grity, (3) the skill-of the witnesses: (4) the design of the author, where it is a testimony out of a book cited: (5) the consistency of the parts and circumstances of the relation: [and] (6) contrary testimonies.

There is another which, though by itself it be no true ground of Probability, yet is often made use of for one, by which men most commonly regulate their Assent, and upon which they pin their faith more than [on] anything else, and that is [7.] The opinion of others: though there cannot be a more dangerous thing to rely on, or more likely to mislead one, since there is much more falsehood and error among men than Truth and Knowledge.

All the arguments,* pro and con, ought to be examined before we come to a judgment. The mind, if it would proceed rationally, ought to examine all the grounds of Probability, and see how they make more or less for or against any proposition, before it assents to, or dissents from, it; and, upon a due balancing the whole, reject or receive it with a more or less firm assent, proportionably to the preponderancy of the greater grounds of probability on one side or the other. For example:

If I myself see a man walk on the ice, it is past probability-it is Knowledge. But if another tells me he saw a man in England, in the midst of a sharp winter, walk upon water, hardened with cold, this has so great conformity with what is usually observed to happen, that

* The 8vo. (stereotyped) edition commonly in use in this country, among its many inaccuracies, reads 'agreements' here, which is absurd.-ED.

I am disposed, by the nature of the thing itself, to assent to it, unless some manifest suspicion attend the relation of that matter of fact. But if the same thing be told to one born between the Tropics, who never saw or heard of any such thing before, there the whole probability relies on testimony: and [accordingly] as the relators are more in number, and of more credit, and have no interest to speak contrary to the truth, so that matter of fact is like to find more or less belief; though to a man whose experience has been always quite contrary, and who has never heard of anything like it, the most untainted credit of a witness will scarcely be able to find belief: as it happened to a Dutch ambassador, who, entertaining the King of Siam with the particularities of Holland which he was inquisitive after, amongst other things, told him, 'that the water in his country would sometimes in cold weather be so hard that men walked upon it, and that it would bear an elephant, if he were there.' To which the King replied, Hitherto I have believed the strange things you have told me, because I look[ed] upon you as a sober, fair man; but now I am sure yoù lie.'

They being capable of great variety. Upon these grounds depends the Probability of any proposition: and as the conformity of our Knowledge, as the certainty of our observations, as the frequency and constancy of experience, and the number and-credibility of testimonies, do more or less agree or disagree with it, so is any proposition in itself more or less probable.

CHAPTER XVI.

OF THE DEGREES OF ASSENT.

Our assent ought to be regulated by the grounds of probability. The grounds of Probability, as they are the foundations on which our Assent is built, so are they also the measure whereby its several Degrees are or ought to be regulated: only we are to take notice, that whatever grounds of Probability there may be, they yet operate no further on the mind which searches after Truth and endeavours to judge right, than [as] they appear; at least in the first judgment or search that the mind makes. I confess, in the opinions men have and firmly stick to in the world, their Assent is not always from an actual view of the reasons that at first prevailed with them; it being in many cases almost impossible, and in most very hard, even for those who have very admirable memories, to retain all the proofs which upon a due examination made them embrace that side of the question It suffices that they have once with care and fairness sifted the matter as far as they could; and that they have searched into all the particulars that they could imagine to give any light to the question, and with the best of their skill cast up the account upon the whole evidence: and thus, having once found on which side the probability appeared to them, after as full and exact an inquiry as they can make, they lay up the conclusion in their memories as a truth [which] they have discovered; and for the future they remain satisfied with the testimony of their memories that this is the opinion that, by

the proofs they have once seen of it, deserves such a degree of their Assent as they afford it.

Without this, the greatest part of men must be either very sceptics, or change every moment, and yield themselves up to [any one] who, having lately studied the question, offers them arguments, which, for want of memory, they are not able presently to answer.

The ill consequence of this if our former judgment were not rightly made.—I cannot but own that men's sticking to their past judgment, and adhering firmly to conclusions formerly made, is often the cause of great obstinacy in error and mistake. But the fault is—not that they rely on their memories for what they have before well judged, but because they judged before they had well examined; which is indeed to think they judged right, because they never judged at all; and yet these, of all men, hold their opinions with the greatest stiffness: those being generally the most fierce and firm in their tenets who have least examined them.

Probability is either of matter of fact or speculation.— The Propositions we receive upon inducements of Probability are of two sorts; either [1.] concerning some particular existence, or, as it is usually termed,' matter of fact,' which, falling under observation, is capable of human testimony; or else [2.] concerning things which, being beyond the discovery of our senses, are not capable of any such testimony [i. e. are matter of speculation'].

6

The concurrent experience of all other men with ours produces assurance approaching to knowledge.-Concerning the first of these, viz., particular matter of fact;

First, The highest Degree of Probability is-When

the general consent of all men in all ages, as far as it can be known, concurs with a man's constant and never-failing experience in like cases, to confirm the truth of any particular matter of fact attested by fair witnesses. Such are all the stated constitutions and properties of bodies, and the regular proceedings of causes and effects in the ordinary course of nature. This we call-an Argument from the nature of things themselves: for what our own and other men's constant observation has found always to be after the same manner, that we with reason conclude to be the effect of steady and regular causes, though they come not within the reach of our Knowledge. Our Belief thus grounded rises to—Assurance.

Unquestionable testimony and experience for the most part produce confidence.-Secondly, The next Degree of Probability is,-When I find by my own experience, and the agreement of all others that mention it, a thing to be for the most part so; and that the particular instance of it is attested by many and undoubted witnesses:—v. g. History giving us such an account of men in all ages, and my own experience, as far as I had an opportunity to observe, confirming it, that most men prefer their private advantage to the public,' if all historians that write of Tiberius say, that Tiberius did so, it is extremely probable. And in this case, our Assent has a sufficient foundation to raise itself to a Degree which we may call-Confidence.

Fair testimony, and the nature of the thing [being] indifferent, produce also confident belief.—Thirdly, In things that happen indifferently,-when any particular matter of fact is vouched by the concurrent testimony of unsus