Our position is clear. We believe that the world has entered a period of responsible decision-making-most definitely, a period of responsible decisionmaking. We shall not abandon our policy of preserving and strengthening peace, which was quite unequivocally confirmed by the Twenty-seventh Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In accordance with the wishes of its people, the Soviet State will continue in the future to step up efforts to guarantee universal security. We shall do this by means of a process of interaction with all countries and their peoples.

With regard to our unilateral moratorium, I can say that it will, as before, operate until 31 March 1986. But even after that date we shall continue, as announced, to refrain from exploding nuclear devices if the United States does likewise. We once again give the American Administration the chance to take a responsible decision-to put an end to nuclear explosions.

Otherwise the Soviet Union will resume tests. This must be absolutely clear. We regret this, but we shall be forced to do so, since we cannot forgo our own security and the security of our allies. I say all this in order that there should be no reservations on this matter.

Meanwhile, I emphasize again and again that our principal intention is to stop the nuclear-arms race. The simplest, clearest and most effective step in that direction would be to halt nuclear explosions.

We have proposed that talks should be started immediately with a view to a total ban on nuclear-arms tests, to include verification issues. Any variants are acceptable to the Soviet Union-bilateral Soviet-American talks, trilateral talks with the participation of the United Kingdom, or multilateral talks within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.

We have now reached the conclusion that the situation requires urgent action. It is not yet too late to stop the nuclear-arms race. What is needed is a first major step in that direction. A halt to nuclear tests by all, most importantly by the Soviet Union and the United States, but also by other nuclear Powers, could constitute such a step. We attach enormous importance to the solution of this problem, which affects the destiny of all peoples.

I am prepared to meet President Reagan at the earliest opportunity in London, Rome or any other European capital which may agree to receive us, with a view to reaching agreement on this question, and I do not see any insurmountable obstacles to this, whether of a political, technical or any other nature. What is wanted here is the essential political will and understanding of our mutual responsibility. We propose that we should meet, exchange opinions on this vitally important problem and issue instructions for the drafting of an appropriate agreement.

We hope that this proposal by the Soviet Union will be duly evaluated and properly interpreted by the President of the United States and by the Governments of the countries of Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America, of the whole world.

Time waits for no one. On behalf of the Soviet people we appeal to the American people and their Government, to the peoples and Governments of all

For the program adopted by the Congress, see Document 31.

countries, to take active and practical steps which would translate the ban on nuclear explosions into reality and make it an immutable touchstone of interState relations.

Mankind stands at a boundary which requires exercise of the utmost responsibility. The consequences of the nuclear race may become dangerously unpredictable. We must act together. This is a matter for each and every one of us. It was about all this that I wanted to speak to you, dear comrades, at our meeting today. Goodbye.

51. White House Statement: Soviet Nuclear Test Ban Proposal, March 29, 19861

The President has taken note of General Secretary Gorbachev's speech on Soviet television today.2

The United States has repeatedly made it clear that the practical step now needed in the area of nuclear testing limitations is to enhance mutual confidence in the ability of the two sides to verify existing agreements, in particular the unratified Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty. The President has made a series of concrete proposals to the Soviet Union in this regard, most recently on March 14.5 In this initiative the President invited Mr. Gorbachev to send Soviet experts to the United States to examine our new CORRTEX verification system and to observe a U.S. nuclear test in midApril at our Nevada test site. The President made it clear that if this meeting leads to an agreement on verification-incorporating CORRTEX-which meets our concerns, he is prepared to move forward toward ratification of these two treaties. This proposal is still valid, and we expect the Soviet Union to respond to it seriously, as we have responded to all Soviet proposals.

As far as a nuclear testing moratorium is concerned, the U.S. position has not changed. From the time that the Soviets announced their moratorium last year, we made clear why a moratorium is not in the security interests of the United States, our friends, and allies. The United States has learned through experience that moratoria cannot be counted on to lead to the enhanced security desired. While the total elimination of nuclear weapons remains an ultimate goal, nuclear weapons remain needed to deter aggression and secure the peace. As long as this is the case, a moderate level of nuclear testing is needed to ensure the continued reliability, safety, and effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent.

Regarding a meeting between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev, the two agreed at Geneva "to meet again in the nearest future," and the General Secretary accepted the President's invitation to come to the United States in

1 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, April 7, 1986, pp. 434-435. The statement was made by Deputy Press Secretary Peter H. Roussel.

2 Supra.

Documents on Disarmament, 1974, pp. 225–227.

* Ibid, 1976, pp. 328-332.

-5 Document 35.

1986. In December the President indicated to the General Secretary which dates would be most convenient for this meeting. No reply has yet been received regarding this suggestion. Nevertheless, the President is confident that the General Secretary takes his agreement seriously and that he will respond in due

course.

In the President's view, meetings at the highest level should deal with the entire range of important issues between our two countries. Nuclear testing is one of them but only one; and it is an issue which is directly related to others such as the need-which we see as the highest priority-to reduce the levels of existing nuclear arms and to establish effective verification procedures. If the Soviet Union desires to make serious progress on the question of nuclear testing limitation, it should accept the President's longstanding proposal that we have our experts meet, and should respond positively to the President's most recent offer.

52. Article by ACDA Director Adelman: Nuclear Test Ban, April 19861

Effective limitations on nuclear testing, to enhance international stability, have long been a goal for the United States, and some progress has been made. In 1963 an agreement was reached on banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, oceans and space. A decade later, in the Threshold Test Ban and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to limit the size of underground nuclear tests. Those treaties have not come into force because of verification deficiencies and doubts about Soviet compliance with the limits.

