First. The Soviet Union stated in response to the letter of the leaders of the six States that the Soviet Union will not conduct nuclear explosions even after 31 March-until the United States carries out its first nuclear explosion.'

Second. We are in favour of verification by national technical means of a ban on nuclear tests being supplemented by appropriate international procedures with the use of all the achievements in seismology and, if need be, by on-site inspections.

Third. We are ready to make use of the proposal of the leaders of the six States to assist in the verification of compliance with the nuclear-test ban, including onsite inspections, provided, of course, that this proposal is accepted by the other side.

Fourth. We propose beginning without delay the elaboration of a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and the resumption or starting of the appropriate negotiations in any form-bilateral, trilateral, multilateral-without linking this issue to any other issues.

Fifth. We propose dealing simultaneously with verification issues from the outset in such negotiations.

Sixth. We are even ready to agree to a solution whereby at first only the USSR and the United States would agree to stop any nuclear explosions while the rest of nuclear-weapon States would discontinue such tests later.

Seventh. We are in favour of the start of multilateral negotiations within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament on all the aspects of the problem of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, including adequate measures of verification. The objective of the talks should be the elaboration of a draft treaty which would effectively prohibit the carrying out of any test explosions of nuclear weapons anywhere and by anyone and which would include universally acceptable provisions preventing the sidestepping of this ban by way of undertaking nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

Eighth. We are ready to ratify without delay, on a reciprocal basis, the bilateral Soviet-United States agreements of 1974 and 1976 and do not put forward any preconditions for doing so.

Ninth. We agree with the idea of carrying out consultations with the aim of extending the scope of the Moscow Treaty of 1963 to underground tests which it does not cover.

Tenth. We also have a flexible position on the issue of the mandate for an appropriate ad hoc committee of the Conference on Disarmament. We are ready to co-operate on this subject with the Non-Aligned States as well as with those Western States that are in favour of starting negotiations on a nuclear-test ban, and we do not oppose the proposal to create within the ad hoc committee, should it be established, working groups on the scope of prohibition and on verification of compliance with the Treaty. Neither do we oppose the inclusion in its programme of work of the consideration of all the key issues of the future Treaty.

And lastly. The Soviet Union is concerned to achieve a nuclear-test ban as rapidly as possible, and is therefore prepared to support the proposal to continue

7 Document 33.

8 For the text of the Treaty, see Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 291–293.

the activities of the Group of Experts on Seismology with the objective of the further sophistication of the international seismic data exchange. This is further proof of our desire to assist in every way in the elaboration of effective measures for the verification of compliance with a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

In conclusion I should like to point out once again that the Soviet Union, as was recently stressed by Mikhail S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, "will, for its part, continue to do everything necessary to put the resolution of the urgent problem of ending nuclear tests on practical tracks and to secure the complete elimination of nuclear arsenals." Our country is striving to do everything to avert a nuclear catastrophe. We are ready to go our part of that road: but the other part should be covered by the United States, and not in words, but in deeds.

49. Statement by Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev: Proposals on the Mediterranean [Extract], March 26, 19861

The Soviet Union stands for making the Mediterranean, the cradle of many civilizations, into a zone of stable peace and cooperation. Our proposals for extending agreed confidence-building measures to cover that region, reduced armed forces, withdrawing ships carrying nuclear weapons from the Mediterranean, renouncing the deployment of such weapons in the territories of Mediterranean non-nuclear countries, and for the nuclear powers to make a commitment not to use such weapons against any Mediterranean country that does not allow their stationing in its territory remain in force.

We are prepared to go even further. For the Soviet Union in principle there is no need to have its naval fleet in the Mediterranean on a permanent basis. It has to keep its ships there permanently for this sole reason: The U.S. 6th Fleet armed with nuclear-missile weapons and threatening the security of the USSR. Its allies and friends is in the immediate proximity of our borders.

If the United States, which is situated thousands upon thousands of miles from the Mediterranean, pulled its fleet out of there, the Soviet Union would simultaneously do the same. We are prepared without delay to enter talks on the issue. At this first stage there would be imposed no restrictions on the naval activities and naval armament of the coastal Mediterranean states themselves. Further steps to strengthen security in the region could, in our opinion, be determined

9 Document 33 [variant translation].

1 Moscow TASS in English, March 26, 1986; FBIS Daily Report, March 27, 1986, vol. III, pp. H5-H6. The speech was delivered at a dinner in the Kremlin in honor of Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid.

with account taken of the Soviet proposals made in the statement of January 15, 1986, on the abolition of weapons of mass destruction.2

50. Television Statement by Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev: Moratorium on Nuclear Tests, March 29, 19861

At our meeting today I should like to share with you my views on the present situation regarding the Soviet Union's moratorium on nuclear tests.

Several days ago the United States carried out another nuclear explosion. It is obvious to us all that its timing was not accidental. The explosion was conducted shortly before the expiration of the moratorium declared unilaterally by the Soviet Union. Yesterday it became known that in a few days' time, in the very near future, the United States intends to detonate yet another nuclear device. Soviet people, like all people of good will in all countries, are indignant at such actions by the United States. They write about this in their letters to the Party's Central Committee and request an assessment of the present situation. How, they ask, should all of this be understood? What conclusions should be drawn from this? Why did the United States take such a step? How does our country's leadership intend to act in these circumstances?

We consider it our duty to respond to these messages. And this, indeed, is the reason for our meeting today.

