but the ideas of so many distinct units added together: and these I call Simple Modes; as being contained within the bounds of one Simple idea. Secondly, There are others compounded of simple ideas of several kinds, put together to make one complex one; v. g. beauty, consisting of a certain composition of colour and figure, causing delight in the beholder; theft, which, being the concealed change of the possession of any thing without the consent of the proprietor, contains a combination of several ideas of several kinds: and these I call Mixed Modes.

Substances single or collective.-Secondly, The ideas of Substances are such combinations of Simple ideas as are taken to represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves, in which the supposed or confused idea of Substance, such as it is, is always the first and chief. Thus, if to Substance be joined the simple idea of a certain dull whitish colour, with certain degrees of weight, hardness, ductility, and fusibility, we have the idea of lead; and a combination of the ideas of a certain sort of figure, with the powers of motion, thought, and reasoning, joined to substance, make the ordinary idea of a Man. Now, of substances also there are two sorts of ideas; one of Single Substances, as they exist separately, as of a man, or a sheep; the other of several of those put together, as an army of men, or flock of sheep; which Collective ideas of several Substances thus put together, are as much, each of them, one single idea as that of a man, or unit.

Relation. Thirdly, The last sort of Complex ideas is that [which] we call Relation; which consists in the consideration and Comparing one idea with another. Of these several kinds we shall treat in their order.

The most abstruse ideas from the two sources.-If we trace the progress of our mind, and with attention observe how it repeats, adds together, and unites its simple ideas received from Sensation or Reflection, it will lead us farther than at first perhaps we should have imagined. And I believe we shall find, if we warily observe the originals of our notions, that even the most abstruse ideas, how remote soever they may seem from sense, or from any operation of our own minds, are yet only such as the Understanding frames to itself, by repeating and joining together ideas that it had either from objects of sense, or from its own operations about them; so that those even large and abstract ideas are derived from Sensation or Reflection; being no other than what the mind, by the ordinary use of its own faculties, employed about ideas received from objects of sense, or from the operations it observes in itself about them, may (and does) attain. This I shall endeavour to show in the ideas we have of Space, Time, and Infinity; and some few others that seem the most remote from those originals.

CHAPTER XIII.

OF THE SIMPLE MODES OF SPACE.

Simple Modes.-Though I have often mentioned Simple ideas, which are truly the materials of all our Knowledge; yet, having treated of them rather in the way [by which] they come into the mind than as distinguished from others more Compounded, it

will not be perhaps amiss to take a view of some of them again under this consideration, and examine those different modifications of the same idea which the mind either finds in things existing, or is able to make within itself, without the help of any extrinsic object, or any foreign suggestion.

These modifications of any one simple idea (which, as has been said, I call Simple Modes) are as perfectly different and distinct ideas in the mind as those of the greatest distance or contrariety; for the idea of two is as distinct from that of one as blueness from heat, or either of them from any number; and yet it is made up only of that simple idea of a unit repeated; and repetitions of this kind joined together make those distinct Simple Modes of a dozen, a gross, a million.

Idea of Space.-I shall begin with the simple idea of Space. I have showed (Chap. IV.), that we get the idea of Space both by our sight and touch: which I think is so evident, that it would be as needless to prove that men perceive by their sight a distance between bodies of different colours, or between the parts of the same body, as that they see colours themselves; nor is it less obvious that they can do so in the dark, by feeling and touch.

Space and Extension. This Space, considered barely in length between any two beings, without considering anything else between them, is called Distance; if considered in length, breadth, and thickness, it may be called Capacity: the term Extension is usually applied to it in whatsoever manner considered.

Immensity. Each different Distance is a different mo

dification of Space; and each idea of any different distance or space is a Simple Mode of this idea. Men, for the use and by the custom of measuring, settle in their minds the ideas of certain stated lengths, such as are an inch, foot, yard, fathom, mile, diameter of the earth, &c., which are so many distinct ideas made up only of Space. When any such stated lengths or measures of space are made familiar to men's thoughts, they can in their minds repeat them as often as they will, without mixing or joining to them the idea of Body or any thing else; and frame to themselves the idea of long, square, or cubic feet, yards, or fathoms, here amongst the bodies of the Universe; or else beyond the utmost bounds of all bodies: and, by adding these still one to another, [can] enlarge their ideas of Space as much as they please. This power of repeating or doubling any idea we have of any distance, and adding it to the former as often as we will, without being ever able to come to any stop, let us enlarge it as much as we will, is that which gives us the idea of Immensity.

Figure. There is another modification of this idea, which is nothing but the relation which the parts of the termination of Extension or circumscribed Space have amongst themselves. This the touch discovers in sensible bodies, whose extremities come within our reach; and the eye takes both from bodies and colours, whose boundaries are within its view: where, observing how the extremities terminate, either in straight lines which meet at discernible angles, or in crooked lines wherein no angles can be perceived, by considering these as they relate to one another, in all parts of the extremities of

any body or space, it has that idea we call Figure, which affords to the mind infinite variety. For, besides the vast number of different Figures that do really exist in the coherent masses of matter, the stock that the mind has in its power, by varying the idea of Space, and thereby making still new compositions, by repeating its own ideas and joining them as it pleases, is perfectly inexhaustible; and so it can multiply Figures in infinitum.

For, the mind having a power to repeat the idea of any length directly stretched out, and join it to another in the same direction (which is, to double the length of that straight line), or else join it to another with what inclination it thinks fit, and so make what sort of angle it pleases; and being able also to shorten any lines it imagines, by taking from it one-half, or one-fourth, or what part it pleases, without being able to come to an end of any such divisions, it can make an angle of any [measure]: so also the lines that are its sides, of what length it pleases; which joining again to other lines of different lengths and at different angles, till it has wholly enclosed any space, it is evident that it can multiply Figures both in their shape and capacity in infinitum; all which are but so many different Simple Modes of Space.

The same that it can do with straight lines, it can also do with crooked, or crooked and straight together; and the same it can do in lines, it can also [do] in superficies.

Place.-Another idea coming under this head is that [which] we call Place. As in simple Space we consider the relation of distance between any two bodies or points, so in our idea of Place we consider [first] the relation of dis