of that proposition upon the credit of the tradition that it was revealed: but that would never amount to so great a certainty as the knowledge of it upon the comparing and measuring my own ideas of two right angles, and the three angles of a triangle. The like holds in matter of fact, knowable by our senses: v. g. the History of the Deluge is conveyed to us by writings which had their original from Revelation; and yet nobody, I think, will say he has as certain and clear a knowledge of the flood as Noah that saw it, or as he himself would have had, had he then been alive and seen it. For he has no greater assurance than that of his senses, that it is written in the Book supposed [to be] written by Moses inspired; but he has not so great an assurance that Moses wrote that Book as if he had seen Moses write it. So that the assurance of its being a Revelation is less still than the assurance of his senses.

Revelation cannot be admitted against the clear evidence of reason.—And therefore no Proposition can be received for Divine Revelation, or obtain the assent due to all such, if it be contradictory to our clear Intuitive Knowledge; because this would be to subvert the principles and foundations of all Knowledge, Evidence, and Assent whatsoever: and there would be left no difference between truth and falsehood-no measures of credible and incredible in the world-if doubtful propositions shall take place before self-evident, and what we certainly know [shall] give way to what we may possibly be mistaken in.

Traditional revelation much less.-Thus far a man has use of Reason, and ought to hearken to it; even in im

mediate and original Revelation, where it is supposed to be made to himself: but to all those who pretend not to immediate Revelation, but are required to pay obedience, and to receive the truths revealed to others, which, by the tradition of writings or word of mouth, are conveyed down to them, Reason has a great deal more to do, and is that only which can induce us to receive them. For, matter of Faith being only Divine Revelation and nothing else, Faith (as we use the word, called commonly-Divine Faith) has to do with no Propositions but those which are supposed to be divinely revealed.' So that I do not see how those who make Revelation alone the sole object of Faith can say that it is a matter of Faith, and not of Reason, to believe that such or such a Proposition, to be found in such or such a book, is of Divine Inspiration, unless it be revealed that that proposition, or all in that book, was communicated by Divine Inspiration.

Things above reason.-But, Thirdly, there being many things wherein we have very imperfect notions, or none at all, and other things of whose past, present, or future existence, by the natural use of our faculties, we can have no knowledge at all, these, as being beyond the discovery of our natural faculties and above Reason, are, when revealed, the proper matter of Faith. Thus— that 'part of the angels rebelled against GOD, and thereby lost their first happy state,' and that 'the dead shall rise, and live again'—these, and the like, being beyond the discovery of Reason, are purely matters of Faith, with which Reason has, directly, nothing to do.

Or not contrary to reason, if revealed, are matter of faith. But since GOD, in giving us the light of Reason

has not thereby tied up His own hands from affording us, when he thinks fit, the light of Revelation in any of those matters wherein our natural faculties are able to give a probable determination, Revelation, where GoD has been pleased to give it, must carry it against the probable conjectures of Reason; because the mind, not being certain of the truth of that [which] it does not evidently know (but only yielding to the probability that appears in it) is bound to give up its assent to such a testimony, [as], it is satisfied, comes from One who cannot err, and will not deceive. But yet it still belongs to Reason to judge [1.] of the truth of its being a Revelation, and [2.] of the signification of the words wherein it is delivered. Indeed, if anything shall be thought Revelation which is contrary to the plain principles of Reason and the evident Knowledge [that] the mind has of its own clear and distinct ideas, there Reason must be hearkened to as to a matter within its province: since a man can never have so certain a knowledge that a proposition, which contradicts the clear principles and evidence of his own Knowledge, was divinely revealed, or that he understands the words rightly wherein it is delivered, as he has that the contrary is true; and so [he] is bound to consider, and judge of it, as a matter of Reason, and not swallow it, without examination, as a matter of Faith.

Revelation, in matters where reason cannot judge, or but probably, ought to be hearkened to.-First, Whatever Proposition is revealed, of whose Truth our mind, by its natural faculties and notions, cannot judge,—that is purely matter of Faith, and above Reason.

Secondly, All propositions whereof the mind, by the

use of its natural faculties, can come to determine and judge, from naturally acquired ideas, are matter of reason; with this difference still, that in those concerning which it has but an uncertain evidence, and so is persuaded of their truth only upon probable grounds, which still admit a possibility of the contrary to be true, without doing violence to the certain evidence of its own Knowledge, and overturning the principles of all Reason-in such Probable Propositions, I say, an evident Revelation ought to determine our assent even against Probability. For where the principles of Reason have not evidenced a Proposition to be certainly true or false, there clear Revelation-as another principle of Truth and ground of Assent-may determine; and so it may be matter of Faith, and be also above Reason; because, Reason, in that particular matter, being able to reach no higher than Probability, Faith gave the determination where Reason came short, and Revelation discovered on which side the truth lay.

In matters where reason can afford certain knowledge, that is to be hearkened to.-Thus far the dominion of Faith reaches, and that without any violence or hindrance to Reason, which is not injured or disturbed, but assisted and improved, by new discoveries of Truth, coming from the eternal Fountain of all Knowledge. Whatever God hath revealed is certainly true; no doubt can be made of it. This is the proper object of Faith: but whether it be a Divine Revelation or not, Reason must judge; which can never permit the mind to reject a greater evidence [in order] to embrace what is less evident, nor allow it to entertain Probability in opposition to Knowledge

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and Certainty. Whatsoever is Divine Revelation ought to overrule all our opinions, prejudices, and interests, and has a right to be received with full assent: such a submission as this of our Reason to Faith takes not away the landmarks of Knowledge: this shakes not the foundations of Reason, but leaves us that use of our faculties for which they were given us.

If the boundaries be not set between faith and reason, no ·enthusiasm or extravagancy in religion can be contradicted. -If the provinces of Faith and Reason are not kept distinct by these boundaries, there will, in matter of Religion, be no room for Reason at all; and those extravagant opinions and ceremonies that are to be found in several [of the] religions of the world will not deserve to be blamed. So that, in effect, Religion, which should most distinguish us from beasts, and ought most peculiarly to elevate us as rational creatures above brutes, is that wherein men often appear most irrational, and more senseless than beasts themselves. • Credo quia impossibile est. I believe because it is impossible,'-might, in a good man, pass for a sally of zeal, but would prove a very ill rule for men to choose their opinions or religion by.

CHAPTER XIX.

OF ENTHUSIASM.

Love of truth necessary.-He that would seriously set upon the search of truth, ought, in the first place, to prepare his mind with a love of it; for he that loves it