10. Report From President Reagan to the Congress: Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements, February 1, 19861 FOREWORD Today, many people harbor a deep concern over the Soviet Union's cheating on the arms control commitments it has willfully undertaken. Soviet violations and probable violations-as elaborated in this report-endanger the future viability of the arms control process, since compliance cannot be unilateral. For one side (the United States) to adhere and for the other side (the Soviet Union) not to adhere does not constitute real arms control at all. Rather it constitutes a dangerous form of unilateral disarmament in the guise of bilateral arms control. This state of affairs is not long sustainable. If arms control is to have meaningif it is truly to contribute to national security and to global and regional stability— all parties must fully comply with the agreements they make. While we are scrupulously complying with all our obligations, we must also be forthright where the Soviets do not comply. To be serious about arms control is to be serious about compliance. The United States Government has concluded that the USSR has violated its legal obligation under or political commitment to: -the SALT I ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement;3 -the SALT II Treaty;4 -the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons as it reflects the rules of customary international law;5 -the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention;" -the Limited Test Ban Treaty; and -the Helsinki Final Act.8 In addition, the United States Government has concluded that it is likely that the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Soviet Noncompliance, February 1, 1986. The Foreword was signed by ACDA Director Adelman. 2 The President's Report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements, January 23, 1984 [Documents on Disarmament, 1984, pp. 33–34]. The President's Unclassified Report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements, February 1, 1985 [ibid., 1985, pp. 37-40], and The President's Unclassified Report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements, December 23, 1985 [ibid., pp. 935–953]. [Footnote in source document. Citations to Documents on Disarmament added.] 3 The texts of the Treaty and Agreement appear ibid., 1972, pp. 197–204. 4 Ibid., 1979, pp. 189 ff. related actions which suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. While we remain concerned about Soviet violations of Basket I of the Helsinki Final Act and the Limited Test Ban Treaty, there is no unambiguous evidence of new 1985 Soviet violations of these two treaties. With regard to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, or the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, there also is no clear evidence of new 1985 Soviet lethal attacks that meets our strict standards of evidence. However, the Soviets clearly remain in violation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. The apparent removal of SS-16 equipment from Plesetsk during 1985 changes the status of the SS-16 which had previously been judged to have been probably deployed at Plesetsk in probable violation of the Soviet Union's legal obligation and political commitment. Nevertheless, the President's Report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements, December 23, 1985, states: The Soviet Union has thus far not provided explanations sufficient to alleviate our concerns on these issues, nor has the Soviet Union taken actions needed to correct existing violations. Instead, they have continued to assert that they are in complete compliance with their arms control obligations and commitments.10 The U.S. Government has determined that the Soviets have violated their commitments in nine cases and probably violated them in others. The following is an abbreviated summary of the findings. Specific and precise findings on each issue, with explanations, are contained in the report text. While these violations constitute a most disturbing pattern of Soviet behavior," the Soviets have adhered to many if not most provisions of the treaties to which they are a Party. However, selective compliance is not enough. Parties to agreements are required to honor all obligations and commitments. Many Soviet violations can still be remedied. We hope they are. Over the past several years, however, the Soviet Union has neither provided satisfactory explanations nor undertaken corrective actions which would bring them into full compliance with their solemn arms control obligations. The United States will continue diplomatic efforts to have the Soviet Union correct these problems. We have vigorously pressed, and will continue to press, "Soviet practices were also studied in a report to the President by the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control, an independent Presidential advisory committee. That study also concluded that the Soviets had violated many arms control obligations. (Report to the President by the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control, “A Quarter Century of Soviet Compliance Practices Under Arms Control Commitments: 1950–83 (Summary)," October 1984.) [Footnote in source document.] A summary of the report cited here has been reprinted in Documents on Disarmament, 1984, . pp. 715-725. compliance issues with the Soviets. This is done in the Standing Consultative Commission, the Nuclear and Space Talks, and through other diplomatic channels. We will continue to try to negotiate new agreements with the Soviet Union, even if they are violating existing ones, for several reasons: First, we are continuing to press the