(1) The Challenge of Preserving Independence and Stability in East Asia and the Pacific The Soviet Union continues to extend its power and influence in the region. Over 50 Soviet divisions are deployed in the Soviet Far East, along with about 2,000 tactical aircraft and one-third of the SS-20 mobile missile force. Modernization of Soviet naval forces in the region continues with the addition of Kirov cruisers to the expanding Soviet Pacific fleet. The Soviets have also built up their forces in Vietnam and the South China Sea. More than 2,500 Soviet military advisors are supporting efforts in Vietnam, and approximately 30 Soviet ships routinely patrol the South China Sea. This buildup is clearly aimed at the United States and its allies and friends in the region. Since North Korean President Kim Il-Song's visit to Moscow in 1984, the Soviet Union has expanded its military assistance to North Korea. In exchange, the Soviets have received overflight rights for both strike and reconnaissance aircraft. These improvements in Soviet-North Korean military cooperation clearly threaten security in Northeast Asia. Our support to the Republic of Korea (ROK) under the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954, and in particular, the presence of U.S. forces in Korea, have played a key role in deterring North Korean aggression. North Korea's military modernization, reorganization, and repositioning of forces nearer the DMZ has seriously reduced attack warning time for U.S. and South Korean forces. We are, however, committed to meeting the challenges to regional security in Northeast Asia both by maintaining U.S. strength in the region and by aiding South Korea in its self-defense efforts. Our developing defense relationship with China is based on a commonality of security interests. A secure, modernizing China can be a force for peace and stability in East Asia and the world. During my recent visit to China, reaffirmed our willingness to play a positive role in China's defense modernization. We will continue to pursue high-level dialogues, functional military exchanges, and military technological cooperation in areas that will enhance China's ability to defend itself against external threats. The Cambodian people continue to suffer under a brutal Vietnamese military occupation. At the same time, the large Vietnamese force in Cambodia threatens our ally Thailand. We will continue to help the Thai Government meet regional threats and defend its borders against Vietnamese aggression. (2) U.S. Forces A strong and visible U.S. presence in the region is necessary to deter the Soviet Union, North Korea, and Vietnam from interfering with the independence and stability of our allies and friends. The U.S. Commander in Chief for the Pacific (USCINCPAC), with headquarters in Hawaii and forces spread across the western Pacific and Indian Oceans, has responsibility for U.S. military operations in a region covering more than 50 percent of the earth's surface. Chart III.H.5 shows the forces allocated to the Pacific Command. The sheer size of the East Asian and Pacific region and the limited availability of U.S. forces necessitates close cooperation with our friends and allies to meet threats posed by potential adversaries. - Japan Japan's importance to security in the region cannot be overestimated. Though limited to a defensive role, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces are improving their capabilities. The Japanese defense budget has grown, albeit from a low base, during the past 16 years, rising by more than 5 percent in real terms annually despite a slowdown in overall government spending. This continuation of sustained real growth in defense spending is one in a series of encouraging steps that demonstrate Japan's recognition of its responsibility as a member of the democratic community of nations, an obligation formally accepted by Prime Minister Nakasone. Other positive steps include the acceptance of the defense of sea lines of communications to 1,000 nautical miles (forces for which are addressed by Japan's 1986-1990 Defense Plan) and, most recently, the decision to permit commercial participation in the Strategic Defense Initiative research effort. Republic of Korea (ROK) - The primary threat to the ROK remains North Korea. Even though the presence of American troops gives the ROK important military advantages, North Korea today could launch a massive attack with minimal warning. Together with the ROK and our United Nations partners, we must continue to strengthen U.S. and ROK capabilities on the Korean peninsula. To this end, U.S. and ROK forces are modernizing steadily and participate jointly in five annual training exercises in Korea. Stability on the peninsula will enhance the success of international events, such as the 1988 Olympics, that are being held in the ROK, and sustain the growth in national pride and confidence that results from such successes. The Philippines -- Our security relationship with the Philippines rests on several interrelated factors. U.S. military facilities in that country permit us to maintain a continuous air and naval presence in the region. We are committed under the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 to assist in the defense of the Philippines in the event of attack. Finally, we share an interest in the maintenance of a friendly, democratic government in the Philippines, which is critical to the stability of Southeast Asia. Last February, the Philippine people took control of their own destiny through a peaceful, democratic revolution. Communist insurgents, however, have been quick to capitalize on the economic hardships of the Marcos era. As a result, their insurgency has grown rapidly