31. Program Adopted by the Twenty-seventh Congress of the CPSU [Extract], March 7, 19861 In the interests of mankind and for the good of all peoples [present and future generations], the CPSU and the Soviet state uphold a broad, constructive program of measures aimed at ending the arms race, achieving disarmament and ensuring peace and security [for the peoples]. Regarding general and complete disarmament under strict, comprehensive international control as a historic task and continuing the struggle for its realization, the CPSU will consistently strive for: —restricting, and narrowing the sphere of, military preparations, especially those connected with weapons of mass destruction. First of all, outer space must be totally excluded from this sphere, so that it will not become an arena of military rivalry and a source of death and destruction. The exploration and study of space should be carried out only for peaceful purposes, for the development of science and production, in accordance with the requirements of all peoples. The USSR favors collective efforts in solving this problem, and it will actively participate in international cooperation of this kind. The Soviet Union will also favor the adoption of measures that facilitate the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and the creation of zones free of these and other means of mass destruction; -implementing, stage by stage and by the end of the 20th century [steps leading to], the complete elimination of nuclear arms, through [and including] the termination of the testing and production of all types of such arms, the renunciation by all nuclear power of the first use of such weapons, and the freezing, reduction and destruction of [all] arsenals of these weapons; -stopping the production of and eliminating other types of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, and prohibiting the creation of new types of such weapons; -reducing the armed forces of states-above all of the permanent members of the UN Security Council and states linked to them by military agreements-limiting conventional arms, stopping the creation of new types of such arms that approximate weapons of mass destruction in their destructive power, and reducing [the] military expenditures [of states]; -freezing and reducing troops and arms in the most explosive regions of the planet, dismantling military bases on foreign territory, and taking measures to strengthen mutual trust and to lessen the risk of the outbreak of armed conflicts, including those that result from accidents. 'The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Special Supplement, "The Communist Party Program and Party Statutes, Final Versions," p. 23. Translation copyright 1986 by The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, published weekly at Columbus, Ohio. Reprinted by permission of The Digest. The CPSU's position is to strive to overcome the split of the world into military-political groupings. The CPSU favors the simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, or, as a first step, the dismantling of their military organizations. With a view to easing the confrontation between the military blocs, the Soviet Union favors the conclusion between them of a treaty on the mutual nonuse of force and the maintenance of relations of peace, a treaty that would be open to other states as well. The Party will exert efforts to have questions of arms limitation and averting the threat of war resolved through honest and strictly observed accords based on equality and equal security for the sides, and to rule out all attempts to conduct negotiations "from a position of strength" or to use them as a cover for an arms buildup. The Soviet state and its allies do not seek to achieve military superiority, but they also will not allow the existing military-strategic equilibrium in the world arena to be upset. At the same time, they are consistently striving to steadily lower the level of this equilibrium and to reduce the amounts of arms on both sides, while ensuring the security of all peoples. The CPSU solemnly declares: There is no weapon that the Soviet Union would not be prepared to limit or prohibit on a mutual basis, with effective verification. The USSR does not encroach on the security of any country, in the West or in the East. It threatens no one, it does not seek confrontation with any state, and it desires to live in peace with all countries. Since the time of Great October, the Soviet socialist state has borne on high the banner of peace and friendship among peoples. The CPSU will continue to remain loyal to this Leninist banner. 32. Address by the Special Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze): Nuclear and Space Arms Talks, March 13, 19861 After last November's summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, we thought that the summit and the events leading up to it might well foreshadow the possibility for a fresh start in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. We were fully aware, however, of the substantial barriers to agreement which remained to be surmounted. On March 4 our negotiators concluded the fourth round of the nuclear and space arms talks (NST) in Geneva. This was preceded by Gorbachev's January 15 announcement of a new Soviet arms control proposal.2 In late February, after 1 Department of State, Current Policy No. 807. The speech was delivered before the Foreign Service Institute Symposium on "The Future of START," Arlington, Virginia. 2 Document 5. extensive consultations with our allies, the President authorized our negotiators in Geneva to present a comprehensive response to Mr. Gorbachev's proposal. It is appropriate to recall the main outlines of Mr. Gorbachev's proposal and those of the President's response, as well as such clarifications as our negotiators have been able to obtain from the Soviet negotiators in Geneva. I will first address the initial steps as they have been set forth by both sides. Agreements concerning the first steps and the manner in which they are executed will largely determine what is possible in subsequent stages. One of the features of Mr. Gorbachev's proposal was his attempt to trump the President's emphasis on the goal of the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons by offering a staged timetable to achieve that goal. But the second and third stages of his proposal can only be agreed and implemented by a multilateral group of nations including the United Kingdom, France, China, and other industrial nations as well. Furthermore, for those steps to become practicable, with no diminution of the security of the United States and its allies, a number of changes must first take place in the world scene. There must be a correction in today's imbalances in non-nuclear capabilities; an elimination of chemical warfare capabilities; an improvement in the methods of handling conditions of tension in the world, such as Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Angola; and a demonstration that the Soviet Union has reconciled itself to peaceful competition. With regard to the first steps, there appeared to be some new elements in the position of the Soviet side. On INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces], the Soviets appeared to have shifted somewhat their position on British and French nuclear forces. Because the INF proposals represent the most tangible movement resulting from Mr. Gorbachev's package, because the U.S. February initiative focuses on INF, and because these movements ultimately affect prospects in START [strategic arms reduction talks], I will later provide some elaboration of developments in this area. Mr. Gorbachev also expressed at least rhetorical support for more extensive verification measures than the Soviets have supported in the past. Finally, a first reading of the English text of Gorbachev's proposal indicated there might be a change in their position calling for a ban on strategic defense research; this, however, like several other indications of change, later turned out to be illusory. START But before getting into such areas of change in the positions of the two sides, let me review the basic position of the United States in the three NST negotiating groups and the status of our discussions with the Soviets. In START, the U.S. position reflects the summit joint statement commitment toward "the principle of 50 percent reductions in the nuclear arms of the U.S. and U.S.S.R., appropriately applied...." 