1970s, the technological trend was clearly toward instability-particularly on the Soviet side. The Soviets moved deliberately toward the accumulation of heavy land-based missiles with accurate warheads, capable of striking preemptively at hard targets in the United States. They moved, in other words, in the direction of accumulating sufficient numbers of such weapons to have a first-strike arsenal that threatens our retaliatory force.

But at present, the technological trend seems to be in a different direction. Systems like the air-launched cruise missile are effective mainly as second-strike systems. These missiles fly slower; they are easy to disperse and conceal; they are useful largely for retaliation.

There is a third hopeful development, and that is the Strategic Defense Initiative. Here is another field where technology holds out great hope for a more stable world. The fact is that in the 10 years or so since we last debated the subject of defensive systems in this country, we have witnessed a technological revolution whose consequences and implications we simply cannot ignore. No one in this city needs to be reminded of the astonishing transformation in our lives that has been sparked by circuits etched on chips of silicon. It seems to me that it is only reasonable to ask-as the President asked in his speech of March 23, 1983-whether, in the wake of this technological revolution, we are condemned to live in a permanent state of vulnerability to nuclear destruction. It seems to me we are obliged to ask whether the same discoveries which have allowed us, even in the past 10 years, to shrink room-size computers down to laptop scale may not make it possible one day to erect a system of defenses capable of shielding us from preemptive attack. Ten years ago, such an idea seemed implausible; but anyone who takes an honest view of the new technologies we have at our disposal has to wonder whether such an idea is so implausible today.

We do not yet have a definitive answer to these questions, but the outlook is optimistic and it is imperative that we continue investigating.

SDI's Contribution to Arms Control

Now I'm aware, of course, that some people argue that the interests of SDI and arms control are opposed. This argument seems to me to rest on a fundamental misunderstanding both of the Strategic Defense Initiative and of arms control. Once again, people are afflicted by a kind of tunnel vision.

We don't yet know exactly how effective a defensive system we may be able to deploy. But if you return to the broad, basic concepts of arms control and to the precise definition of "stability," you will see very quickly that a survivable, cost-effective system-even an imperfect one-will enhance stability. How? By making preemptive attack more complicated, more difficult to execute. That, remember, is the essence of technical "stability"--to reduce the incentives for surprise attack. An attacker bent on preempting has to have confidence in his ability to destroy a large percentage of the defender's retaliatory force and other military assets. Planning of this kind is vastly complicated and confused when reasonably effective defenses are in place. Survivable defenses would enhance

5 Documents on Disarmament, 1983, pp. 199-201.

stability by making a preemptive attack a lot more difficult to execute. In fact, if you think about it, you will realize that it would be difficult to design such defenses that failed to enhance stability in this fashion.

But what about the argument that SDI will accelerate the arms race? This argument, too, is based on some questionable premises. In the first place, let's be clear about something. In 40 years of arms control negotiations, the Soviet Union has yet to reduce its offensive arsenal. In 40 years of arms control negotiations, the Soviet offensive arsenal has continued to grow. Why? Part of the reason may be that the Soviets have never had a real incentive to reduce their offensive weapons; they have always calculated that they would gain more by building offensive weapons than by not building them. So even when we conspicuously slowed down our modernization program in the 1970s, hoping the Soviets would do the same, implicitly inviting the Soviets to do the same, the Soviet program continued to increase-indeed, for a while it speeded up.

Now, it seems to me that defensive systems, if they prove survivable and costeffective in this way, may provide just the incentive that has been missing, just the incentive that is necessary to bring about reductions in offensive arsenals. Why? Because in the presence of effective defenses, offensive weapons become considerably less valuable. If defenses prove technologically feasible and both sides were to move to a mixture of defensive and offensive systems, both sides would be faced with a choice: they could invest in expanding their offenses, or they could invest in expanding their defenses. Both sides will be faced with the same question: they will have to ask themselves which contributes more to their security-a better offense or a better defense?