over the past few years and now constitutes a grave threat to Philippine democracy. The United States has moved since last February to provide substantial additional amounts of economic and military assistance to the Philippines. Continued assistance will be required in order to ensure that the Philippine Government has sufficient economic and security resources to complete the transition to permanent democratic government. Thailand -- While Thailand, a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), has pledges of support from several of its neighbors in the event of an attack by the large Vietnamese forces in Cambodia and Laos, the Thais still consider the United States their primary defense ally. Under the Manila Pact, the United States has supported Thailand with a broad range of programs to improve and modernize the Thai armed forces. Our efforts have included joint participation in combined exercises, provision of equipment and training, and improved cooperative logistics support through the U.S. security assistance program and negotiation of a U.S.-Thai war reserve stockpile agreement. These robust, ongoing programs are enhancing both Thailand's security and world peace. Australia and New Zealand -- The ANZUS treaty, which until recently joined us with both Australia and New Zealand in common defense efforts, now operates in a practical sense as a bilateral mutualsecurity pact with Australia. While our commitment to security in the South Pacific remains as strong as ever, the New Zealand Government's unyielding position on port access forced us to drop New Zealand from formal U.S. security obligations. Bilateral cooperation with Australia, under ANZUS, will continue, however, as the cornerstone of our security efforts in the South Pacific. We look forward to New Zealand's early resumption of normal allied cooperation. d. Western Hemisphere The highest priority in U.S. defense planning is accorded to the defense of North America, the contiguous Caribbean Basin, and the adjoining sea and air routes that are the lifeline of American trade. In North America itself, we coordinate our defense efforts with Canada -- with whom we share the world's longest unfortified border -- under the auspices of the Canada-U.S. Basic Security Plan. Our programs for Latin America are planned within the structure of the Rio Treaty and the Charter of the Organization of American States. (1) The Challenge U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere seeks to deter strategic attack on North America, promote democracy and freedom, foster economic development, support dialogue and negotiations, and together with our friends and allies, maintain the security of the region. Latin America remains an attractive Third World target in Moscow's pursuit of its global ambitions. Soviet military aid and training assistance have made Cuban military and paramilitary forces the second largest in the hemisphere. Eastern-bloc equipment and large numbers of Russian and Cuban advisors support Nicaragua's armed forces, which are the largest in Central America. The forces of Cuba and the Soviet Union could hold our Caribbean lifelines at risk in times of global crisis, as well as form a base from which the Soviets and client states could support guerrilla wars and intimidate other nations in the region. U.S. policy and programs therefore seek effective ways to reduce Soviet presence and influence in the region, constrain Soviet- and Cuban-supported destabilization and insurgency, and support democracy and economic development. (2) Risks To the north, the threat to the United States and Canada has been steadily increasing as a result of Soviet advancements in ballistic missiles, missile-carrying submarines, bombers, and long-range cruise missiles. Continuation of the United States-Canada combined military command of NORAD, prudent surveillance and air defense modernization, and progressive research in advanced technologies for aerospace defense are required to maintain the security of North America. Traditionally, Latin America has been an area in which we have maintained a limited military presence to meet our treaty commitments for defense of the Panama Canal. Economic and military assistance have been the primary vehicles for pursuing our security objectives in the area. If left unchecked, the massive Cuban and Nicaraguan buildup of conventional military forces, and the spread of communistbacked insurgency, could eventually force the United States to reorient substantial forces to protect its interests in the region. To preclude this possibility, the United States is pursuing a strategy of: increased foreign assistance, to promote regional selfdefense capabilities and economic stability; a stepped-up tempo of exercises and training, to demonstrate our ability and resolve to assist friendly nations directly threatened by aggression; and support of the Nicaraguan Democratic Forces, to maintain pressure on the Sandinista regime to cease its support of regional subversion and make good on its guarantee to the Nicaraguan people of a fully democratic government. We have made substantial progress toward these objectives in Central America over the past year, but have fallen behind in South America, where insurgencies, drug trafficking, and Soviet efforts at destabilization threatened both established and fledgling democracies. Future progress is threatened by continued reductions in foreign assistance and defense resources targeted for the region. The funding required for these programs is relatively modest, but it is imperative that the full required amount be provided. The alternative would be much more costly, and would greatly increase the risk to U.S. security worldwide. |