tional situation, are of the view that now, more than ever, there is a need for taking resolute action and concrete measures aimed at ending the arms race, proceeding to effective disarmament and averting the danger of war.

They support the programme proposed by the Soviet Union for the complete and comprehensive liquidation of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction by the end of this century. They are convinced that the cessation of nuclear testing, the achievement of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of the extension of the arms race to outer space, a ban on and the liquidation of chemical weapons and other disarmament measures would be conducive to bringing about a more secure world for the peoples of Europe and the entire globe. The allied States profess a complex approach to disarmament problems and that the liquidation of weapons of mass destruction be supported by significant cuts in armed forces and conventional armaments. Along with making Europe free of nuclear weapons, the problem of the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments is acquiring an ever greater significance for the present and future of the European continent. It is on this continent that the two largest groupings of armed forces equipped with the most up-to-date armaments face each other and the destructive power of some systems of conventional armaments is growing equal to that of mass-destruction weapons. The allied States seek to ensure that concrete nuclear disarmament measures and cuts in conventional armaments and armed forces are followed by appropriate reductions in the military spending of the States.

Guided by these considerations, the Warsaw Treaty member States present these concrete proposals to all the other European States, to the United States of America and Canada. These proposals constitute a significant supplement to the programme for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, but at the same time bear an independent character, and their realization would substantially reduce the danger of war in Europe.

I.

The Warsaw Treaty member States propose a substantial reduction in the land and tactical air forces of European States and in the corresponding forces of the United States and Canada stationed in Europe. Simultaneously with conventional armaments, tactical nuclear weapons with a range of up to 1,000 kilometres should also be reduced.

The geographical zone of reduction includes the whole territory of Europe, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals.

They propose that the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe be carried out gradually at agreed times, with the military balance maintained at ever lower levels and without jeopardizing the security of any of the parties. In addition, parallel to the troops under reduction their armaments and equipment inclusive of nuclear means would also be dismantled.

As a first step, a one-time mutual reduction is proposed to be carried out in such a way that the troop strength of the countries belonging to the opposing militarypolitical alliances be cut by 100,000–150,000 troops on each side within a year or two. Cuts in tactical air forces as part of these measures would be a great significance. Immediately afterwards, given the willingness of the NATO

countries to act likewise, the Warsaw Treaty member States are ready to carry out further significant reductions, as a result of which, the land forces and tactical air forces of both military alliances in Europe would, by the early 1990s, be reduced by some 25 per cent as compared with present levels. Such reductions would affect more than half a million troops on each side, thus the opposing armed forces in Europe would be reduced by over 1 million troops.

The allied socialist States stand for continuing the process of reductions in the armed forces and armaments of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty. Significant reductions in the armed forces and armaments of the two alliances would make it possible for all the other European countries to join this process.

They propose that the components of armed forces to be reduced be demobilized in the form of equivalent larger units, units and subunits, together with their troop arms and equipment. Troops would be discharged in accordance with established procedures in the given State.

Armaments and equipment subject to reduction could be destroyed or stored on national territories in accordance with agreed procedures. Nuclear warheads should be destroyed. Certain types of military equipment could, subject to agreement, be transferred for peaceful purposes.

Funds becoming available as a result of appropriate reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments cannot be allocated to the creation of new types of weapons or to other military purposes; they should be used for the needs of economic and social development.

The States signing the Agreement on the reduction of armed forces and armaments would undertake not to increase their land forces and tactical strike air forces outside the zone of reduction.

II.

The Warsaw Treaty member States propose to work out such a system of reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments under which the process of reduction would result in a lessening of the danger of surprise attack and would contribute to the consolidation of strategic stability on the European continent. With this end in view, they propose to come to agreement at the very beginning of the process on a significant reduction in the tactical air forces of the two military-political alliances in Europe and on lowering the level of the concentration of troops along the lines of contact between the two alliances.

For the same purpose, supplementary measures would be elaborated and implemented which were suitable for strengthening the conviction of the countries of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO and the other States of Europe that surprise offensive operations would not be launched against them.

They plan to reach agreement on limiting the number and size of larger military exercises and on exchanging more detailed information about the size of forces and equipment regrouped to Europe from other regions for the period of military exercises, and on other measures facilitating the increase of mutual trust.

The implementation of measures like the establishment of nuclear and chemical weapon-free zones on the European continent, gradual reduction in the military activity of the two military alliances, the establishment of co-operation among their member States on questions of arms reduction and disarmament

would facilitate the strengthening of confidence, the creation of more favourable conditions for the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe.

III.

The reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments would take place accompanied by reliable and effective verification through national technical means and international procedures including on-site inspection.

They propose to organize, together with measures of verification for the process of reduction, the observation of the military activities of troops remaining after reductions.

Appropriate forms of verification would be applied concerning measures strengthening mutual confidence and implemented in harmony with the agree

ments.

For purposes of verification the parties will exchange, at an agreed date, data on the total troop strengths of their land forces and tactical strike air forces stationed in the zone of reduction and separately on their components to be reduced and on those not affected by the reduction. They will exchange information concerning the designation of the formations to be dismantled, their troop strength, location, and the quantity of their main types of weapons agreed upon. The parties would notify each other of the beginning and completion of the reduction.

