the municipal laws of some governments, a capital crime. In this case, when the positive mode has one name, and another name as it stands in relation to the law, the distinction may as easily be observed as it is in substances, where one name (v. g. man) is used to signify the thing, another (v. g. father) to signify the relation.

The denominations of actions often mislead us.—But because very frequently the positive idea of the action, and its moral relation, are comprehended together under one name, and the same word [is] made use of to express both the mode or action and its moral rectitude or obliquity, therefore the Relation itself is less taken notice of: and there is often no distinction made between the positive idea of the action, and the reference it has to a rule. By which confusion of these two distinct considerations under one term, those who yield too easily to the impressions of sounds, and are forward to take names for things, are often misled in their judgment of actions. Thus the taking from another what is his, without his knowledge or allowance, is properly called-stealing:' but that name being commonly understood to signify also the moral pravity of the action, and to denote its contrariety to the law, men are apt to condemn whatever they hear called 'stealing,' as an ill action disagreeing with the rule of right. And yet the private taking away [of] his sword from a madman, to prevent his doing mischief, —though it be properly denominated ‘stealing,' as the name of such a mixed mode,—when compared to the Law of God, and considered in its relation to that supreme rule, is no sin or transgression, though the name 'stealing' ordinarily carries such an intimation with it.

All relations terminate in simple ideas. From what has been said [we may, in conclusion] observe, First, That it is evident that all Relation terminates in-and is ultimately founded on those Simple ideas we have got from Sensation or Reflection: so that all that we have in our thoughts ourselves (if we think of anything, or have any meaning)—[all that we] would signify to others when we use words standing for relations-is nothing but some simple idea, or collection of simple ideas compared one with another.

We have ordinarily a notion as clear (or clearer) of the relation as of its foundation.-Secondly, That in Relations, we have for the most part, if not always, as clear a notion of the Relation, as we have of those simple ideas wherein it is founded.

The notion of the relation is the same, whether the rule any action is compared to be true or false.-Thirdly, That in these I call Moral Relations I have a true notion of relation by comparing the action with the rule, whether the rule be true or false. For if I measure anything by a yard, I know whether the thing I measure be longer or shorter than that supposed yard, though perhaps the yard I measure by be not exactly the standard : which, indeed, is another inquiry. For, though the rule be erroneous, and I mistaken in it, yet the agreement or disagreement observable in that which I compare with it makes me perceive the relation. Measuring by a wrong rule I shall be brought to judge amiss of its moral rectitude: yet I am not mistaken in the relation which that action bears to that rule I compare it to, which is [merely a relation of] agreement or disagreement.

CHAPTER XXIX.

OF CLEAR AND OBSCURE, DISTINCT AND CONFUSED IDEAS.

'Clear' and 'obscure' [in ideas], explained by sight.— The perception of the mind being most aptly explained by words relating to the sight, we shall best understand what is meant by Clear and Obscure in our ideas by reflecting on what we call clear and obscure in the objects of sight. Light being that which discovers to us visible objects, we give the name of obscure to that which is not placed in a light sufficient to discover minutely to us the figure and colours which are observable in it; and which, in a better light, would be discernible. In like manner our Simple ideas are clear-when they are such as the objects themselves, from whence they were taken, did or might, in a well-ordered sensation or perception, present them. Whilst the memory retains them thus, and can produce them to the mind whenever it has occasion to consider them, they are clear ideas. So far as they either want anything of that original exactness, or have lost any of their first freshness, and are, as it were, faded or tarnished by time, so far are they obscure. Complex ideas, as they are made up of simple ones, so they are clear [1.] when the ideas that go to their composition are clear; and [2. when] the number and order of those simple ideas, that are the ingredients of any complex one, [are] determined and certain.

Causes of obscurity.—The cause of obscurity in Simple ideas seems to be either [1.] dull organs, or [2.] very slight and transient impressions made by the objects, or

else [3.]a weakness in the memory not [being] able to retain them as received. For-to return again to visible objects, to help us to apprehend this matter if the organs or faculties of perception [be] like wax over-hardened with cold, [which] will not receive the impression of the seal from the usual impulse wont to imprint it; or like wax of a temper too soft, [which] will not hold it well when imprinted; or else supposing the wax of a temper fit, but the seal not applied with a sufficient force to make a clear impression-in any of these cases, the print left by the seal will be obscure.

Distinct and confused, what.-As a clear idea is—that whereof the mind has such a full and evident perception as it receive[s] from an outward object operating duly on a well-disposed organ, so a distinct idea is that wherein the mind perceives à difference from all other [ideas]; and a confused idea is such as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another from which it ought to be different.

Objection." If no idea be confused but such as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another from which it should be different, it will be hard," may any one say, "to find anywhere a confused idea. For, let any idea be as it will, it can be no other but such as the mind perceives it to be; and that very perception sufficiently distinguishes it from all other ideas, which cannot be other, i. e. different, without being perceived to be so. No idea, therefore, can be undistinguishable from another from which it ought to be different, unless you would have it different from itself: for from all other [ideas] it is evidently different."

Confusion of ideas is in reference to their names.-To remove this difficulty, and to help us to conceive aright what it is that makes the confusion ideas are at any time chargeable with, we must consider that things ranked under distinct names are supposed different enough to be distinguished; and so each sort, by its peculiar name, may be marked, and discoursed of apart, upon any occasion: and there is nothing more evident than that the greatest part of different names are supposed to stand for different things. Now, every idea a man has being [evidently] what it is, and distinct from all other ideas but itself, that which makes it confused is—when it is such that it may as well be called by another name as that which it is expressed by; the difference which keeps the things (to be ranked under those two different names) distinct, and makes some of them belong rather to the one, and some to the other of those names, being left out; and so the distinction, which was intended to be kept up by those different names, is quite lost.

Defaults which make confusion.-The defaults which usually occasion this confusion are chiefly these following:

Complex ideas made up of too few simple ones.-First, When any complex idea (for complex ideas are most liable to confusion) is made up of too small a number of simple ideas, and [of] such only as are common to other things, whereby the differences (that make it deserve a different name) are left out. Thus, he that has an idea made up of barely the simple ones of a beast with spots has a confused idea of a leopard; it not being thereby sufficiently distinguished from a lynx and several