The Carter Administration tried to achieve a ban on all underground nuclear tests. That effort failed for several reasons. The Soviet aggression in Afghanistan was one, and verification problems were another. Last, but clearly not least, were the growing doubts in the United States about the wisdom of banning all testing so long as we have to rely on nuclear weapons to keep the peace.

Those doubts had deep roots in reality. President Reagan, early in his first term, told it like it is. While reaffirming that a comprehensive test ban remains a US objective, he underlined the fact that it is, by necessity, a long-term goal not something to be realized soon, not something to be realized before critical verification problems are solved, and not something to be realized as long as we depend so critically on our nuclear deterrent to prevent war.

Four compelling reasons

But do we still need to test when we already have so many nuclear weapons? Yes, for four very compelling reasons; the safety, reliability, effectiveness and

"Documents on Disarmament, 1985, p. 867.

'NATO Review, vol. 34, No. 2 (April 1986), pp. 5-7.

2 The text of the Treaty may be found in Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 291–293. 3 Ibid., 1974, pp. 225-227 and ibid., 1976, pp. 328–332.

credibility of our nuclear deterrent which keeps the peace. The weapons today are more secure, better controlled and overall safer than ever before. Testing has played a key role in this progress. We need to do everything possible to ensure their safety against any future accidents.

The reliability of our deterrent is also a central concern. A popular argument today is that stopping testing will, over time, reduce each side's confidence in its nuclear weapons and thereby reduce the chances of their ever being used. This may sound logical but it is false logic.

The strength of democracies has historically prevented aggression; weakness has often invited it. Waning confidence and growing uncertainties about what can and cannot be done will not reduce the risk of war. If we lack confidence in our capabilities and an adversary perceives this uncertainty-whether it is real or not deterrence would be weakened and the risk of nuclear weapons being used could increase. Testing provides a key assurance about our weapons' reliability and in turn provides confidence in our systems.

Modernization is necessary to maintain an effective and credible deterrent force. The massive build-up of Soviet nuclear forces over the past decade cannot be ignored. Our modernization programmes over several administrations—the MX, B1, Stealth, Trident-require that weapons are tested.

Modernization has helped in more ways than just maintaining a credible deterrent. It has, for example, enabled us to greatly reduce both the number and megatonnage of the weapons stockpile. In fact, our stockpile of nuclear weapons is almost a third smaller than in 1967 and its aggregate megatonnage is one quarter of the 1960 level.

No one wants to base deterrence and the safety of the nation and our alliances on untested, less safe, less reliable or less effective weapons. So where does this leave the Soviet Union's testing moratorium?

Last August General Secretary Gorbachev announced that the Soviets would unilaterally refrain from testing until the end of 1985 and extend it longer if the United States joined the moratorium. He later extended their moratorium until 31 March and then until the first US test after 31 March, which was in fact carried out on 10 April. The Soviets also claimed that they would accept verification measures to monitor compliance.

Were these positive moves towards real arms control? I think not.

The Soviets knew that we were not prepared to sacrifice our requirement for tests for the sake of a moratorium, however superficially appealing. The Soviets also knew that if we did agree to a moratorium, they would be the winner. They could likely get away with some bending of the rules in their closed society, if necessary, and they could keep their labs and people in place. In our free society many of the needed defence experts would leave for productive positions elsewhere.

The Soviets also knew that we had not forgotten 1961, when, in the middle of test ban negotiations, they broke a de facto three-year-long testing moratorium,

* Ibid., 1985, pp. 444-445.

'Documents 5 and 33.

reneging on their own pledge not to test. They conducted over 40 atmospheric tests in nine weeks, the most intensive series of tests ever.

The timing of Gorbachev's announcement of a moratorium, coinciding with the 40th commemoration of the bombing of Hiroshima, gave it even more of a propaganda flair. To the credit of the West, most people recognized it for just that. The Soviet Union's nuclear test moratorium has not gained the public relations mileage for which it was undoubtedly intended.

If the Soviets are serious about limitations on testing and about verification, let's begin at the beginning. The Threshold Test Ban and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties have remained unratified for more than a decade. The United States has had serious questions over Soviet compliance and has tried, on numerous occasions, to get the Soviets to address the serious verification uncertainties associated with these treaties.

President Reagan's initiative of March 1986 for Soviet experts to be briefed on our new CORRTEX verification system and observe a nuclear test at our Nevada test site in mid-April, was the most recent in a series of attempts to build confidence and cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear testing limitations." The President also provided Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev with a description of the CORRTEX technical method, which is the most precise and non-intrusive estimative system we know of for calculating the yield of nuclear explosions. As yet, the Soviets have not formally replied to the President's initiative.

Progress on these treaties would build confidence and let us address possible further steps. The Soviets know all that, but they still say "nyet." When it sinks in that the United States and the West will not be pressured to give up what is essential to our security, we can then hope for a Soviet “da.”

53. U.S. Paper Submitted to the Conference on Disarmament: Amendment to the U.S. Draft Chemical Weapons Convention, April 3, 19861

In order to make clear the U.S. intention that no imbalance in inspection obligations is intended or contained in the U.S. draft chemical weapons convention (CD/500, April 18, 1984),2 the following textual changes are made to the provisions in Article X (Special On-Site Inspection):

Replace subparagraphs 1(a) and 1(b), dealing with facilities for which a special on-site inspection may be requested, with the following:

(a) Any location or facility subject to systematic international on-site inspection pursuant to Articles III, V and VI.;

(b) Any military location or facility or any other location or facility owned by the government of a party.;

"See Document 35.

'CD/685.

2 For the text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1984, pp. 269–299.