-Receive simultaneously from the Parties their respective current inventories of armaments and military installations and troops under arms, in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph (b) of the FIRST STAGE in paragraph 19 of Part I, Chapter III, of this Act. -Carry out the technical studies provided for in subparagraph (c) of the FIRST STAGE in paragraph 19 of Part I, Chapter III, of this Act. -Ascertain that the Parties comply fully with the maximum limits agreed to or provisionally in effect for the various categories of armaments, military installations and troops under arms and with the reduction timetables agreed to or provisionally in effect. -Ascertain that the replenishment supplies, ammunition, spare parts and replacement equipment acquired are compatible with the inventories and registers submitted previously by the Parties and with the limits and timetables agreed to or provisionally in effect. -Verify that no new weapon systems are introduced which qualitatively or quantitatively alter current inventories of war matériel, and that weapons prohibited in this Act are neither introduced nor used. -Establish a register of all weapons transactions carried out by the Parties, including donations and any transfer of war matériel. -Verify fulfilment of the commitment by the States Parties to initiate and complete the constitutional procedures for signing, ratifying or acceding to the treaties and other international agreements on disarmament and follow-up actions directed to that end. -Receive simultaneously from the Parties the list of foreign military bases, schools and installations and verify their dismantlement, in accordance with the provisions of this Act. -Receive the census of foreign military advisers and other foreign elements participating in military and security activities and verify their withdrawal in accordance with the recommendations of the Verification and Control Commission. -Verify compliance with this Act in respect of traffic in arms and consider any reports of non-compliance. For that purpose the following criteria shall be taken into account: (1) Origin of the arms traffic: port or airport of embarkation of the weapons, munitions, equipment or other military supplies intended for the Central American region. (2) Personnel involved: persons, groups or organizations participating in the organization and conduct of the traffic in arms, including the participation of Governments or their representatives. (3) Type of weapon, munitions, equipment or other military supplies; category and calibre of weapons; country in which they were manufactured; country of origin; and the quantities of each type of weapon, munitions, equipment or other military supplies. (4) Extraregional means of transport: land, maritime or air transport, including nationality. (5) Extraregional transport routes: indicating the traffic routes used, including stops or intermediate destinations. (6) Places where weapons, munitions, equipment and other military supplies are stored. (7) Intraregional traffic areas and routes: description of the areas and routes; participation of governmental or other sectors in or consent to the conduct of the traffic in arms; frequency of use of these areas and routes. (8) Intraregional means of transport: determination of the means of transport used; ownership of these means; facilities provided by Governments, governmental and other sectors; and other means of delivery. (9) Receiving unit or unit for which the arms are destined: determination of the persons, groups or organizations to whom the arms traffic is destined. -Verify compliance with this Act with regard to irregular forces and the non-use of their own territory in destabilizing actions against another State, and consider any report in that connection. To that purpose, the following criteria should be taken into account: (1) Installations, means, bases, camps or logistic and operational support facilities for irregular forces, including command centres, radiocommunications centres and radio transmitters. (2) Determination of propaganda activities or political, material, economic or military support for actions directed against any State of the region. (3) Identification of persons, groups and governmental sectors involved in such actions. -Verify compliance with the commitments concerning terrorism, subversion and sabotage contained in this Act. -The Commission and the States Parties may request, as they deem appropriate, the assistance of the International Committee of the Red Cross in helping to solve humanitarian problems affecting the Central American countries. (d) Rules and procedures -The Commission shall receive any duly substantiated report concerning violations of the security commitments assumed under this Act, shall communicate it to the Parties involved and shall initiate such investigations as it deems appropriate. -It shall also be empowered to carry out, on its own initiative the investigations it deems appropriate. -The Commission shall carry out its investigations by making on-site inspections, gathering testimony and using any other procedure which it deems necessary for the performance of its functions. -Without prejudice to its quarterly and special reports, the Commission shall, in the event of any reports of violations or of non-compliance with the security commitments of this Act, prepare a report containing recommendations addressed to the Parties involved. -The Commission shall be accorded every facility and prompt and full cooperation by the Parties for the appropriate performance of its functions. It shall also ensure the confidentiality of all information elicited or received in the course of its investigations. -The Commission shall transmit its reports and recommendations to the States Parties and to the Governments of the Contadora Group on a confidential basis. It may make them public when it considers that that would contribute to full compliance with the commitments contained in the Act. (d) Rules of procedure -After the Commission is established, it shall draw up its own rules of procedure in consultation with the States Parties. (e) Duration of the mandate of the Commissioners -The representatives of the member States of the Commission shall have an initial mandate of two years, extendable by common agreement among the Parties, and the States participating in the Commission. (f) Establishment -The Commission shall be established at the time when the Act is signed. C. Ad Hoc Committee for Evaluation and Follow-up of Commitments concerning Economic and Social Matters (a) Composition -For the purposes of this Act, the Meeting of Ministers for Economic -The Committee shall have technical and administrative secretariat responsible for its ongoing operation; this function shall be assumed by the Secretariat of Central American Economic Integration (SIECA). (b) Functions -The Committee shall receive the annual reports of the Parties concerning -The Committee shall make periodic evaluations of the progress made in 4. Financing of the Execution and Follow-up Mechanisms (a) The Execution and Follow-up Mechanisms referred to in Part II of the Act shall be financed through a Fund for Peace in Central America. (b) The resources for that Fund shall be obtained in the form of equal contributions by the States Parties and additional contributions obtained from other States, international organizations or other sources, which may be managed by the Central American States with the collaboration of the Contadora Group. 