tance between any thing and any two or more points, which are considered as keeping the same distance one with another, and so considered as at rest: for, when we find any thing at the same distance now [at] which it was yesterday from any two or more points, which have not since changed their distance one with another, and with which we then compared it, we say it has kept the same place; but if it has sensibly altered its distance. with either of those points, we say it has changed its place; though, vulgarly speaking in the common notion of place, we do not always exactly observe the distance from precise points, but from large portions of sensible objects to which we consider the thing placed to bear relation, and its distance from which we have some reason to observe.

Thus a company of chess-men standing on the same squares of the chess-board where we left them, we say they are all in the same place, or unmoved though perhaps the chess-board has been in the mean time carried out of one room into another: because we compared them only to the parts of the chess-board which keep the same distance one with another. The chess-board, we also say, is in the same place, if it remain in the same part of the cabin, though perhaps the ship in which it is sails all the while; and the ship is said to be in the same place, supposing it kept the same distance with the parts of the neighbouring land; though perhaps the earth has turned round, and so both chessmen and board and ship have, every one, changed place, in respect of remoter bodies, which have kept the same distance one with another. But yet the distance from

certain parts of the board being that which determines the place of the chess-men, and the distance from the fixed parts of the cabin (with which we made the comparison) being that which determined the place of the chess-board, and the fixed parts of the earth that by which we determined the place of the ship; these things may be said properly to be in the same place in those respects; though, their distance from some other things, which in this matter we did not consider, being varied, they have undoubtedly changed place in that respect: and we ourselves shall think so, when we have occasion to compare them with those others.

But this modification of Distance, [which] we call Place, being made by men for their common use, that by it they might be able to design the particular position of things, where they had occasion for such designation; men consider and determine of this place by reference to those adjacent things which best served their present purpose, without considering other things which to answer another purpose would better determine the place of the same thing. Thus in the chess-board, the use of the designation of the place of each chess-man being determined only within that chequered piece of wood, it would cross that purpose to measure it by any thing else: but when these very chess-men are put in a bag, if any one should ask where the Black King is, it would be proper to determine the place by the parts of the room, and not by the chess-board; there being another use of designing the place it is now in, than when in play it was on the chess-board; and so [this place] must be determined by other bodies. So, if any one should ask in what

'place' are the verses which report the story of Nisus and Euryalus, it would be very improper to determine this place by saying, they [are] in such a part of the earth, or in Bodley's Library; but the right designation of the place would be the part of Virgil's Works.

That our idea of Place is nothing else but such a relative position of any thing as I have before mentioned I think is plain, and will be easily admitted, when we consider that we can have no idea of the place of the Universe, though we can [have] of all the parts of it: because beyond that we have not the idea of any fixed, distinct, particular beings, in reference to which we can imagine it to have any relation of distance; but all beyond it is one uniform Space or Expansion, wherein the mind finds no variety, no marks. For, to say that the world is somewhere means no more than that it does exist; this, though a phrase borrowed from place, signifying only its existence, not location: and when one can find out and frame in his mind clearly and distinctly the place of the Universe, he will be able to tell us whether it moves or stands still in the undistinguishable inane of infinite space: though it be true that the word 'place' has sometimes a more confused sense, and stands [secondly] for-that space which any body takes up;' and so the Universe is in a place. The idea, therefore, of Place we have by the same means whereby we get the idea of Space (whereof this is but a particular limited consideration), viz. by our sight and touch; by either of which we receive into our minds the ideas of Extension or Distance.

CHAPTER XIV.

OF DURATION, AND ITS SIMPLE MODES.

Duration is fleeting extension.-There is another sort of Distance or length, the idea whereof we get not from the permanent parts of Space, but from the fleeting and perpetually perishing parts of Succession. This we call Duration; the Simple Modes whereof are any different lengths of it [of which] we have distinct ideas; as 'hours,' days,' 'years,' &c., time,' and 'eternity.'

Its idea from reflection on the train of our ideas.-The answer of a great man to one who asked what Time was, 'Si non rogas intelligo** (which amounts to this 'The more I set myself to think of it, the less I understand it')-might perhaps persuade one that Time, which reveals all other things, is itself not to be discovered. Duration, Time, and Eternity are not without reason thought to have something very abstruse in their nature. But however remote these may seem from our comprehension, yet if we trace them right to their originals, I doubt not but one of those sources of all our Knowledge, viz. Sensation and Reflection, will be able

The allusion here seems to be to Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, who lived in the latter part of the fourth and beginning of the fifth century of our era; though Locke has not quoted very accurately in the place, and Augustine's title to the designation of 'a great man' may be deemed more than questionable by many. The exact words of Augustine are" Quid ergo est tempus? Si nemo ex me quærat, scio; si quærenti explicare velim, nescio."-Confess"., Lib. XI., cap. xiv., sec. 2.-ED.

to furnish us with these ideas as clear and distinct as many others which are thought much less obscure; and we shall find that the idea of Eternity itself is derived from the same common original with the rest of our ideas.

To understand Time and Eternity aright, we ought with attention to consider what idea we have of Duration, and how we came by it. It is evident to any one who will but observe what passes in his own mind, that there is a train of ideas which constantly succeed one another in his Understanding, as long as he is awake. Reflection on these appearances of several ideas, one after another, in our minds is that which furnishes us with the idea of Succession; and the distance between any parts of that succession, or between the appearance of any two ideas in our minds, is that we call Duration. For whilst we are thinking, or whilst we receive successively several ideas in our minds, we know that we do exist; and so we call the existence, or the continuation of the existence, of ourselves or any thing else, commensurate to the succession of any ideas in our minds, the duration of ourselves, or [of] any such other thing coexisting with our thinking.

That we have our notion of Succession and Duration from this original, viz., from Reflection on the train of ideas which we find to appear one after another in our own minds, seems plain to me, in that we have no perception of duration but by considering the train of ideas that take their turns in our Understandings. When that succession of ideas ceases, our perception of duration ceases with it; which every one clearly [experiences]

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