The point is that if defensive technologies are comparatively effective, there will be a strong incentive to shift resources into defensive systems, since that is where security would lie. If resources are shifted into defenses and out of offenses, it follows that the world is going to become a safer place. The cause of arms control of stability in the broad sense-will be served. With effective defenses in place, it may become possible-we hope it would become possiblefinally to convince the Soviets to make the real reductions in arsenals we have wanted all along.

There's another problem that we have tried to solve with arms control negotiations that SDI may alleviate, and that is the problem of accidental launch. We have done a great deal by means of technology and negotiation to attempt to minimize the chances of a purely accidental launch. But it seems to me we all would feel a bit safer if there were a system capable of intercepting a missile accidentally launched at one of our cities.

Broadening Our Arms Control Dialogue and Understanding

There is a fourth and final development that bodes well for arms control in the larger sense. Under this Administration, there has been a deliberate broadening of our arms control dialogue with the Soviet Union. In addition to the traditional discussion of the bean count of weapons on both sides, we have tried to explore with the Soviets some of the underlying concepts of our strategic relationshipthe relation between offense and defense, the concept of stability, the kinds of circumstances that could contribute to war, and the spread and use of chemical

weapons. These are all important issues. In recent years there has been an unhealthy, almost monomaniacal focus on the significance of weapons totals, on the numbers. The broader areas I mention must remain a part of the arms control picture.

None of this is to suggest that we should be any less serious in our efforts to negotiate specific agreements with the Soviets to reduce weapons and stabilize the nuclear balance. But let's not forget that an agreement requires serious bargaining by both sides. To achieve progress at this point, the Soviets need to reorient themselves away from the press room toward the confidential negotiations. We need to see some serious bargaining on the issues; we need to see from the Soviets new positions that take the security needs of both sides into account instead of the one-sided positions they have put forward so far. Diligence and flexibility on the part of our negotiators will avail nothing until the Soviets engage in serious negotiation where the action is-and that is in the conference room, behind closed doors. The ball is in their court; and frankly, it would be nice if, instead of giving press conferences and making announcements all the time, they would play a little more tennis.

But while the success of arms control may be advanced by new agreements, it obviously depends upon more than agreements. We Americans need to broaden our understanding of arms control. That is the message I would like to leave you with today. We need to take into account all the factors that affect stability and the preservation of peace-not only the agreements we conclude with the Soviets but the level of regional conflict, the overall strength of deterrence, the cohesion and confidence of our alliances, the promise of technology itself.

Viewed in this broad light, the prospects of arms control, of long-run stability, are not at all dark but, indeed, quite optimistic. Look around you. The tide of history is turning in favor of peace, of global stability, and of the prosperity of free peoples. Most of the insurgencies in the world today are not, as was true a decade ago, communist insurgencies that are the seedbeds of tyranny and persecution but democratic uprisings that are the fountainheads of freedom. The economies setting the pace of world growth and development today are free economies. Freedom is on the march—not on the run. In every corner of the globe, new democracies are flowering. In the West, where formerly there was Spenglerian doom, there is a renewal of confidence and of hope.

History is with us. If we are prudent about the requirements of stability, about arms control in both the narrow and the largest senses, there is no doubt that we can control the nuclear menace; if we are ingenious enough technologically, perhaps some day we can radically reduce it. But we must keep our eyes attuned to the broad vision-not simply parchment security, but real security. It is in these broad terms that we must evaluate the future, for it is in these broad terms that the foreign policy legacy of this Administration will be judged.

78. Israeli Reply to the UN Secretary-General: Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, May 16, 19861

1. As is well known, Israel supports the establishment of a nuclear-weaponfree zone in the Middle East on the basis of arrangements directly and freely arrived at between the States of the region. This position is a matter of United Nations record and was restated in our letter dated 13 June 1985 (A/40/383).2 2. A dimension of this subject which merits closer attention relates to the context in which the nuclear-weapon-free zone may be established and its wider implications for regional peace and security.