93 Reentry vehicles (RVs) on ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] and SLBMS [submarine-launched ballistic missiles] would be reduced to a limit of 4,500-about 50% below current levels. 3 For the summit joint statement, see Documents on Disarmament, 1985, pp. 866–870. Reentry vehicles on ICBMS would be reduced to 3,000—about 50% below The United States cannot agree to one common limit on ballistic missile RVs and bomber weapons, as proposed by the Soviets. If one counted ALCMs, shortrange attack missiles, and gravity bombs as equivalent to Soviet ballistic missile RVS-despite the massive Soviet air defenses faced by U.S. bombers and the far lower readiness rate of bombers compared to ballistic missiles-the United States would be significantly penalized. But if the Soviets were to accept our proposed limit of 4,500 RVs along with our proposed limit of 1,500 ALCMs, it would result in reduction to a total of 6,000 ballistic missiles RVs and ALCMs on each side. This total constitutes the same number proposed by the Soviets for the overall limit on "nuclear charges" but would include a more appropriate definition of which systems reflect the strategic balance. With respect to strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, the United States has proposed a reduction in strategic ballistic missiles to a limit of 1,250-1,450, or about 40-45% below the current higher Soviet level. In this context, the United States could accept further reduction of heavy bomber limits to 350 (compared to our earlier proposal of 400)—about 40% below the current U.S. SALT [strategic arms limitation talks]-accountable level. For reasons similar to those applying to an RV and ALCM aggregate, the United States cannot agree to the Soviet proposal to include in a single aggregate strategic ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. However, if agreement were reached on a range of 1,250-1,450 for ICBMS and SLBMs, and on heavy bomber limits of 350, it would result in reduction of the total of strategic ballistic missiles and heavy bombers to between 1,600 and 1,800. "Build-down" is our suggested means of implementing the agreed reductions. We are prepared to begin working out details of a reduction schedule as soon as agreement can be achieved on the endpoints to be reached at the completion of the first stage. The U.S. proposal also contains a ban on the development and deployment of all new heavy strategic ballistic missiles and on the modernization of existing heavy missiles due to the destabilizing character of such systems. All mobile ICBMS would also be banned because of significant verification difficulties and inherent asymmetries in deployment opportunities between the sides. Round 4 of the NST negotiations was not productive with respect to START. Mr. Gorbachev's January 15 proposal did not include any changes in the Soviet position regarding START, and the Soviet negotiators at Geneva neither responded adequately to the possibilities raised by the U.S. initiative at the end of the previous round nor did they introduce any new ideas of their own. A large boulder on the path to progress in START has been the continuing Soviet insistence on defining strategic weapons as those systems capable of striking the territory of the other side. In addition to those central systems that the United States considers to be strategic, the Soviet definition of strategic delivery vehicles would also cover, on the U.S. side, all our LRINF [longer range intermediate-range nuclear forces] missiles, 340 "medium-range" dual-capable aircraft deployed in Europe and Asia, and 540 attack aircraft deployed on all 14 U.S. aircraft carriers, while 2,000-3,000 comparable Soviet nuclear delivery vehicles, including some 300 Backfire bombers, would not be so counted. Were the United States to retain equality in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles under the Soviet definition, we would have to cut LRINF missiles and dual-capable aircraft at sea and on land to 430-20% of the current Soviet global level. If the United States were to retain LRINF missiles and dual-capable aircraft at current levels, we would have to cut strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to less than half the allowed Soviet number. The Soviets proposed this inequitable definition of "strategic" during the early stages of the SALT I and SALT II negotiations. In both cases, they eventually withdrew their definition and agreed to a "central systems" approach to defining the systems subject to limitations in the agreements-that is, to ICBMS, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. We hope and expect that they will do so again. Until they do, prospects for progress on START will be severely encumbered. I have mentioned the disputed issue of how bomber weapons should be handled. Another issue between the sides concerns the handling of sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). The Soviets contend that all cruise missiles with ranges over 600 kilometers, including SLCMs, should be banned. Yet the Soviets do not answer our questions about how such a ban could be verified and do not acknowledge that such an outcome would leave the United States, much of whose population and industry is within range of shorter-range SLCMs, much more vulnerable to attack from residual systems than the Soviet Union. Another issue inhibiting progress in START is the Soviet demand for agreement to a ban on "space-strike arms" as a prerequisite even to serious negotiation on measures to limit strategic offensive systems. We regard such a precondition as unacceptable on its merits; we also believe serious negotiations in all three groups should proceed concurrently. We do not dispute the interrelationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive areas. In fact, it was the United States which first drew this connection during SALT I. With these considerations in mind, I will turn briefly to the defense and space negotiating group. Defense and Space With respect to defense and space, the United States has made clear that we are committed to the SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] research program, which is being carried out in full compliance with the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty. We are seeking to explore with the Soviets how a cooperative transition |