proved to be unacceptable not only for the Soviet Union but also for a considerable majority of other participants of the negotiations.

We, however, have introduced our proposals not to produce deliberate deadlocks. On the contrary, the goal of our proposals is to ensure the effective and indeed realistic verification of the observance of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, with full respect for the sovereign rights of States Parties to the future Convention.

It is stated in the Message of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, M.S. Gorbachev, addressed to the Conference on Disarmament that the Soviet Union proposes that the unduly protracted negotiations to conclude a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons should be vigorously advanced. Seeking to accelerate the talks on that issue, the Soviet delegation has introduced today a number of new proposals that make it possible to remove the differences that have existed until now.

65. Newspaper Article by Senator Mathias: Nuclear Testing, April 23, 19861

Each new nuclear bomb test is conducted at the cost of an opportunity to end nuclear testing. Two weeks ago, when we exploded another nuclear bomb under the Nevada desert, we did so despite Soviet announcements that they would end their eight-month moratorium unless the United States demonstrated similar restraint. Yesterday, we conducted another test, moving the Soviets still closer towards a resumption of nuclear testing.

This latest episode is just another example of the lack of progress on the testban issue. Indeed, the prospects of obtaining a comprehensive test-ban treaty seem more remote today than when I came to Congress 25 years ago. This backsliding has occurred despite vast improvements in technologies to verify compliance with such a treaty and a change in the Soviet position.

The barrier to progress is no longer a lack of verification technology, but a deliberate policy. This administration is the first since the dawn of the nuclear age that refuses to search for a means to eliminate nuclear testing. If the Soviet proposals are mere propaganda ploys as the administration asserts, why not test their sincerity? What really concerns some current strategists is the possibility that the Soviet Union is serious about eliminating nuclear testing. So the world is confronted with a curious and confusing role reversal in which we are speaking the lines the Russians used to speak, and they are speaking ours.

By overwhelming majorities in both houses, the Congress has called upon the President to: (1) endorse the still unratified 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty that limits nuclear tests to yields below 150 kilotons2 and (2) immediately resume negotiations with the Soviet Union to eliminate all nuclear testing. Communities

5 Document 19.

'The Sun (Baltimore), April 23, 1986. Sen. Mathias (R.; MD) was a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

and church groups around the country have passed similar proclamations. But the administration has ignored these messages.

Despite new CIA calculations that cast considerable doubt on administration allegations that the Soviets have violated the 150-kiloton threshold of the treaty, the administration still refuses to support the treaty. It has withheld support for ratification on the grounds that improved verification procedures are necessary to monitor compliance. But the treaty itself provides for the exchange of useful verification information upon ratification.

The administration's response to the second step called for by the Congressthe immediate resumption of comprehensive test-ban negotiations-has been equally unsatisfactory. It has answered repeated Soviet offers to negotiate by conducting more nuclear tests. In taking these actions the administration has chosen to ignore three treaties that commit the superpowers to pursue negotiations towards a complete ban on nuclear testing. To refuse to even talk about the issue is to raise a question about the credibility of our commitment.

The administration has refused to resume negotiations on the grounds that a test ban: (1) is not sufficiently verifiable, (2) reduces stockpile reliability, and (3) inhibits the development of new nuclear weapons. I will address each of the criticisms.

Verifiability: As far back as 1963 President Kennedy determined that a comprehensive test ban treaty was verifiable if the Soviet Union would agree to an adequate number of on-site inspections.3 During talks from 1977 to 1980 a similar assessment was made. At that time the Soviets agreed to accept in-country tamper-proof seismic boxes and on-site inspections. The two sides were close to agreement before the talks were suspended for political reasons. These historical examples reveal that our technical capacity to verify compliance is not at issue. The real issue is whether or not the U.S. and U.S.S.R. can work out acceptable arrangements so that we can use our verification capabilities to monitor compliance. But we can't work out verification arrangements if the administration refuses to talk.

