I can assure you that the Soviet Union, for its part, will continue to do everything necessary to bring about a practical solution to the urgent problem of ending nuclear tests and to achieve the complete elimination of nuclear arsenals.

34. Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the Conference on Disarmament: Twentyseventh Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Outer Space [Extract], March 13, 19861

The 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union concluded its work a few days ago in Moscow.2 The international situation was evaluated at the highest party and State level, and the basic goals and directions of the foreign policy of the party and the State were determined.

In many respects what was stated at the Congress by the party and State leadership of our country has a very direct bearing on the work of the Conference on Disarmament, primarily on the issues of the prevention of nuclear war and of nuclear disarmament that we are considering here.

The Congress, first of all, confirmed the overall direction of Soviet foreign policy: the struggle against the nuclear threat and against the arms race, and for maintaining and strengthening universal peace. This is not simply a general slogan, this is the most urgent task of our time, which specific proposals by the Soviet Union are aimed at resolving. In view of the complex and acute situation of the current historic period, persistent efforts must be made right now to put an end to the material preparations for nuclear war. The twentieth century is coming to an end in the conditions of a nuclear confrontation. What will happen later? Will mankind be able to escape the nuclear threat, or will the policy of confrontation, leading to an increased likelihood of a nuclear conflict, gain the upper hand? The world is now overburdened with dangers and contradictions, and all this is happening, into the bargain, against the background of a qualitative leap in the development of the means of destruction, which have for a long time already had the capacity of destroying everything living on Earth.

The Soviet Union, as the 27th Congress reaffirmed, will work persistently to affirm the principle of peaceful coexistence in international relations and will actively advocate the realization of the programme for the complete elimination of weapons of mass destruction by the end of this century. Given the utter inadmissibility of nuclear war and the necessity of ensuring life on our planet, peaceful co-existence must become the law of relations among States.

Having thoroughly analyzed the current situation in the world the Soviet leadership arrived at a number of principled considerations that determine the

'CD/PV.347, pp. 14-21.

2 For an extract of the program adopted by the Congress, see ante, Document 31.

practical steps of the USSR aimed at improving the international situation. These considerations include the following.

First, the character of present-day weaponry leaves no country with any hope of safeguarding itself solely with military and technical means. To ensure security is increasingly seen as a political problem, and it can be only resolved by political means.

Second, in the context of the relations between the USSR and the United States, security can only be mutual, and if we take international relations as the whole, it can only be universal.

Third, the United States, with its military and industrial machine, remains the locomotive of militarism, for so far it has no intention of slowing down. The world, naturally, is much larger than the United States and its military bases on foreign soil; that is why in world politics one cannot confine oneself to relations with a single country, no matter how important it may be.

Fourth, all States face the task of establishing a pattern of civil international intercourse and co-operation, of creating a universal system of international economic security which, together with disarmament, must become a dependable pillar of international security generally.

Thus, to put it briefly, the essence of our approach is this: the world of today has become too small and too fragile for wars and a policy of force. It cannot be saved and preserved if we fail to do away-resolutely and irrevocably-with the way of thinking and acting that for centuries has been rooted in the acceptability and permissibility of wars and armed conflicts.

The conclusion drawn from this prerequisite, and it is the conclusion by which the USSR is guided in its practical activities, is that it is no longer possible to win either the arms race or nuclear war itself. The continuation of the arms race on Earth, let alone its spread to outer space, can render the situation in the world such that it will no longer depend on politicians but would become captive to technology and to technocratic military logic. Consequently, not only nuclear war itself but also the preparations for it, the aspiration to win military superiority, can bring no political gain to anybody.

The present high level of the balance of the nuclear capabilities ensures for the time being-and only for the time being equal danger to each of the opposite sides. However, the continuation of the nuclear-arms race can bring this equal threat to a point where even parity will cease to be a factor of military and political deterrence.

Genuine, real security in our age can be guaranteed not by an excessively high but by the lowest possible level of strategic parity, from which it is necessary to exclude totally nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction.