Soviet Union for clarifications, explanations and corrective action, and have made clear that we will consider proportionate and appropriate action in response to Soviet noncompliance. Second, the U.S. believes that equitable arms reduction agreements with provisions that are effectively verifiable will, if complied with, enhance stability and security. New arms control agreements, if soundly formulated and adhered to, can serve U.S. interests. We should not abandon efforts to achieve agreements that can increase U.S. and Allied security and reduce the risk of war, provided that such agreements are effective and verifiable. Third, negotiating with the Soviets does not in any way condone or ignore past Soviet behavior. Continuing to negotiate can give us leverage and is another way to try to get the Soviets to abide by existing agreements. Compliance is an issue of widespread concern throughout the U.S. Government, in the legislative as well as executive branches and among those of all political persuasions. It is a truly bipartisan issue. A group of leading Democratic Congressmen has, for example, written the Soviet leader of its concerns over Soviet violations. 12 They stated "that adherence to existing treaties is a necessity in order for future agreements to be possible." Given the importance of the compliance issue and the technical nature of much of the material which has been written about it, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has prepared this unclassified report. It spells out the obligations and actions of the Soviet Union on its major arms control commitments, and where and how the U.S. Government has determined that the USSR is in violation. In some cases where concerns have been raised over Soviet adherence to specific provisions we studied the issue and have not found the Soviets in violation, as had been feared. Of course, since this report is unclassified, much of the evidence presented in the extensive classified Presidential reports to the Congress cannot be presented here. We have tried to minimize the possible distortions and gaps in the evidence that result from the restrictions of classification and the need to protect the sources and methods of our verification capabilities. Moreover, the report makes clear that not all Soviet violations and probable violations are of equal severity, clarity, or impact. Indeed, while some of the individual violations have serious military significance others do not. Nonetheless, a continuing pattern of Soviet violations cannot help but have a long-term impact upon our national security. In addition, any violation inherently carries serious implications for arms control. The integrity of the system and sanctity of a nation's commitments are critical. So we dare not ignore even small Soviet violations much less large ones. Regardless of their particular military significance, violations jeopardize the 12 Letter by Cong. Aspin, Cong. Solarz, et al., to Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary, USSR, dated March 20, 1985. [Footnote in source document.] process and framework, particularly where there is a pattern of behavior. Failure to respond appropriately might lead the Soviets to think that they can violate their commitments with impunity. Compliance is everybody's business. The universal importance of full compliance was recently recognized by the United Nations. On December 12, 1985, the General Assembly passed by a vote of 131-0 (with 16 abstentions) a resolution on arms control compliance which: -urges all parties to arms limitation and disarmament agreements to comply with their provisions; -calls upon those parties to consider the implications of noncompliance for international security and stability and for the prospects for further progress in the field of disarmament; and --appeals to all U.N. members to support efforts to resolve noncompliance questions "with a view toward encouraging strict observance of the provisions subscribed to and maintaining or restoring the integrity of arms limitation or disarmament agreements.' "13 It is in this light that we offer our report to the American people, and to foreign audiences as well, as a useful guide while we seek to make progress in resolving compliance issues and in moving ahead on arms control in the future. ABM TREATY The Treaty Between the U.S. and the USSR on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) entered into force in 1972. The Protocol to the ABM Treaty entered into force in 1976.4 The ABM Treaty is of unlimited duration and subject to review by the Parties at 5-year intervals. The ABM Treaty and its Protocol ban deployment of ABM systems except that each Party is permitted to deploy one ABM system around the national capital area or, alternatively, at a single ICBM deployment area. However, the Treaty explicitly recognizes the existence of ABM test ranges for the development and testing of ABM systems or components for modernization and replacement. 1. The Krasnoyarsk Radar Limitations on large phased-array radars are one of the core priorities of the ABM Treaty. Large phased-array radars constitute the most critical and the longest-lead time components needed for a prohibited territorial ABM system. The ABM Treaty permits the deployment of new large phased-array radars (LPARs) as: a. ABM radars within the ABM deployment area; b. ABM radars at one of the current or additionally agreed ABM test ranges; c. radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack provided that they are located along the periphery of the deploying Party's national territory and are oriented outward; d. radars used for the purpose of tracking objects in outer space; and |