Images de page
PDF
ePub

73. Statement by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Crowe) Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Nuclear Testing Issues, May 8, 19861

I do appreciate this opportunity to contribute to your deliberations on various proposals to ban the testing of nuclear weapons. My statement, which we have just mentioned, does address the issue of testing broadly and, I believe, comprehensively, with emphasis on linkages between testing and deterrence, the prime mission of our nuclear forces.

To begin, I share the view of many on this committee that the world would be better off without nuclear weapons. But, until that occurs, some of us more or less have to mind the store, making sure that we have a nuclear deterrent as reliable and as credible as we can make it, with minimum risk to our national security. As Secretary Weinberger stated in his fiscal year 1987 report to the Congress, we seek to prevent war by persuading potential adversaries that the cost of attacking us will exceed any gain that they could hope to achieve. This is the core of our defense strategy today, as it has been for most of the postwar period.

I am not sure that the Soviet military establishment looks at deterrence in exactly the same context.

I know that we and they approach the strategic balance in different ways. For their part, the Soviet Union takes a very robust and multifaceted approach toward this balance. It has over the course of time acquired an unusually large number and a wide mix of offensive nuclear forces:

An air defense system, with extraordinary radar coverage and interceptor density around the nation's periphery;

The world's only operational ABM system, featuring interceptor missiles with both conventional and nuclear warheads;

An antisatellite system operational for more than two decades, including missiles with a conventional warhead designed to blast satellites out of the sky; A shield of earth, rock, concrete and steel around many of their nuclear forces, coupled with a concurrent program hardening command, control, and communications facilities and equipment; and

A heavy emphasis on damage limitation through civil defenses.

Thus, while the Soviet Union has pursued a comprehensive nuclear testing program over time, that program-and I want to stress this-is only one component of a military strategy forged around a massive array of offensive and defensive forces.

For our part, we have never tried to emulate the Soviet fortress mentality; nor do we replace our strategic offensive forces at the same pace as one sees in the Soviet Union.

Instead, we historically have let our deterrent rely heavily on the incremental modernization of existing launch platforms, with recurring emphasis on nuclear weapon technologies. To illustrate this point:

1 Nuclear Testing Issues: Hearings... (S. Hrg. 99–937), pp. 3742.

Over the years, we could have emphasized large ICBM's and megatonnages in warheads. Instead, we leaned toward more accurate missiles and new warheads of lower yields.

We might have moved more quickly toward an entirely new design for our ballistic missile submarines, featuring larger tubes or more missiles per submarine, or a larger inventory of SSBN's. Instead, we applied the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle solution, the MIRV solution, in other words. Similarly, in the mid-1970's, a decision not to replace the aging B-52's was accompanied by the development of an entirely new weapon system centered around cruise missiles.

For better or worse, many of these decisions were made on the basis of fiscal constraints. Sometimes they were accompanied by an illusion that nuclear disarmament was just around the corner. In any event, improvements to our systems placed proportionately greater emphasis on weapons, rather than the proliferation of basic platforms. This, in turn, has led us to rely, and to rely heavily, on a comprehensive nuclear testing program.

Today, of course, we are forced to replace aging platforms with a new Trident submarine, the B-1 bomber, and the Peacekeeper.

We fully expect that these new platforms will be around for a long time, barring some major initiative, a successful initiative, in arms control. They will be, in that event, the mainstay of our nuclear deterrent force. In turn, we must retain the flexibility to make incremental improvements in weapon systems designs and validation of such designs through the Nuclear Testing Program in order to insure that these systems remain an effective and credible deterrent.

At this point, let me say just a few words about Soviet policy on nuclear testing. In general, the Soviet Union has been reaching for the high ground in political and social propaganda, condemning in particular the United States program. In reality, however, I would argue that their nuclear disarmament proposals of midJanuary2 do not contemplate a worldwide ban on nuclear testing until the late 1990's-more than a decade from now.