Stockpile Reliability: The weakness of their verification arguments has forced treaty opponents to search for new objections. The most fashionable new claim is that testing is necessary to insure the continued reliability of our existing nuclear warheads. However, the fact is that only a small fraction of the tests are conducted for this purpose. Furthermore, there are non-explosive means of confirming reliability. As the former director at Los Alamos, Norris Bradbury, has testified, "It has been rare to the point of non-existence for a problem revealed by the sampling and inspection program to require a nuclear test for its resolution." Even if confidence in the reliability of Soviet and U.S. warheads did diminish over time, it would strengthen deterrence by lowering the confidence either side could have of conducting a successful attack.

Building New Warheads: The claim that continued testing is required to maintain the reliability of existing warheads diverts attention from the administration's primary reason for opposing a test ban-the fact that testing is

3 Cf., ibid., 1963, pp. 181–182, 193–194, 250–257.

+ Ibid., 1978, p. 508.

required for the development of new kinds of warheads. Of course a major objective of a test ban is to prevent just this sort of development and thereby inhibit the growth of destabilizing weapon systems. The deployment of faster, more accurate nuclear weapons increases the risk of nuclear war by forcing both sides to decide in a crisis whether to launch their nuclear weapons or risk losing them in an attack. The development of MIRVed (multiple-warhead) missiles, which most experts believe have been one of the most destabilizing factors in the nuclear arms race, might have been prevented if the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had agreed to a comprehensive test ban treaty in the 1960s.

The case in favor of a nuclear test ban is compelling. Not only will such a ban inhibit the technological arms race between the superpowers, but, by setting an international example, it can slow down the proliferation of nuclear weapons. For these reasons the administration's unyielding position on the test ban should not go unchallenged. The American people-through their elected representatives in Congress-have sent a message to the president. It is time for him to endorse the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and resume negotiations for a comprehensive test ban. In this nuclear age we cannot afford to adopt a casual attitude towards nuclear testing. The time to act is now.

66. Statement by the Australian Representative (Butler) to the Conference on Disarmament: Nuclear Test Ban, April 24, 19861

Australia wants a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and, like many others, it wants it urgently. The treaty we envisage would have a scope ensuring that all nuclear test explosions are banned. This would apply to tests by all States, in all environments, for all time. Such a treaty would have to be durable. It would have to stick and thus it would have to include mechanisms for the verification of compliance with it. We want this treaty because we know that it would serve as an important step towards bringing about an end to the nuclear arms race. We also know that it would further strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation régime. The desirability of this treaty has been recognized by the world community for almost 25 years, including by States possessing nuclear weapons.

A recent major expression of Australia's national policy towards a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty was given in a resolution we co-sponsored at the fortieth session of the General Assembly, resolution 40/81. That resolution expressed our belief that a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty can and should be worked on in this single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. This belief is basic to our continuing support of the draft mandate for an ad hoc committee under item 1 of our agenda, as contained in document CD/521.2

CD/PV. 359, pp. 24-28.

2 Document CD/521, submitted by Australia, Japan, and the NATO members of the CD July 20, 1984, calls for the ad hoc committee to examine the specific issues relating to a comprehensive test ban, including those of scope and verification and compliance, with a view to the negotiation of a treaty on the subject.

Some members of this Conference have withheld consensus on that draft mandate on the ground that it does not constitute, what they call, a “full negotiating mandate". We are, frankly, uncertain as to the meaning of that assertion in concrete terms. What is concrete, and of irreducible significance, is that this Conference works on the basis of consensus. The notion of consensus rests upon one of the supreme political and social values-mutual tolerance. This means tolerance of differences and the resolve that those differences will be discussed and not permitted to block progress towards our common goals.