For purposes of verification, an international consultative committee will be formed with the participation of representatives of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty as well as of interested neutral and non-aligned and other countries of Europe. On-site inspection of the reduction of armed forces and the destruction or stockpiling of armaments could be carried out, if necessary, with the involvement of representatives of the international consultative committee. For purposes of such supervision posts of control, composed of representatives of the international consultative committee, would be set up at major railway centres, airports and harbours.

IV.

The present proposals for the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe could be the subject of concrete discussion in the second stage of the conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe.

At the same time, keeping in mind the pressing urgency of taking measures to lower the level of military confrontation in Europe, the Warsaw Treaty member States would consider it possible to proceed without delay to explore the proposals presented here. To this end, they deem it possible to convene a special forum with the participation of the European States as well as the United States and Canada.

They are also prepared to widen the framework of the Vienna negotiations on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe through the inclusion of other European States and the corresponding modification of the terms of reference of those negotiations.

While expressing their readiness to make use of all possible channels and for mutually lowering the level of military confrontation on an all-European scale, they reaffirm their interest in reducing armaments and armed forces in Central Europe and come out once again for a successful conclusion of the first stage of the Stockholm Conference.

In terms of the assessment of the real intentions of military-political groupings and individual States the question of military doctrines is no less important. The mutual suspicion and distrust accumulated over many years must be dispelled, the two sides must be thoroughly acquainted with each other's problems in this regard, too. For the sake of European and world security the military concepts and doctrines of military alliances must be of a defensive character.

The Warsaw Treaty member States declare with full responsibility that they will never, under any circumstances, initiate military actions against any State, whether in Europe or in another region of the world, if they themselves are not victims of aggression. Their proposals stem from their consistent policy aimed at the elimination of the military threat, the creation of a stable and secure world, from the defensive character of their military doctrine which presupposes the maintenance of armed forces at the lowest possible level and the reduction of military capabilities to a level indispensable for defence.

The member States of the Warsaw Treaty were guided by the same peaceful intentions when they presented their proposal for the simultaneous dissolution of the two military alliances.

The member States of NATO also profess the defensive nature of their alliance. Consequently there can be no obstacle to the mutual and significant reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe.

In presenting this Appeal, the Warsaw Treaty member States set no preliminary conditions for starting the objective discussion of the proposals contained therein. They are ready to consider, in a creative spirit, other relevant proposals formulated either by the NATO member States, by the neutral and non-aligned or the other States of Europe.

105. Statement by the Principal Deputy Press Secretary to the President (Speakes): Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks, June 12, 19861

The Warsaw Pact statement regarding troop reduction was made at a Warsaw Pact meeting in Budapest yesterday. This has apparently been agreed to by Warsaw Pact leaders but has not been presented for a detailed Western review in any of the conventional arms control fora. That would be not yet in Vienna, where MBFR is being considered, or CDE in Geneva, or the Conference on Disarmament in Stockholm.

'Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, June 16, 1986, p. 787. 2 Supra.

We find the ideas, as reported, of interest and would welcome the opportunity to analyze concrete proposals embodying them. We would note, however, that the Warsaw Pact has not responded fully to a more modest, but more concrete, NATO proposal last November at Vienna for a first step toward conventional reductions. That proposal, last November, involved initial reductions of U.S. troops by 5,000 and Soviet troops by 11,500 with a 3-year, no-increase commitment on forces in the zone. Also, it called for a development of a verification regime over 3 years and the development of an agreed database on which future reductions would be calculated.3

106. Letter From Senator Gore to The New York Times: The SALT II Treaty, June 16, 19861

To the Editor:

Kenneth L. Adelman's argument in defense of the President's decision to abandon the second strategic-arms accord (Op-Ed, June 15) represents a stunning repudiation of the case once made by the Committee on the Present Danger in opposition to SALT II.2

The committee's complaint was that the treaty failed to reduce the Soviet Union's advantage in intercontinental-ballistic-missile throw-weight. Such an advantage, it was argued, would allow the Russians an option to break out of the treaty and, by quickly multiplying the number of warheads in their force, threaten us with a first-strike capability. This was the "fatal flaw" in SALT II that Mr. Reagan alleged in his campaign.

It now appears, according to Mr. Adelman, that we need never have worried about such a contingency. Why? Because scenarios involving large increases in the number of Soviet warheads are only "easily made on paper," but would be time-consuming, expensive and not especially useful militarily. Where was Mr. Adelman when we could have used these moderate counsels? He was a member of the Committee on the Present Danger.

Nobody can predict what the Russians are going to do in the absence of SALT constraints. Mr. Adelman could not have done it when he was convinced SALT was bad because it might allow a major Soviet breakout. He can't do it now that he thinks SALT is useless because a major Soviet breakout isn't worth worrying about.

All we can do is note that SALT constrained the number of ballistic-missile launchers the Russians could have at a level substantially below the number they are capable of deploying. And all we can do is note that SALT blocked the

3 Documents on Disarmament, 1985, pp. 898–899, 906–910.

'The New York Times, June 25, 1986, p. A–26. Copyright 1980 by The New York Times Company. Reprinted by permission.

2 The SALT II agreement appears in Documents on Disarmament, 1979, pp. 189 ff. ACDA Director Adelman's June 15 letter to The New York Times is not printed here. See instead his June 18 letter to members of Congress, printed post, Document 108.