In the interim, these proposals suggest only that the United States and Soviet Union join in a moratorium or delay in nuclear testing-an arrangement which can be broken and which, in fact, worked very much to our disadvantage in 1961, when the Soviets broke out of a 3-year moratorium with the most intensive Nuclear Test Program in history. Even their recent suspension of nuclear testing seems to have been a temporary political expedient. They are now gearing up for resumption of such tests.

As a whole, the Soviet nuclear disarmament proposals of mid-January serve their security interests, not ours. We should, of course, not expect otherwise. But, even if we are able to find a more equitable road to nuclear disarmament, that road will have its own asymmetries, uncertainties, and potential instabilities in the East-West military balance.

As the process evolves, both sides can be expected to place a premium on the survivability, reliability, and effectiveness of that last component of their nuclear

2 Document 5.

capability. In this regard, General Secretary Gorbachev was correct when he noted, "the interrelationship between offensive and defensive arms is so obvious as to require no proof." What he did not mention are some very obvious efforts by the Soviet Union to strengthen such linkages within their own force structure, including, but certainly not limited to, an Earth and space shield for many of their nuclear strike forces, national command structure, and communications assets. For deterrent purposes, it is absolutely essential that we be able to place such protected targets at risk. To do this, we must be able to perfect our own nuclear weapons, as necessary, and that, in turn, requires continuity within the Nuclear Testing Program.

We also face major uncertainties surrounding the mix of launch vehicles apt to evolve from a nuclear disarmament process. We don't know whether the Soviets will emphasize mobile or hardened ICBM's, more dispersed and sheltered bombers, or ballistic missile submarines, some of which may be berthed in coastal tunnels. In any event, uncertainties surrounding the evolving mix and location of Soviet offensive forces underscore the importance of remaining flexible in weapon system design and validation of such designs through testing. Last, the whole process of eliminating nuclear weapons on a worldwide basis is fraught with extraordinary problems of compliance and verification. We do not know, in the first instance, whether nuclear disarmament is an achievable proposition by the year 2000. Further, we have no way of knowing whether a nuclear disarmament treaty, even one pursued diligently by the United States and the Soviet Union, will capture the last weapon on Earth. Thus, we will have to maintain a deterrent to nuclear attack right down to the last moment, and, from a United States and allied security perspective, we want that deterrent to be as effective and credible as possible. Nuclear testing, I would suggest, or argue, is required to guarantee this.

To put all of this into perspective:

A comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, now or later, will contribute absolutely nothing to nuclear disarmament. By itself, it will not eliminate a single nuclear weapon.

Conversely, continuation of a comprehensive Nuclear Testing Program can assure that we go down the road of nuclear disarmament with minimum degradation in the safety, security, survivability, reliability, and flexibility of our nuclear deterrent, and, in turn, minimum risk to our national security as well as the security of our allies.

Thus far, I have focused upon the strategic and military requirements for nuclear testing. Let me now turn to the technical side.

In general, the design, development, and storage of nuclear weapons demand the highest standards in safety and security. We can never afford to rest on our oars. Similarly, we must ensure that all of the complex mechanisms of achieving safety and security do not, in some unexpected fashion, degrade the reliability of that weapon as part of our strategic nuclear deterrent. We can completely satisfy

3 Documents on Disarmament, 1985, p. 561.

ourselves on that score only by maintaining in some fashion a Nuclear Testing Program.

Given a strong emphasis on product safety and reliability in the United States, I, frankly, do not understand why Congress would want to suspend testing on one of the most critical and sophisticated elements of our nuclear deterrent, namely, the warhead.

With respect to weapons reliability and effectiveness, we are dependent upon the testing program in five distinct ways.

It gives us confidence in our existing stockpile of nuclear weapons. Our fervent hope is that we will never have to use such weapons. But, like other systems not used over many years, we must be sure that they will perform as designed, and that any potential adversary be aware of this fact. That's the heart of deterrence. It provides information essential to the effective employment of nuclear weapons confidence that the right weapon is applied to the right target. The lethality of nuclear weapons, theirs and ours, against hardened targets is one of our major concerns. So, too, is the expected survival and performance of such weapons in a nuclear environment, featuring the synergistic effects of blast, high intensity radiation, and electromagnetic pulse.