3. The Middle East, as a region, is plagued with mistrust and suspicion. The numerous conflicts within and between States have resulted in hostilities and wars. The lack of stable and open channels for normal State intercourse and for dialogue between all the States in the region serves to exacerbate existing tensions and conflicts. It is precisely because of these conflicts and tensions that the creation of an effective and credible nuclear-weapon-free zone would inspire trust and actively promote confidence between all States concerned.

4. Israel believes that direct negotiations to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in our area, based on the precedents of Latin America and the South Pacific and especially on the recommendation of the Palme Commission (United Nations document A/CN. 10/38 of 8 April 1983),3 would be a major confidencebuilding measure. While there are, as mentioned, political and other differences between the States concerned, this should not be seen as an obstacle to the convening of such negotiations but rather their primary justification.

5. Should the States in the region be willing to participate in such an initiative, the implications for a wider regional dialogue would be considerable. This would constitute a significant step in reducing tensions and reconciling differences in this turbulent region. It thus becomes apparent that a mutually binding nuclearweapon-free zone designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons could be of crucial importance in creating an atmosphere of peaceful coexistence and precluding conventional wars.

6. In addition, the arrangements could promote economic, scientific and technological development of all peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

7. Alternative approaches regarding the establishment of a nuclear-weaponfree zone, such as a series of unilateral declarations purporting to bring a nuclearweapon-free zone into existence in the region, would not appear to have any practical or legally binding effect. Above all, this approach cannot engage any of the complex issues, factors and aspects that would require clarification and negotiation in order to establish the appropriate framework for an effective and credible nuclear-weapon-free zone. Nor would this approach in any way harness the considerable potential that a nuclear-weapon-free zone could have for the development of the region.

A/41/465, pp. 4-5.

2 Printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1985, pp. 355–356.

3 Ibid., 1983, p. 253.

8. These, then, are the essential advantages of a negotiated nuclear-weaponfree zone to which Israel attaches great significance.

9. Israel once again takes this opportunity to reiterate its willingness to participate in direct negotiations for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone without pre-conditions before more valuable time is lost.

79. Communique of the Contadora Core Four Delegations, May 18, 19861

The Plenipotentiary Representatives of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras to the joint meeting of the Contadora Group and Central American Countries taking place on the 16, 17, and 18 of this month in Panama City, inform the media of the following;

-That in the course of these negotiations the pending issues of "military maneuvers” and “armaments and military personnel" were discussed; -That also in the course of these negotiations, proposals were presented by the Contadora Group, Nicaragua and Honduras as well as a joint proposal by Guatemala and Costa Rica;

-That this last proposal, which involves a novel plan for disarmament and the reduction of armaments and military personnel, was also supported at the end of the negotiating session by delegations from El Salvador and Honduras, forming a consensus of four countries;

-That this proposal offers the possibility of entering into a real, direct, simple and just negotiation providing maximum freedom to the Central American States to fulfill their security needs and, at the same time, avoid the creation of an endless arms spiral;

-That this same proposal eliminates the imprecise criteria and excessively variable and subjective elements existing in prior proposals that had made it practically impossible to negotiate equitably; and -That the Nicaragua delegation proposed that all negotiations concerning limitation of arms and military personnel take place after the signing of the (Contadora) Act,2 which would result in a problematic, uncertain and undefined negotiation after the signing (of the Act) and would also leave the relevant clause of the Act in an imprecise and undefined form; (The delegations) express the willingness of their Governments to: First: achieve a reduction in tension in the area through a valid agreement concerned with disarmament, reduction of armaments and military personnel and regulation and limitation of military maneuvers;

Second: arrive at a rational equilibrium concerning disarmament limits in the area that will restore confidence between the parties;

Third: comply with the contractual agreements from the time that they go into effect;

1 ACDA files.

2 Documents on Disarmament, 1984, pp. 662–676.