ly

preparations for war, whether on land, at sea or in the air. The possibilities have now become evident.

In our view, especially in the current situation, it is essential to reduce the numbers of troops participating in major military manoeuvres notifiable under the Helsinki Final Act.'

It is time to begin dealing effectively with the problems still outstanding at the Conference. It is well known that the stumbling block there is the issue of notifications regarding major ground force, naval and air force exercises. Of course, those are serious problems and they must be addressed in a serious manner in the interests of building confidence in Europe. However, if their comprehensive solution cannot be achieved at this time, why not explore ways of finding partial solutions, for instance by reaching agreement now on notifications of major ground force and air force exercises, while postponing the question of naval activities until the next stage of the Conference.

It is not an accident that a considerable part of the new Soviet initiatives is directly addressed to Europe. By achieving a radical shift towards the policy of peace, Europe could have a special role to play: that of rebuilding detente.

For this Europe has the necessary historical experience, which is often unique. Suffice it to recall that the joint efforts of the Europeans, the United States and Canada produced the Helsinki Final Act. If there is a need for a specific and vivid example of new thinking and political psychology in approaching the problems of peace, co-operation and international trust, that historic document could in many ways serve as such an example.

VI.

Ensuring security in Asia is of vital importance to the Soviet Union, as one of the major Asian Powers. The Soviet programme for eliminating nuclear and chemical weapons by the end of the current century is in harmony with the sentiments of the peoples of the Asian continent, for whom the problems of peace and security are no less urgent than for the peoples of Europe. In this context one cannot fail to recall that Japan and its cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the victims of nuclear bombing and Vietnam was the object of the use of chemical weapons.

We highly appreciate the constructive initiatives put forward by the socialist countries of Asia and by India and other members of the non-aligned movement. We consider it highly important that the two Asian nuclear-weapon Powers, the USSR and the People's Republic of China, have both undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

The implementation of our programme would fundamentally change the situation in Asia, rid the nations in that part of the globe too of the fear of nuclear and chemical warfare, and bring security in that region to a qualitatively new level.

We regard our programme as a contribution to the search, together with all Asian countries, for an overall comprehensive approach to establishing a system of secure and durable peace in the continent.

7 Documents on Disarmament, 1975, pp. 304–308.

VII.

Our new proposals are addressed to the whole world. Initiating active steps to halt the arms race and reduce arms levels is a necessary prerequisite for tackling the increasingly acute global problems: the deteriorating human environment and the need to find new energy sources and combat economic backwardness, hunger and disease. The pattern imposed by militarism-arms instead of development-must be replaced by the reverse-disarmament for development. The noose of the trillion-dollar foreign debt now strangling scores of countries and entire continents is a direct consequence of the arms race. Over two hundred and fifty billion dollars are annually siphoned out of the developing countries, an amount practically equal to the size of the mammoth United States military budget. Indeed, this coincidence is far from accidental.

The Soviet Union wants each measure limiting and reducing arms and each step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons not only to bring nations greater security but also to make it possible to allocate more funds for improving people's lives. It is natural that the peoples seeking to put an end to backwardness and attain the level of the industrially developed countries associate the prospects of freeing themselves from their foreign-debt dependence on imperialism, which is draining their economies, with the limitation and elimination of weapons, the reduction of military expenditures and the switching of resources to the goals of social and economic development. This theme will undoubtedly figure most prominently at the International Conference on Disarmament and Development to be held next summer in Paris.

The Soviet Union is opposed to making the implementation of disarmament measures dependent on the so-called regional conflicts. Behind this lies both an unwillingness to follow the path of disarmament and a desire to impose upon sovereign nations something that is alien to them and which would make it possible to maintain profoundly unfair conditions whereby some countries live at the expense of others, exploiting their natural, human and spiritual resources for the selfish imperial purposes of certain States or aggressive alliances. The Soviet Union, as before, will continue to oppose this. It will continue consistently to advocate freedom for peoples, peace, security, and a stronger international legal order. The Soviet Union's goal is not to whip up regional conflicts but to eliminate them through collective efforts on a just basis, and the sooner the better. Today, there is no shortage of statements professing a commitment to peace. What is really in short supply is concrete action to strengthen its foundations. All too often peaceful words conceal war preparations and power politics. Moreover, some statements made from high rostrums are in fact intended to eliminate any trace of that new "spirit of Geneva" which is having a salutary effect on international relations today. Indeed, it is not merely a question of statements: there are also actions clearly designed to incite animosity and mistrust and to revive confrontation, which is the antithesis of detente.

We reject this form of acting and thinking. We want 1986 to be not just a peaceful year but one that would enable us to reach the end of the twentieth century under the sign of peace and nuclear disarmament. The set of new foreign policy initiatives that we are proposing is intended to make it possible for mankind to approach the year 2000 under peaceful skies and peaceful space,

without fear of nuclear, chemical or any other threat of annihilation and fully confident of its own survival and of the continuation of the human race.

The new resolute measures now taken by the Soviet Union for the sake of peace and of improving the overall international situation are the expression of the substance and the spirit of our domestic and foreign policies and their organic unity. They reflect the fundamental law of history which was emphasized by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. The whole world sees that our country is holding high the banner of peace, freedom and humanism raised over our planet by the Great October Revolution.

On the issues of preserving peace and preserving mankind from the threat of nuclear war, no one should remain indifferent or stand aloof. This concerns each and everyone. Each State, large or small, socialist or capitalist, has an important contribution to make. Every responsible political party, every social organization and every person can also make an important contribution.