The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, M.S. Gorbachev, stated at the Congress:

Nuclear danger has made States equal in one respect. In a big war nobody would have a chance to stay aside and profit by somebody else's misfortune. Equal security is the imperative of today. To ensure this security is more and more a political task which can be solved only by political means. It is high time to lay a foundation more solid than weapons for relations among States. We do not see and neither do we seek an alternative.

The USSR proposes that the problems of disarmament shall be approached as a complex whole, since as far as security is concerned everything is interrelated. It is this requirement that constitutes the basis of our programme set forth in the Statement of M.S. Gorbachev on 15 January last.3

The urgent task of today is to create a comprehensive system of international security, and it is very important for the cause of peace, it is in the interest of all mankind, to find ways to achieve closer and more productive international cooperation in order to build such a system. In the opinion of the Soviet Union, the basis of such a system in the military sphere seems to be as follows: first, renunciation by the nuclear Powers of war-both nuclear and conventionalagainst each other or against third countries; second, prevention of an arms race in outer space, cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests and the total elimination of such weapons, a ban on and the destruction of chemical weapons, the renunciation of other means of mass annihilation; third, a strictly controlled lowering of the levels of military capabilities of countries to the limits of reasonable adequacy; fourth, disbandment of military alliances and, as a stage towards this, renunciation of their enlargement and of the formation of new ones; and fifth, the balanced and commensurate reduction of military budgets.

It was stated from the rostrum of the Congress that the Soviet Union is and will be acting on the world scene seriously and openly, actively and honestly. We intend to strive persistently and actively for the elimination of nuclear weapons, for a radical cutback in the arms race, for the building of international security that is dependable and equal for all States.

I have referred only to that part of the basic elements of international security proposed by the USSR which has a direct bearing on the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

Now, Mr. President, permit me to dwell on item 5 of the agenda of our forum. At present, item 5 of the agenda of the Conference, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", is acquiring ever-increasing significance. The technology of the development and production of space strike weapons is advancing and accelerating in certain places at a truly cosmic pace.

According to a statement by the Director of the SDI Programme, James Abrahamson, research on the Strategic Defense Initiative is moving from technology development to "major experiments". In addition, it was stated that the United States is also working on technology to counter possible Soviet counter-steps to the SDI. This is evidence that the United States, despite the soothing statements about the SDI programme being "research", intends to advance that programme far beyond the limits of research. Thus, the implementation of the "star wars" plans may very soon become irreversible.

We have no intention of dwelling in detail on the dangers connected with the deployment of space strike weapons. We have repeatedly set forth our viewpoint on that subject. Let us consider only one aspect: how would the Strategic Defense Initiative influence stability?

The analysis carried out in the Soviet Union and in other countries of any versions of deployment of strike weapons in outer space, or of any versions of

3 Document 5.

deployment by one or by both sides of large-scale ABM systems, indicates that such actions would result in the disruption of the military equilibrium, in a sharp destabilization of the strategic situation and in the increased risk of nuclear war. The deployment by one side of an ABM system in space practically means that it acquires an additional offensive potential (military superiority) equal to the number of the other side's strategic missiles that the ABM system is capable of neutralizing. The side that has created the ABM system for its territory acquires the capability of countering the retaliatory nuclear strike of the other side or, which is one and the same thing, the capability of a first nuclear missile strike with impunity. A situation arises when one of the sides acquires full strategic superiority and a powerful incentive to try to achieve its political aims by means of nuclear war.

In other words, the SDI, in creating the illusion of an impenetrable space shield, inevitably entails a shift towards a “first-strike” state of mind. All this leads not only to the disruption of the military balance but also to the loss of the capacity for nuclear deterrence, which destroys the foundation of strategic stability. In these conditions, of course, we cannot speak of eliminating nuclear weapons, or of their reduction. Quite the reverse, the sides would have to increase offensive nuclear weapons, and that would result in an unrestrained arms race. Incidentally, new discoveries made under the programme for the development of space strike weapons could also be applied for the development of new types of conventional weapons for ground forces, for the air force and for the navy.

