When I issued guidance on U.S. policy on June 10, 1985,8 the military plans and programs for fiscal year 1986 were about to be implemented. The amount of flexibility that any nation has in the near term for altering its planning is modest at best. Our military planning will take more time to move out from under the shadow of previous assumptions, especially in the budgetary conditions which we now face. These budgetary conditions make it essential that we make the very best possible use of our resources.

The United States had long planned to retire and dismantle two of the oldest Poseidon submarines when their reactor cores were exhausted. Had I been persuaded that refueling and retaining these two Poseidon submarines would. have contributed significantly and cost-effectively to the national security, I would have directed that these two Poseidon submarines not be dismantled, but be overhauled and retained. However, in view of present circumstances, including current military and economic realities, I have directed their retirement and dismantlement is planned.

As part of the same decision last June, I also announced that we would take appropriate and proportionate responses when needed to protect our own security in the face of continuing Soviet noncompliance. It is my view that certain steps are now required by continued Soviet disregard of their obligations.

Needless to say, the most essential near-term response to Soviet noncompliance remains the implementation of our full strategic modernization program, to underwrite deterrence today, and the continued pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program, to see if it is possible to provide a safer and more stable basis for our future security and that of our allies. The strategic modernization program, including the deployment of the second 50 Peacekeeper missiles, is the foundation for all future U.S. offensive force options. It provides a solid basis which can and will be adjusted over time to respond most efficiently to continued Soviet noncompliance. The SDI program represents our best hope for a future in which our security can rest on the increasing contribution of defensive systems that threaten no one.

It is absolutely essential that we maintain full support for these programs. To fail to do so would be the worst response to Soviet noncompliance. It would immediately and seriously undercut our negotiators in Geneva by removing the leverage that they must have to negotiate equitable reductions in both U.S. and Soviet forces. It would send precisely the wrong signal to the leadership of the Soviet Union about the seriousness of our resolve concerning their noncompliance. And it would significantly increase the risk to our security for years to come. Therefore, our highest priority must remain the full implementation of these programs.

Secondly, the development by the Soviet Union of its massive ICBM forces continues to challenge seriously the essential balance which has deterred both conflict and coercion. Last June I cited the Soviet Union's SS-25 missile, a second new type of ICBM prohibited under SALT II, as a clear and irreversible violation. With the number of deployed SS-25 mobile ICBM's growing, I now

call upon the Congress to restore bipartisan support for a balanced, cost-effective, long-term program to restore both the survivability and effectiveness of the U.S. ICBM program. This program should include the full deployment of the 100 Peacekeeper ICBM's. But it must also look beyond the Peacekeeper and toward additional U.S. ICBM requirements in the future, including the small ICBM to complement Peacekeeper. Therefore, I have directed the Department of Defense to provide me by November 1986 an assessment of the best options for carrying out such a comprehensive ICBM program. This assessment will address the basing of the second 50 Peacekeeper missiles and specific alternative configurations for the small ICBM in terms of size, number of warheads, and production

rates.

Finally, I have also directed that the advanced cruise missile program be accelerated. This would not direct any increase in the total program procurement at this time, but rather would establish a more efficient program that both saves money and accelerates the availability of additional options for the future.

This brings us to the question of the SALT agreements. SALT II was a fundamentally flawed and unratified treaty. Even if ratified, it would have expired on December 31, 1985. When presented to the U.S. Senate in 1979, it was considered by a broad range of critics, including the Senate Armed Services Committee, to be unequal and unverifiable in important provisions. It was, therefore, judged by many to be inimical to genuine arms control, to the security interests of the United States and its allies, and to global stability. The proposed treaty was clearly headed for defeat before my predecessor asked the Senate not to act on it.

The most basic problem with SALT II was that it codified major arms buildups rather than reductions. For example, even though at the time the treaty was signed in 1979, the U.S. had, and only planned for, 550 MIR Ved ICBM launchers, and the Soviet Union possessed only about 600, SALT II permitted each side to increase the number of such launchers to 820. It also permitted a buildup to 1,200 MIRVed ballistic launchers (both ICBM's and submarine launched ballistic missiles, SLBM's) even though the United States had only about 1,050 and the Soviet Union had only about 750 when the treaty was signed. It permitted the Soviet Union to retain all of its heavy ballistic missiles. Finally, it limited ballistic missile launchers, not the missiles or the warheads carried by the ballistic missiles. Since the signing of SALT II, Soviet ballistic missile forces have grown to within a few launchers of each of the 820 and 1,200 MIR Ved limits and from about 7,000 to over 9,000 warheads today. What is worse, given the failure of SALT II to constrain ballistic missile warheads, the number of warheads on Soviet ballistic missiles will continue to grow very significantly, even under the treaty's limits, in the continued absence of Soviet restraint.

In 1982 on the eve of the START negotiations, I undertook not to undercut existing arms control agreements to the extent that the Soviet Union demonstrated comparable restraint. Unfortunately the Soviet Union did not exercise comparable restraint, and uncorrected Soviet violations have seriously undermined the SALT structure. Last June I once again laid out our legitimate concerns but decided to go the extra mile, dismantling a Poseidon submarine, not to comply with or abide by a flawed and unratified treaty, but rather to give the

Soviet Union one more chance and adequate time to take the steps necessary to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. The Soviet Union has not used the past year for this purpose.

Given this situation, I have determined that in the future the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces and not on standards contained in the SALT structure, which has been undermined by Soviet noncompliance, and especially in a flawed SALT II treaty, which was never ratified, would have expired if it had been ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet Union.

