soviets have demonstrated that a launcher for this missile can be reloaded in much less than a day.

Finding

The U.S. Government judges, on the basis of the evidence available, that the USSR's actions with respect to the rapid reload of ABM launchers constitute an ambiguous situation as concerns its legal obligations under the ABM Treaty not to develop systems for rapid reload. The Soviet Union's reload capabilities are a serious concern. These and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

6. ABM Territorial Defense

The ABM Treaty includes the obligation"... not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense..." The prohibition on the defense of "the territory of its country" means a ban on the ABM defense of the Party's national territory, which is the central purpose of the Treaty, as distinct from defending a specifically allowed region, such as Moscow. While the size of the territory that must be defended to constitute a territorial defense was not defined, this is considered to mean a defense of all or a large portion of the country.