102. News Conference Remarks by President Reagan: U.S. Policy on the SALT Agreements [Extracts], June 11, 19861 Q. Mr. President, your decision to tear up the SALT treaty by the end of the year has caused great consternation among the allies, among Members of Congress on both sides of the aisle, among others who fear that you are creating a more dangerous world. My question is: Is this decision irrevocable? And I'd like to follow up. The President. Well, Helen, I have to say that I can understand why they would be distressed with the way the news has been carried. But let me go back to what the situation really is. First of all, this treaty, which was signed 7 years ago, was never ratified—well, it was more than 7 years ago, I guess. But for 7 years there is supposed to have been this restraint and this observation of the—or observance of the treaty's terms. And for 7 years this country has been doing that. The Soviet regime, for 7 years, has been violating the restraints of the treaty.2 We found it necessary to or advisable to do away with two Poseidon submarines as we launched the last Trident. But that, I had to make plain, while it did keep us within the constraints of the SALT agreement, that wasn't the reason. Had there been no SALT agreement, we would have done away with those two submarines because or dismantled them because of the cost and the military value of them, or lack of it.3 But then what I said was that before we reached another point where this might be an issue at all, several months away, which has to do with the arming of the 131st B-52 with a new air-launch cruise missile; and in the interim period I said that we could not go on unilaterally observing the constraints while the Soviet Union violated them and gained even greater superiority over us; and that we were going to be bound from now on by the necessity of maintaining a deterrent. We're not seeking to achieve superiority over them, but we're certainly not going to let them go on increasing their superiority over us. But I said-because we have these several months before that moment comes up-that we were going to do our utmost since they themselves have talked of arms reductions-that we were going to do our utmost to see if we couldn't involve them in replacing this SALT treaty, which, first of all, was never ratified, as I said, but, second of all, would no longer be in power if it had been ratified, because it was stated for a limited period of time-that, if we could replace that with a realistic program of arms reduction, which has been my goal ever since I've been here. Now we have 'Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, June 16, 1986, pp. 780-781, 783. 2 The President is referring here to the SALT II Treaty. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1979, pp. 189 ff. 3 Document 82. the first Soviet leader, to my knowledge, that has ever voluntarily spoken of reducing nuclear weapons. And we want to follow up on that. Q. Well, it sounds like you are going to tear it up, Mr. President. Do you agree with Richard Perle, who branded as Soviet supporters Members of Congress who want to keep you within the limits of this treaty? The President. I'm not going to make any comment on anyone who wants to keep this. But I did find it rather strange that some of the Senators who spoke very critically of me, without really understanding what it is that I've tried to explain about this-some of them were Members of the Senate when they refused to ratify the treaty to begin with. The treaty was really nothing but the legitimizing of an arms race. It didn't do anything to reduce nuclear weapons or the nuclear threat. All it did was regulate how fast and how much we could continue increasing the number of weapons. So, I was always hostile to that particular treaty because it did not reduce weapons, and that's what we're going to do. But again, as I say, the Soviets have an opportunity to meet us now with regard to some of the very things they've been proposing-arms reduction. And we will observe the constraints to the same extent that the Soviet Union does. But we can't go on unilaterally observing this while they take off on their own with the violations that they've already made, and probably more to come. Q. Mr. President, if I could pursue the questions on your decision on the SALT treaty: On one hand, you're saying that the Soviets have continued to increase their superiority over us. On the other hand, you said that the treaty did not constrain either side in terms of the arms race and was one of the reasons you were not for it. It really can't be both ways. At the same time, we've had a massive defense buildup, the Reagan defense buildup. Which way is it? Have the Soviets been able to increase superiority over this period of time, or has the treaty not been able to stop them? The President. No, it hasn't been able to. The treaty actually set limits, as for example, that you could only have one new type of weapon now that you could develop that didn't exist. And they have developed two instead of one. And this was a violation. It also set numbers and figures so that it was a restraint to the extent of just not an all-out arms race with no limit on the way you could progress. But when you say about achieving, remember, we're still playing catch-up. They were building when we were dismantling. And we feel that, as I've said before, there's no way that we can allow them to reach for and get a superiority. And we don't want a superiority over them. But also we simply want to maintain enough of a deterrent that even with whatever superiority they have it won't be enough for them to take the chance on the followup action that could happen. Q. If I could just follow that up: At the same time, your own arms control director, Mr. Adelman, has said that the Soviet violations have not had any great military significance. What is the possibility now, since the violations themselves-which have been disputed by some people as to their significance-what is the possibility that by abandoning the treaty now, which is, as you just |