to happen, is yet harder to be understood. We have by daily experience clear evidence of motion produced both by impulse and by thought; but the manner how hardly comes within our comprehension: we are equally at a loss in both. So that, however we consider motion, and its communication either from body or spirit, the idea which belongs to spirit is at least as clear as that which belongs to body. And if we consider the active power of moving—or, as I call it, motivity-it is much clearer in Spirit than Body; since two bodies, placed by one another at rest, will never afford us the idea of a power in the one to move the other, but by a borrowed motion: whereas the mind every day affords ideas of an active power of moving of bodies; and therefore it is worth our consideration, whether active power be not the proper attribute of [pure] Spirit, and passive power of Matter. Hence may be conjectured, that created Spirits are [alone] both active and passive.

But whichever of these ideas be clearest that of Body or Spirit-this is evident, that the simple ideas that make them up are no other than what we have received from Sensation or Reflection; and so is it of all our other ideas of Substances; [and] even of GOD.

Idea of God. For if we examine the idea we have of the incomprehensible Supreme Being, we shall find that we come by it [in] the same way; and that the complex ideas we have both of God and separate spirits are made up of the simple ideas we receive from Reflection: v. g. having, from what we experi[ence] in ourselves, got the ideas of Existence and Duration, of Knowledge and Power, of Pleasure and Happiness, and of several othe

Qualities and Powers which it is better to have than to be without-when we would frame an idea the most suitable we can to the Supreme Being, we enlarge every one of these with our idea of Infinity; and so, putting them together, make our complex idea of GOD.

And thus we have seen what kind of ideas we have of Substances of all kinds; wherein they consist, and how we come by them.

CHAPTER XXIV.

OF COLLECTIVE IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES.

One idea. Besides these complex ideas of several Single Substances, as of man, horse, gold, &c., the mind has also complex Collective ideas of Substances; which I so call, because such ideas are made up of many particular Substances considered together, as united into one idea, and which so joined are looked on as one; v. g. the idea of such a collection of men as make an army, though consisting of a great number of distinct Substances, is as much one idea as the idea of a man: and the great collective idea of all [earthly] bodies whatsoever, signified by the name world, is as much one idea as the idea of any the least particle of matter in it; it sufficing to the unity of any idea, that it be considered as one representation or picture, though made up of ever so many particulars.

Made by the power of composing in the mind. These Collective ideas of Substances the mind makes by its power of Composition, and uniting, severally, either sim

ple or complex ideas into one; as it does by the same faculty make the complex ideas of particular Substances, consisting of an aggregate of divers simple ideas united in one Substance.

All artificial things are collective ideas.-Amongst such collective ideas are to be counted [those of] most artificial things; at least [of] such of them as are made up of distinct Substances: and in truth, if we consider all these Collective ideas aright, as army, constellation, &c., as they are united into so many single ideas, they are but the artificial draughts of the mind, bringing things very remote, and independent [of] one another, into one view; the better to contemplate and discourse of them [when] united into one conception, and signified by one name. For there are no things so remote, nor so contrary, which the mind cannot, by this art of composition, bring into one idea, as is [evident] in that signified by the name— Universe.

CHAPTER XXV.

OF RELATION.

Relation, what.-When the mind so considers one thing, that it does, as it were, bring it to and set it by another, and carry its view from one to the other; this is-as the words import--Relation and respect; and the denominations given to positive things, intimating that respect, and serving as marks to lead the thoughts beyond the subject itself denominated to something distinct from

it, are what we call relatives; and the things so brought together [we call] related. Thus, when the mind considers Caius as such a positive thing, it takes nothing into that idea but what really exists in Caius; v. g. when I consider him as a man, I have nothing in my mind but the complex idea of the species man. So likewise, when I say, 'Caius is a white man,' I have nothing but the bare consideration of a man who has that white colour. But when I give Caius the name husband, I intimate some other person; and when I give him the name whiter I intimate some other thing: in both cases my thought is led to something beyond Caius; and there are two things brought into consideration. And since any idea, whether Simple or Complex, may be the occasion why the mind thus brings two things together, and, as it were, takes a view of them at once, though still considered as distinct; therefore any of our ideas may be the foundation of Relation. As in the above-mentioned instance, the contract and ceremony of marriage with Sempronia [are] the occasion of the denomination or relation of husband; and the colour white the occasion why he is said to be whiter than [suppose] freestone.

Relations without correlative terms not easily perceived.— These, and the like Relations, expressed by relative terms that have others answering them with a reciprocal intimation, as father and son, cause and effect, are very obvious to every one; and everybody, at first sight, perceives the relation. But where languages have failed to give correlative names, there the Relation is not always so easily taken notice of. [Magistrate] is, no doubt, a relative name as well as [husband] but in languages

where this and the like words have not a correlative term, there people are not so apt to take them to be so; as wanting that evident mark of relation which is between correlatives, which seem to explain one another, and not to be able to exist, but together. Hence it is that many of those names, which, duly considered, do include evident relations, have been called External Denominations. But all names, that are more than empty sounds, must signify some idea which is either [1.] in the thing to which the name is applied (and then it is positive, and is looked on as united to and existing in the thing to which the denomination is given) or else [2.] it arises from the respect the mind finds in it to something distinct from it, with which it considers it; and then it includes a Relation.

Some seemingly absolute terms contain relations.Another sort of relative terms there is [viz., those] which are not looked on to be either relative, or so much as External Denominations; [but] which yet, under the form and appearance of signifying something absolute in the subject, do conceal a tacit, though less observable Relation. Such are the seemingly positive terms of old, great, imperfect, &c.

Relation different from the things related. This farther may be observed, that the ideas of Relation may be the same in men who have far different ideas of the things that are related, or that are thus compared; v. g. those who have far different ideas of a man may yet agree in the notion of a father; which is a notion superinduced to the substance or man, and refers only to an act [or condition] of that thing called man, let man be what it will.