No task is more urgent, more noble and humane, than uniting all efforts to achieve this lofty goal. This task must be accomplished by our generation-we cannot shift it onto the shoulders of those who will succeed us. This is the imperative of our time. This, I would say, is the burden of our historic responsibility for our decisions and actions in the time remaining until the beginning of the third millennium.

The course of peace and disarmament will continue to be pivotal to the foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State. In actively pursuing this course, the Soviet Union is prepared to engage in wide-ranging co-operation with all those who adopt a stance of reason, goodwill and awareness of responsibility for assuring mankind a future without wars or weapons.

6. Statement by President Reagan on the Soviet Proposal, January 15, 19861

In 1983 at the Japanese Diet, I called for the total abolition of nuclear weapons.2 Since that time the United States has put forward a series of proposals to achieve this goal through radical reductions in strategic weapons. As early as 1981, I set forth a specific proposal for the elimination of all long-range intermediate nuclear missiles.3 At the Geneva arms control talks in November, we made yet another proposal designed to bring us closer to the goal of zero nuclear weapons. Now the Soviet Union has responded with a proposal which builds on some of the elements we had previously set forth.

I welcome the Soviets' latest response and hope that it represents a helpful further step in the process. We, together with our allies, will give careful study to General Secretary Gorbachev's suggestions. Many elements contained in the

2

1 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, January 20, 1986, pp. 63–64.

Public Papers of the Presidents: Ronald Reagan, 1983, vol. II, pp. 1575–1576.

3 Documents on Disarmament, 1981, pp. 573-574.

response are unchanged from previous Soviet positions and continue to cause us serious concern. There are others that at first glance may be constructive.

The American delegation in Geneva has instructions to implement the agreement reached at the Geneva summit to seek early progress in achieving radical reductions in offensive nuclear weapons, including an interim agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces. If the position outlined by General Secretary Gorbachev advances this objective, it would prove to be a constructive step.

7. White House Statement on the Soviet Proposal, January 16, 19861

The Soviet response is another step in what we hope will be an increasingly positive process of give-and-take. We will, together with our allies, give it careful study, keeping in mind our basic objectives. Many elements of the Soviet proposal appear unchanged and cause us concern. Others, at first glance, appear constructive. We also have proposals on the table that we hope the Soviets will respond to. We look forward to exploring both sides' proposals at the negotiating table in Geneva.

We welcome the Soviet Union's response and its support for the goal of elimination of nuclear weapons, a goal toward which we have long been committed. We hope the details of the Soviet proposal will prove to represent a helpful step in the arms reduction process and the implementation of the joint statement's call for early progress.

At first glance many elements in the new Soviet proposal appear unchanged from their previous proposals and cause us concern, for example, the continued linkage of reductions to a ban on "space-strike arms." We believe strategic defenses can make a significant contribution to stability in a world free from nuclear weapons.

In other areas there may be some constructive steps, for example, the Soviet statement addressed verification measures, including on-site inspection. This offer, of course, needs to be translated into specifics for it to be properly evaluated.

Other parts of the Soviet offer also require more concrete detail, and we hope Soviet negotiators will explain their proposals promptly and fully in the proper negotiating forums.

We wish to emphasize that Geneva is the proper place for detailed explorations of both U.S. and Soviet proposals on nuclear and space arms. The Soviets mentioned ideas regarding progress in other arms control fields, such as MBFR, chemical weapons, and CDE. We hope they will explain their ideas fully in those negotiations as well.

1 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, January 20, 1986, p. 65. The statement was read by the Principal Deputy Press Secretary to the President, Larry M. Speakes, to reporters assembled in the Briefing Room at the White House during his daily press briefing, which began at 9:30 a.m.

2 Document 5.

The U.S. tabled new proposals in the nuclear and space talks (NST) at the end of the last round, and we expect a further Soviet response to those proposals. Our goal remains equitable, verifiable, and stabilizing agreements. We will evaluate the Soviet proposals in that light.

8. Letter From Congressman AuCoin to The Washington Times: Ban on Antisatellite Weapons Testing, January 17, 19861

My amendment prohibiting U.S. anti-satellite weapons testing against objects in space as long as the Soviets don't test was signed into law a few weeks ago. Your Jan. 2 news article "Battle brewing over Congress's ban on testing of antisatellite weapons" included a leak from an unnamed "administration source" claiming that "the ban was passed not only to prevent the United States from obtaining an ASAT capability comparable to that of the Soviets but to hinder the testing of space defense technology."

In fact, the ban has neither of these purposes. Its direct purpose is not to restrict any U.S. program, but rather to prevent the Soviets from testing and deploying a modern effective ASAT. Such a Soviet weapon could threaten essential U.S. space assets, including the satellites that would give us first warning of a Soviet missile attack. If we want the Soviets to do without an effective ASAT, we have to be willing to do the same.

To talk about "prevent[ing] the United States from obtaining an ASAT capability comparable to that of the Soviets" is to ignore the fact that in 1964 we deployed a better ASAT that the Soviets have today. We retired our system in 1975 because the Air Force felt it wasn't much good. This says a lot about the potency of the Soviet system. The issue isn't the obsolete junk ASAT the Soviets have today; it's the very lethal ASAT they could field down the road, if we allow testing to go ahead.

The administration should tell us why it acts as if it's content to allow our vital early warning satellites-and any future space defense satellites as well-to become vulnerable to Soviet attack.

3

See Documents on Disarmament, 1985, pp. 902-903.

The Washington Times, January 17, 1986. Reprinted by permission.