It enables us to determine critical nuclear effects on such nonnuclear systems as surveillance, command, control, and communications systems. It is imperative that we continue to explore the nature of the entire spectrum of nuclear effects problems and develop fixes to deal with them as long as we have to rely on equipment that must function in a nuclear environment.

It helps us to verify that a weapon modified for reliability, security, or safety reasons, or a weapon tailor-made for a new delivery system, such as cruise missiles, the Peacekeeper, or the Trident D-5, will emerge as a reliable and effective component of our nuclear deterrent forces. At one time, for example, we had to recall all of the Polaris warheads because of reliability problems which degraded the inventory effectiveness by as much as 75 percent. Only nuclear testing allowed us to verify that Polaris modifications had solved the problem.

It helps us design new weapons of smaller size and weight for a given yield. For years, the United States has led the world in this aspect of nuclear technology with considerable savings in the size and cost of delivery systems. But each new delivery system and its associated weapon requires thorough testing before it can be counted as part of our strategic or tactical nuclear deterrent.

At the same time, I would emphasize that, while I do not want to go into the details, it is not uncommon for these tests to produce technical surprises— something not predicted in either simulations or computer-based analyses. These surprises can impact any one or all of these areas: Reliability; weapons stockpile or deployment; physics studies of new concepts; or safety considerations.

Last, but not least, let me say a few words about verification and compliance. It is clearly our biggest problem in arms control negotiations with the Soviets, whether we are talking about launchers, weapons, or testing. We would like, of course, for them to be more open, more amenable to objective verification methods. They remain very closed, and, as the Chernobyl accident demonstrated, very loath to share unvarnished data with technical experts from the United States or even from Europe.

These verification problems are compounded by a Soviet Government which sees itself in a continuing military struggle for world power and influence. On the one hand, they have shown a rather clear pattern of exploiting loopholes in any arms control arrangement, and even breaking out of existing agreements in order to continue this struggle. On the other hand, they want us to leave compliance issues surrounding nuclear testing to good faith.

I, frankly, doubt that the Kremlin will ever be able to square this circle. Thus, we must assure that verification and compliance mechanisms surrounding any nuclear testing arrangement be as direct, straightforward and objective as possible.

To sum it up, I believe that the United States way of managing its nuclear deterrent and the strategic balance is far less burdensome on our society and our economy than the Soviet way. But you must recognize that our approach to nuclear deterrence puts a premium on high technology rather than brute force. So, too, does our effort to develop a strategic defense, unaccompanied by a government and a people digging in for survival.

In defense planning, we are drawn toward nuclear testing by one simple fact: We expect to achieve deterrence from a relatively small mix of strategic nuclear forces likely to be in service for a long period of time. To maintain that effectiveness and credibility over time, we must have a weapons modernization and maintenance program supported by rigorous underground testing-the only environment left to us. We cannot assume, even in view of the Soviet proposals, that nuclear disarmament is just around the corner.

For something as exotic and potentially lethal as a nuclear weapon, such testing also is embedded in the highest standards of safety, security, and survivability, as well as reliability. We should regard with the utmost concern any suggestion that we could allow our nuclear weapons stockpile to "gracefully" degrade over time.

Further, virtually everything about the nuclear disarmament process-asymmetries, uncertainties, and potential instabilities in the evolving military balance-suggests that a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing should only occur toward the end, rather than at the beginning, of this process. Certainly this is the case for the United States and its allies, if not for the Soviet Union.

As a bottom line, I sincerely believe we stand a better chance of achieving nearterm progress in nuclear disarmament with less damage to our national security by approaching weapons reductions directly, rather than obliquely through a comprehensive test ban. The United States has formally proposed such reductions in both theater systems and strategic systems. The Joint Chiefs of Staff fully support these proposals and would enthusiastically welcome a constructive response by the Soviets to them. It has not been forthcoming as yet.

« PrécédentContinuer »