not, this may serve to explain their following one another in an habitual train, when once they are put into that track, as well as it does to explain such motions of the body.

Some antipathies an effect of it.-To this, perhaps, might be justly attributed most of the sympathies and antipathies observable in men, which work as strongly, and produce as regular effects, as if they were natural; and are therefore called so, though they at first had no other original but the accidental connexion of two ideas, which either the strength of the first impression, or future indulgence, so united, that they always afterwards kept company together in that man's mind, as if they were but one idea. I say, most of the antipathies, I do not say all; for some of them are truly natural, depend upon our original constitution, and are born with us.

Instances. The ideas of goblins and sprites have really no more to do with darkness than light; yet let but a foolish maid inculcate these often on the mind of a child, and raise them there together, possibly he shall never be able to separate them again so long as he lives; but darkness shall ever afterwards bring with it those frightful ideas, and they shall be so joined that he can no more bear the one than the other.

A man receives a sensible injury from another, thinks on the man and that action over and over, and, by ruminating on them strongly, or much, in his mind, so cements those two ideas together that he makes them almost onenever thinks on the man, but the pain and displeasure he suffered come into his mind with it, so that he scarce

distinguishes them, but has as much an aversion for the one as the other. Thus hatreds are often begotten from slight and almost innocent occasions, and quarrels propagated and continued in the world.

A man has suffered pain or sickness in any place-he saw his friend die in such a room-though these [things] have in nature nothing to do with one another, yet when the idea of the place occurs to his mind, it brings (the impression being once made) that of the pain and displeasure with it; he confounds them in his mind, and can as little bear the one as the other.

Many children, imputing the pain they endured at school to the books they were corrected for, so join those ideas together that a book becomes their aversion, and they are never reconciled to the study and use of them all their lives after: and thus reading becomes a torment to them, which otherwise possibly they might have made the great pleasure of their lives.

Why time cures some disorders in the mind which reason cannot.- When this combination is settled, and whilst it lasts, it is not in the power of Reason to help us, and relieve us from the effects of it. Ideas in our minds, when they are there, will operate according to their natures and circumstances; and here we see the cause why time cures certain affections, which reason, though in the right and allowed to be so, has not power over, nor is able against them to prevail with those who are apt to hearken to it in other cases.

Influence [of association] on intellectual habits.-Intellectual habits and defects contracted [in] this way not less frequent and powerful, though less observed.

are

Let the ideas of being and matter be strongly joined either by education or much thought-whilst these are still combined in the mind, what notions, what reasonings, will there be about separate Spirits!

Observable in different sects.-Some such wrong and unnatural combinations of ideas will be found to establish the irreconcileable opposition between different sects of philosophy and religion. For we cannot imagine every one of their followers to impose wilfully on himself, and knowingly refuse truth [when] offered. Interest, though it does a great deal in the case, yet cannot be thought to work whole societies of men to so universal a perverseness, as that every one of them to a man should knowingly maintain falsehood: some at least must be allowed to do what all pretend to, i. e. -to pursue truth sincerely; and therefore there must be something that blinds their Understandings, and makes them not see the falsehood of what they embrace for real truth. That which thus captivates their reason, and leads men of sincerity blindfold from common sense, will, when examined, be found to be what we are speaking of. Some independent ideas, of no alliance to one another, are, by education, custom, and the constant din of their party, so coupled in their minds, that they always appear there together; and they can no more separate them in their thoughts, than if they were but one idea; and they operate as if they were so. This gives sense to jargon, demonstration to absurdities, and consistency to nonsense; and is the foundation of the greatest (I had almost said of all the) errors in the world; or, if it does not reach so far, it is at least the most

dangerous one, since, so far as it obtains, it hinders men from seeing and examining.

Conclusion. Having thus given an account of the Original, Sorts, and Extent of our Ideas-with several other considerations about these (I know not whether I may say) instruments, or materials, of our Knowledgethe Method I at first proposed to myself would now require that I should immediately proceed to show what use the Understanding makes of them, and what Knowledge we have by them. This was that which, in the first general view I had of this subject, was all that I thought I should have to do: but, upon a nearer approach, I find that there is so close a connexion between Ideas and Words, and [that] our abstract ideas and general words have so constant a relation one to another, that it is impossible to speak clearly and distinctly of our Knowledge-which all consists in propositions-without considering, first, the nature, use, and signification of Language: which therefore must be the business of the next Book.

END OF SECOND BOOK.

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

OF WORDS OR LANGUAGE IN GENERAL.

Man fitted to form articulate sounds.-God, having designed man for a social creature, made him not only with an inclination and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind, but furnished him also with Language, which was to be the great instrument and common tie of society. Man, therefore, had by nature [1.] his organs so fashioned as to be fit to frame articulate sounds which we call Words. But this was not enough to produce Language; for several birds will be taught to make articulate sounds distinct enough, which yet are by no means capable of Language.

To make them signs of ideas.—Besides articulate sounds, therefore, [2.] it was farther necessary that he should be able to use these sounds as signs of internal concep tions; and to make them stand as marks for the ideas within his own mind, whereby they might be made known to others, and the thoughts of men's minds be conveyed from one to another.

To make general signs.—But neither was this sufficient to make Words so useful as they ought to be. It is not enough for the perfection of Language that sounds can