I must say frankly that we regard the present actions of the United States Administration, which is continuing nuclear tests in spite of the peoples' urgent demands, as a pointed challenge to the Soviet Union, and not only to it but also to the whole world, to all peoples, including the American people, too.

At a time when whole mountains of combustible nuclear material have been stockpiled in the world, the issue of halting nuclear tests has acquired enormous importance. And this is understandable.

Firstly, halting nuclear tests is the most realistic way of achieving an end to the arms race. Without such tests it is impossible either to improve or to develop new types of nuclear weapons.

In short, if together with the United States and the other nuclear Powers we were to reach agreement on ceasing nuclear explosions, this would make it possible to break the deadlock in the whole process of nuclear disarmament.

Furthermore, continued testing causes enormous harm-which has not yet, perhaps, been fully studied—to nature and the very environment in which we all live. Do we not feel obliged to show concern for our own home? And not only for ourselves, but also for our children and grandchildren.

2 Document 5.

'A/41 255.

And lastly, in this difficult endeavour there is no need to start, as it were, from scratch. Some headway has been made and joint experience acquired: what I mean is that tests have not been conducted for many years now in the atmosphere, under water or on land. Neither have there been nuclear explosions in outer space. In view of precisely these circumstances, and having carefully weighed all the pros and cons, the Soviet Union undertook eight months ago, on the day of the fortieth anniversary of the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, an initiative of extraordinary importance-to cease all nuclear explosions either for military or for peaceful purposes-and called upon the United States and the other nuclear Powers to follow its example and begin moving towards nuclear disarmament.2 I have already had occasion to say that it was not easy for us to take such a decision under conditions of unabated tension in the international situation. If you like, this step necessitated both an awareness of the responsibility which rests with the Governments of the nuclear Powers and the requisite political will. In acting as it did, the Soviet leadership had the mandate of its people, who know the value of peace and genuinely strive for its preservation and consolidation and for co-operation with all peoples.

We acted as we did out of the deep conviction that the world has entered a stage in its development which calls for new approaches to matters of international security. Today, in the nuclear and space age, it is impossible to think in the same terms as in the past. All people must ultimately realize that everything has radically changed. And it is now a question not merely of the preservation of peace, but of mankind's survival.

These, in effect, were the reasons for our decision to announce the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests.

The good initiative of the Soviet Union-and I am immensely pleased to say this-has met with understanding and broad approval in the world. Our action has been highly appreciated by the working people of all countries: communists and social democrats, liberals and conservatives, Christians and Muslims, a great number of public organizations, prominent political figures, scientists and cultural figures, and millions of ordinary people.

How, though, has the other side conducted itself? I mean the United States Administration.

In words, it stands for the elimination of nuclear weapons. A good many statements have been made by it on this score. In fact, however, a gap between words and practical policy has again become apparent. Despite the Soviet Union's call and example, and the persistent demands both of the American people and of peoples throughout the world, the United States Government has continued to carry out nuclear tests.

We had placed certain hopes in the Geneva meeting with the President of the United States and expected to reach agreement with him on this matter, too. As you will recall, encouraging statements were made there by each side and also jointly: that nuclear war is inadmissible, that such a war cannot be won, and that neither side would seek nuclear superiority.

2 Documents on Disarmament, 1985, pp. 444–445.

The results of the Geneva meeting prompted us to make yet another good-will gesture to extend the moratorium until 31 March of this year.3 We thereby showed evidence of our responsible attitude towards dialogue between the leaders of the two Powers and hoped, of course, for steps in response by the United States Administration.

I think you will agree that our statement of 15 January of this year, which gave details of a concrete and realistic programme for the elimination of nuclear weapons, illustrates once again our sincere intention to put an end to nuclear confrontation. When we took that step, the least of our considerations was to score, as journalists say in such cases, gratuitous propaganda points, or to outwit or outperform the other side.

We consider such an approach to the burning problems of contemporary politics to be inadmissible. Our actions were dictated by our responsibility both to the Soviet people and to other peoples, a responsibility to remove the nuclear threat and to preserve and strengthen peace.

In February, the leaders of six non-aligned States, giving expression to the prevailing trends of world public opinion, addressed an urgent appeal to the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States to refrain from exploding nuclear devices up to the time of a further Soviet-American meeting. Our response to this was one of agreement.5

It seemed natural that the United States Administration should support the initiative of the Soviet Union by means of practical steps, respond to popular expectations and, ultimately, reaffirm through action its own statements as pronounced in Geneva. But the result was otherwise.

It is patently evident that the ruling clique of the United States has placed the narrowly mercenary interests of military-industrial circles above the interests of mankind as a whole, and of its own people. The way in which all this is done is also of some importance: ostentatiously, arrogantly and with disdain for the opinion of the international community. It shows neither a sense of realism nor a sense of responsibility.

It becomes ever more apparent that the ruling circles of the Unites States are continuing to emphasize pursuit of a militaristic approach and to rely on force as a means of dictating their will to other countries and peoples. Meanwhile, statements are made for all to hear to the effect that it is precisely by means such as these that they will bring influence to bear on the policy of the Soviet Union. What can we say about this? These endeavours serve no purpose. No one has ever before succeeded in using the methods of power politics against our State, and such methods are now simply ridiculous. And the peoples of other countries are ever more vigorously rejecting the use of power politics in international relations as being obsolete.

The Soviet political leadership is now faced with the difficult question of how to react to such behaviour on the part of the United States.

3 Document 5.

4 Document 27.

5 Document 33.