This destabilization would also take place if the development and deployment of unlimited ABM systems is carried out by both sides. The difference in the scope of scientific and technological groundwork, in geographic conditions and in economic capabilities would result also in differences in the pace of deployment of ABM systems by the sides. Consequently, only one of the sides would acquire initially the capability to counter a retaliatory nuclear strike. The situation which has been described earlier would occur.

Acute destabilization, however, would already be observed in the course of deployment of a large-scale ABM system. At a certain stage of such deployment, the defensive ABM system would grow into a qualitatively new offensive strategic system capable of destroying satellites, aircraft, air command posts, stores and other ground targets. In this connection, the possibility arises of sharply increasing the effectiveness of a first nuclear strike by the integrated use of offensive arms on Earth and space strike weapons. Does that correspond to strengthening stability?

Even in hypothetical conditions of an absolutely simultaneous deployment by the sides of an initially limited, and then comprehensive ABM system, strategic stability would be undermined. In that case, both sides acquire the capability to make a first surprise strike against the space ABM means of the other side, to put them out of operation using their own strike space weapons, i.e. to eliminate the "shield" while simultaneously dealing a nuclear first strike, but now with impunity.

In other words, with the availability of a "space shield" the side which was the first to attack would be the winner. Nothing remains of strategic stability. Furthermore, in the case of the implementation of the "star wars" plans a completely new factor appears which would be conducive to an accidental

beginning of a nuclear war, a factor previously unknown in history. That factor is connected with the need to use fast and extremely complicated automatic equipment in space strike systems, as well as with the necessity of transferring the decision-making function concerning the initiation of hostilities to automatic machines, to computers.

A space ABM system cannot function in the traditional scheme. The time that elapses between the appearance of the missiles in the atmosphere and their destruction must not exceed 100 to 300 seconds. It is necessary during this period to detect and identify targets and distribute them among interceptors, perform targeting operations and destroy the missiles. Naturally, in these conditions there is no time for submitting reports to the leadership or even for checking the operation of the computers. It is the automatic systems, the computers, that would take decisions and start the war. The political leadership would already be unable to play any role in the process.

It is also understandable that only automatic devices are able to respond quickly enough to other automatic devices. What then would happen if the other side also created the necessary automated systems? The fate of mankind would be placed in the hands of automatic machines.

Automatic devices make mistakes, even the most dependable computers sometimes fail. The more complicated the technological systems are, the more probable are errors and unforeseen situations that might result in a catastrophe. The super-complex automatic weapon systems developed and deployed in outer space would have to work in conditions of constant combat alert for decades and never make an error. That is not realistic. Besides, is it possible to predict the reaction of space strike systems to the launching of peaceful delivery missiles? Wouldn't automatic devices activate space weapons in response to an accidental deviation of such missiles from their trajectories or to the accidental explosion in outer space of a space vehicle similar to that of Challenger?

One should not exclude the possibility of a situation in which the creation of a"space shield" by one side would force the other side to create something similar as well. In that case two extremely complex systems would be opposed to each other. By the rules of the technological improvement of this kind of systems, in order to exclude possible technological mistakes joint large-scale tests would need to be carried out. That would be logical in any peaceful international project. It is absurd, however, in this case. The United States would not give an ABM system to the Soviet Union to enable the USSR to adapt its own measures of response to it, and vice versa. Thus, two mutually unco-ordinated and opposed automated systems would still further increase the probability of a catastrophe. On several occasions already the American early warning services have sounded a false alarm after mistaking flocks of wild geese or something else for Soviet bombers. In each case, however, people have had enough time and wisdom to see the mistake. In the case of the SDI, there would not be time for that, and computers-even the "smartest" ones-don't have wisdom.

In the most thorough analysis of the SDI it is impossible to find even some individual features of the project that strengthen strategic stability. The SDI holds out no other promise for the future than the intensification of the arms race, increased tension, and an atmosphere of intense fear and distrust in relations among States. To put it briefly, strategic stability would be replaced by strategic