can be occasions of comparing him to other things, in any manner of agreement, disagreement, or respect what

soever.

The ideas of relations often clearer than of the subjects related. Secondly, Though Relation be not contained in the real existence of things, but [in] something extraneous and superinduced; yet the ideas which relative words stand for are often clearer and more distinct than those of substances to which they belong. The notion we have of a father or brother is a great deal clearer and more distinct than that we have of a man; or—paternity is a thing whereof it is easier to have a clear idea than humanity: and I can much easier conceive what a friend is, than what GOD [is]. Because the knowledge of one action, or one simple idea, is oftentimes sufficient to give the notion of a Relation: but to the knowing of any substantial Being, an accurate collection of sundry ideas is necessary. A man, if he compare two things together, can hardly be supposed not to know what it is wherein he compares them: so that when he compares any things together, he cannot but have a very clear idea of that relation. The ideas, then, of Relations are capable at least of being more perfect and distinct in our minds than those of Substances. cause it is commonly hard to know all the simple ideas which are really in any Substance, but for the most part easy enough to know the simple ideas that make up any Relation I think on, or have a name for: v.g. comparing two men, in reference to one common parent, it is very easy to frame the f brothers, without having yet

the perfect ide

Be

significant relative words,

as well as others, standing only for ideas-and those being all either simple, or made up of simple ones-it suffices for the knowing the precise idea the relative term stands for, to have a clear conception of that which is the foundation of the relation; which may be done without having a perfect and clear idea of the thing it is attributed to.

Relations all terminate in simple ideas.-Thirdly, Though there be a great number of considerations wherein things may be compared one with another, and so a multitude of Relations; yet, they all terminate in, and are concerned about, those simple ideas either of Sensation or Reflection, which I think to be the whole materials of all our Knowledge. To clear this, I shall show it [1.] in the most considerable Relations that we have any notion of; and [2.] in some that seem to be the most remote from Sense or Reflection.

Terms leading the mind beyond the subject denominated are relative.-Fourthly, Relation being the considering of one thing with another which is extrinsic to it, it is evident that all words that necessarily lead the mind to any other ideas than are supposed really to exist in that thing to which the word is applied are relative words: v. g. ([while the terms] a man, black, merry, thoughtful, thirsty, angry, extended-these and the like—are all absolute, because they neither signify nor intimate anything but what does or is supposed really to exist in the man thus denominated) father, brother, king, husband, blacker, merrier, &c., are words which, together with the thing they denominate, imply also something else separate [from] and exterior to the existence of that thing.

I shall now proceed to show [by] some instances, [1.] how all the ideas we have of Relation are made up (as others are) only of simple ideas; and [2.] that they all, how refined or remote from sense soever they seem, terminate at last in Simple ideas. I shall begin with the most comprehensive Relation, wherein all things that do or can exist are concerned; and that is the Relation of Cause and Effect.

CHAPTER XXVI.

OF CAUSE AND EFFECT, AND OTHER RELATIONS.

Whence their ideas got.-In the notice that our senses take of the constant vicissitude of things, we cannot but observe that several particular qualities and substances begin to exist; and that they receive this their existence from the due application and operation of some other being. From this observation we get our ideas of Cause and Effect. That which produces any Simple or Complex idea we denote by the general name Cause; and that which is produced, Effect. Thus, finding in that substance which we call wax [that] fluidity, which is a simple idea that was not in it before, is constantly produced by the application of a certain degree of heat, we call the simple idea of heat, in relation to fluidity in wax, the cause of it, and fluidity the effect.

Creation, generation, making, alteration.-Having thus, from what our senses are able to discover in the operations of bodies on one another, got the notion of Cause

and Effect—viz., that a Cause is that which makes any other thing, either Simple Idea, Substance, or Mode, begin to be; and an Effect is that which had its beginning from some other thing-the mind finds [it] no great difficulty to distinguish the several originals of things into two sorts:—

First, When the thing is wholly made new, so that no part thereof did ever exist before; as when a new particle of matter does begin to exist, in rerum naturâ, which had before no being: and this we call Creation.

Secondly, When a thing is made up of particles which did all of them before exist, but that very thing so constituted of pre-existing particles (which, considered all together, make up such a collection of simple ideas), had not any existence before, as this man, this egg, rose, or cherry, &c. And this, when referred to a substance produced in the ordinary course of nature by an internal principle, but set on work by and received from some external agent or cause, and working by insensible ways which we perceive not, we call-Generation. When the cause is extrinsic, and the effect produced by a sensible separation or juxta-position of discernible parts, we call it-Making; and such are all artificial things. When any simple idea is produced which was not in that subject before, we call it—Alteration. Thus a man is generated; a picture made; and either of them altered, when any new sensible quality, or simple idea, is produced in [any] of them, which was not there before; and the things thus made to exist, which were not there before, are effects; and those things which operated to the existence, causes. To have the idea of Cause and Effect, it

suffices to consider any simple idea, or substance, as beginning to exist by the operation of some other, without knowing the manner of that operation.

Relations of time.-Time and Place are also the foundations of very large Relations; and all finite beings at least are concerned in them. Thus, when any one says that "Queen Elizabeth lived sixty-nine, and reigned forty-five years," these words import only the relation of that duration to some other, and mean no more than this—that the duration of her existence was equal to sixty-nine, and the duration of her government to forty-five annual revolutions of the sun; and so are all words answering [to the question] How long?' Again: "William the Conqueror invaded England about the year 1066," which means this, that, taking the duration from our Saviour's time till now for one entire great length of time, it shows at what distance this invasion was from the two extremes: and so do all words of time answering to the question, When?-which show only the distance of any point of time from the period of a longer duration, from which we measure, and to which we thereby consider it as related.

เ

There are yet, besides those, other words of time that ordinarily are thought to stand for positive ideas, which yet will, when considered, be found to be relative, such as are, young, old, &c. which include and intimate the relation anything has to a certain length of duration, whereof we have the idea in our minds. Thus, having settled in our thoughts the idea of the ordinary duration of a man to be seventy years, when we say a man is young, we mean that his age is yet but a small part of