Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945: With a New AfterwordOxford University Press, 25 mai 1995 - 688 pages Since the original publication of this classic book in 1979, Roosevelt's foreign policy has come under attack on three main points: Was Roosevelt responsible for the confrontation with Japan that led to the attack at Pearl Harbor? Did Roosevelt "give away" Eastern Europe to Stalin and the U.S.S.R. at Yalta? And, most significantly, did Roosevelt abandon Europe's Jews to the Holocaust, making no direct effort to aid them? In a new Afterword to his definitive history, Dallek vigorously and brilliantly defends Roosevelt's policy. He emphasizes how Roosevelt operated as a master politician in maintaining a national consensus for his foreign policy throughout his presidency and how he brilliantly achieved his policy and military goals. |
Table des matières
The Struggle for Unity | 317 |
Balancing Needs | 362 |
Alliance Politics | 406 |
Will There Be Peace? | 485 |
L O | 529 |
Afterword 1995 | 539 |
A Note on Sources and Notes | 553 |
Selected Bibliography | 633 |
| 643 | |
Autres éditions - Tout afficher
Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 Robert Dallek Affichage d'extraits - 1979 |
Expressions et termes fréquents
accept action advised affairs agreed agreement Allies American arms Army asked assure attack August believed Britain British called Chiang Chiefs China Chinese Churchill commitment Committee concern Conference Congress continued cooperation Deal decision Department described Diary discussion Dutch East Indies East economic effective effort Europe European expressed fact fighting forces Foreign Relations France French further German give Hitler hope Hopkins House Hull idea important interest issue Italy Japan Japanese July June keep later leaders London March Marshall means meeting military months Morgenthau move Neutrality operations opinion Pacific peace Personal political possible postwar President President's prevent problems promised proposal question response Roosevelt Russians Senate September ships Soviet Stalin Stimson suggested talks tion told United urged wanted warned Washington wished York
Fréquemment cités
Page 29 - His favorite technique was to keep grants of authority incomplete, jurisdictions uncertain, charters overlapping. The result of this competitive theory of administration was often confusion and exasperation on the operating level; but no other method could so reliably insure that in a large bureaucracy filled with ambitious men eager for power the decisions, and the power to make them, would remain with the President.