Since the United States will retire and dismantle two Poseidon submarines this summer, we will remain technically in observance of the terms of the SALT II treaty until the United States equips its 131st B-52 heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of this year. However, given the decision that I have been forced to make, I intend at that time to continue deployment of U.S. B-52 heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft as an appropriate response without dismantling additional U.S. systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II treaty. Of course, since we will remain in technical compliance with the terms of the expired SALT II treaty for some months, I continue to hope that the Soviet Union will use this time to take the constructive steps necessary to alter the current situation. Should they do so, we will certainly take this into account.

The United States seeks to meet its strategic needs, given the Soviet buildup, by means that minimize incentives for continuing Soviet offensive force growth. In the longer term, this is one of the major motives in our pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative. As we modernize we will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit. I do not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S. strategic offensive forces. Assuming no significant change in the threat we face as we implement the strategic modernization program, the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles than does the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the United States will not deploy more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

In sum, we will continue to exercise the utmost restraint, while protecting strategic deterrence, in order to help foster the necessary atmosphere for significant reductions in the strategic arsenals of both sides. This is the urgent task which faces us. I call on the Soviet Union to seize the opportunity to join us now in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.

Finally, I want to emphasize that no policy of interim restraint is a substitute for an agreement on deep and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms, provided that we can be confident of Soviet compliance with it. Achieving such reductions has received, and continues to receive, my highest priority. I hope the Soviet Union will act to give substance to the agreement I reached with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva to achieve early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50-percent reductions in the strategic nuclear arms of both countries, appropriately applied, as well as an interim INF agreement. If the Soviet Union carries out this agreement, we can move now to achieve greater stability and a safer world.

83. Statement by the Principal Deputy Press Secretary to the President (Speakes): U.S. Policy on the SALT Agreements, May 27, 19861

Since the President came into office, he has done everything that he could to try to persuade the Soviet Union to meet its obligations with respect to SALT and to agree to significant reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. In 1982 he said the United States would continue not to undercut the flawed SALT agreements so long as the Soviets exercised equal restraint.2 Regrettably, the Soviets didn't.

In June 1985 the President tried again. He once again stated his great concern that Soviet noncompliance was ever more deeply undermining the SALT structure. He called upon the Soviet Union to join us in building an interim framework of truly mutual restraint until a START agreement replaces the SALT structure.3

Today the President announced that the United States cannot continue to support unilaterally a flawed SALT structure that Soviet noncompliance has so grievously undermined and that the Soviets appear unwilling to repair. Therefore, in the future, the United States will base decisions regarding its strategic forces on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by the Soviet Union, rather than on standards contained in expired SALT agreements unilaterally observed by the United States.4

The President has decided to retire two older Poseidon submarines as the eighth Trident submarine begins sea trials tomorrow. This means the U.S. will stay in technical observance of SALT for some months. This gives the Soviet Union still more time to correct their erosion of SALT. If they do, the President will take this into account.

Our attempt to use the structure of SALT as the basis for interim restraint until a START agreement can be achieved has always been based on the assumption of Soviet reciprocity. It makes no sense for the United States to continue to hold up the SALT structure while the Soviet Union undermines the foundation of SALT by its continued, uncorrected noncompliance. Therefore, the President believes we must now look to the future, not to the past. The primary task we now face is to build a new structure, one based on significant, equitable, and verifiable reductions in the size of existing U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. This is what we are proposing in the ongoing Geneva negotiations.

Until this is achieved, the United States will continue to exercise the utmost restraint. Assuming no significant change in the threat we face as we implement

1 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, June 2, 1986, p. 710. Mr. Speakes read the statement to reporters assembled in the Briefing Room at the White House during his daily press briefing, which began at 1:01 p.m.

2 Documents on Disarmament, 1982, p. 332. The SALT agreements may be found ibid., 1972, pp. 197 ff. and ibid., 1979, pp. 189 ff.

3 Ibid., 1985, pp. 333-335.

the strategic modernization program, the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or strategic ballistic missile warheads than the Soviet Union.

It is high time that the Soviets honor their obligations, match U.S. restraint, and get down to negotiating seriously in Geneva. If they do, we can move together now to build a safer and more secure world.

84. White House Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy on the SALT Agreements, May 27, 19861

Summary

The United States has completed a comprehensive review of its interim restraint policy and of the required response to the continuing pattern of Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements. Based on this review, and following consultations with the Congress and key allies, we have been forced to the conclusion that the Soviet Union has not, as yet, taken those actions that would indicate a readiness to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. Given the lack of Soviet reciprocity, the President has decided that in the future the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces and not on standards contained in the SALT II agreement of 19792 or the SALT I interim offensive agreement of 1972.3 SALT II was a flawed agreement which was never ratified, which would have expired if it had been ratified, and which continues to be seriously violated by the Soviet Union. The SALT I interim offensive agreement of 1972 was unequal, has expired, and is also being violated by the Soviet Union.

After reviewing the programmatic options available to the United States, the President has decided to retire and dismantle two older Poseidon submarines this summer. The United States will thus remain technically in observance of the terms of the SALT II agreement until we equip our 131st heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of this year. The President has determined that, given the decision that he has been forced to make by lack of Soviet reciprocity, the United States will later this year continue deployment of B-52 heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft, without dismantling additional U.S. systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II agreement.

The President has also called for: renewed bipartisan support for the Administration's full strategic modernization program including all 100 Peacekeeper ICBMs; full funding of our research under the Strategic Defense Initiative; an assessment of options on future ICBM programs, including

Department of State, Special Report No. 147, pp. 3–8.

2 Documents on Disarmament, 1979, pp. 189 ff.

3 Ibid., 1972, pp. 202-204.