This introduces Australia's basic arms control philosophy. Simply, we know that nothing of value or of enduring significance in the field of arms control and disarmament can be wished into existence or can be forced upon States by declaration or fiat. We know that the only way that enduring, reliable arms control agreements can be achieved is through the negotiation of such agreements. We must enter into the matters of substance which divide us because we all agree on one central proposition-they are important. Negotiation in the highly sensitive field of disarmament means that the interests of all parties must be taken into account and that agreements must be so structured including with regard to their verification, that they can be a source of confidence and thus endure in their application. I repeat, no one can declare a disarmament agreement into existence and no one can ram an agreement down anybody's throat. We must work together acknowledging the differences that bring us together.

A comprehensive test-ban treaty could be worked on bilaterally or trilaterally or by a slightly larger number of States. But in our firm view, because of the universal significance of this subject and because of the desirability of universal adherence to any such treaty, it would be best worked on within this single multilateral disarmament negotiating body. Under our present rules and methodologies for the conduct of such negotiation it appears that we need a specific mandate.

Certain member States of this Conference believe, in good faith, that it is essential for the work in this field to be defined by a specific kind of mandate rather than, for example, the generic mandate that is provided to the Conference, as a whole, pursuant to paragraph 120 of the Final Document.3 In some ways my Government regrets this, but accepts it as a practical fact of life.

Having said that I would want it to be clear that, in our view, in the Australian view, there is nothing, I repeat nothing, sacred about mandates. What is of vastly greater importance is getting our work under way, and there is no subject on our present Conference agenda on which this reality is clearer than it is with respect to item 1. Because of our national policy towards a comprehensive nuclear test ban, and because we see nothing irrevocable or sacred about mandates as such, it will be clear to all that Australia could accept another form of mandate other than that provided for in document CD/521. But this is not the point. The only point, in fact the acid test for Australia is this. Will a given mandate permit us to move towards the objective in a way that the commitment and the interests of all

3 I.e., the Final Document of the UN General Assembly's First Special Session on Disarmament, which is printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1978, pp. 411 ff.

in the Conference can be engaged? The answer with respect to the draft mandate in document CD/521 is a resounding yes.

That mandate will permit this Conference to do precisely what it ought to doto begin practical work towards bringing into existence a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty banning all nuclear tests, by all States, in all environments, for all time. That mandate was itself the product of careful negotiation in which flexibility was shown and real concessions were made. That mandate is capable of engaging the commitment and interest of all. It is supported sincerely by its co-sponsors. It is not a smokescreen. Australia's name would not be on it if these were not the facts.

The rejection of document CD/521 on the ground that it is not a "full negotiating mandate" ignores these facts and, lamentably, prevents us from getting on with the work we all know needs to be done. It is very hard for my delegation to understand how some can insist that they are serious about getting work done in this Conference towards a CTB and yet refuse to permit that work to start under document CD/521.

A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is not a subject on which there is widespread or abundant patience. Many delegations say they want a treaty now or that it should be able to be created in a very short time. Others point out that a good deal of work needs to be done on, for example, methods of verification. Australia has no precise answer to the questions-how long will this work take or when we might expect to see a treaty. What we do say is this: the longer we delay starting the work the longer it will take to see the result. We want this Conference to resume its work on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty as soon as possible.

We do not want to be in a situation where when it is decided to bring a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty into existence, we are unable to take that step because we have not done the necessary work and we have not put in place the necessary means of verification. The delay which would then ensue would be an ironic and intolerable one.

This is why, for example, the Foreign Minister of Australia, Mr. Bill Hayden, proposed in this Conference in August 1984 that the Conference should proceed to bring about the establishment of a global seismological monitoring network.* This is why we are up-grading our own national seismological monitoring network so that we can play a full part in a global network. This is why we continue to firmly support the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts and have welcomed assurances from certain member states, including an assurance given by the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union in his recent statement to this Conference, that the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts would continue to enjoy the support of the Conference.

The fact is that what we are dealing with is a process. Paragraph 51 of the Final Document places "the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process". That process is further stated as having the aim of "ending the qualitative improvement of