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defense for the United States is to help others. Thus, an "economy of force" strategy is mandated. Furthermore, we are working to integrate our military strategy, to an unprecedented overall interagency and intergovernmental approach to address the problem in its political, economic, and social dimensions, as well as its military form. Finally, each major kind of low-intensity warfare requires its own strategic approach, since more traditional forms of deterrence are not likely to dissuade those who practice these subtle, ambiguous methods of aggression.
(1) Combatting Insurgencies
The problems of decolonization and nation building associated with the emergence of Third World states from colonial rule has led in many cases, to political, social, and economic instabilities that threaten the survival of legitimate governments, and compromise U.S. security interests. These conditions also exist in older independent nations of the Third World. Generally, these instabilities, combined with popular dissatisfaction and the target government's inability to respond effectively, lay the groundwork for exploitation by internal elements who seek to effect through violence what they cannot change through peaceful, orderly means. Frequently in these instances we find the Soviet Union and its surrogates capitalizing on a nation's misfortunes by supporting these insurgents in their attempts to overthrow the existing order. When they have succeeded, as we have seen, the result is the imposition of a far more odious form of government, as occurred in Vietnam, Cuba, and Nicaragua.
In other examples, insurgencies secure support by promising reedom from repression, and then impose far more repressive governments than any the world has seen since the Middle Ages. Iran is the prime example in this category, and the lesson for the United States is that we should be reluctant indeed to join an apparently popular revolution against a government friendly to the United States, as was the Shah's government in Iran, and only after asking ourselves whether the people involved actually will benefit by any change in rulers. In the Philippines, we satisfied this test and the results now more than justify our actions.
Our response to all these challenges generally has been, and should be, to assist friendly governments threatened by externally supported insurgents in alleviating those legitimate grievances levied against them. At the same time, we are helping the host country regime combat those insurgent groups whose aim is not reasoned reform, but rather the seizing of power to impose their own agenda by force. Since the root problems of insurgency are primarily political, social, and economic, assisting the host country combat the military threat is but one element in a comprehensive strategy that must address the conflict's multiple dimensions. The key to success in this kind of war is the host country's willingness to make those changes and reforms required to preempt the insurgents' cause thereby frustrating their attempts to intimidate the people and cripple the economic infrastructure.
This approach requires a long-term effort on our part. Insurgencies are typically protracted conflicts, and therefore our strategy must be designed for the long haul. It is not so much our objective to help these nations win battles against insurgent military forces as it is to assist their military in buying the time necessary for needed reforms to take root and flourish under govern
ments friendly to the United States. Unless the host government succeeds in eliminating the underlying causes of insurgency, any military successes won in the field will prove f
Our specific role is to work with the other appropriate U.S. government agencies and host country organizations, as necessary, to integrate our effort into a comprehensive strategy to combat the insurgency when that is indicated, and, where possible, identify at an early stage those conditions that foster insurgency. Our support typically involves training indigenous host country forces, pro assistance in technical areas like communications and intelligence, and ensuring that the armed forces have the equipment needed to exploit the training they receive.
In discussing the proper "Uses of Military Power" in last year's Annual Report and in earlier speeches, I noted that the United States should not treat lightly the prospect of employing American combat
rces. From the point of view of one who bears a large part of the responsibility for the lives of American troops, I do not believe the country is ill-served by the requirement that, before we commit military personnel, our national interests be so heavily involved that the only way left to serve those interests is by the commitment to combat of our troops. This caution is especially relevant when contemplating their use to assist regimes threatened by insurgency. For one thing, the deterioration of the host country's situation that could result in a call for U.s. troops is, in itself, an indication that the regime is not making progress in enacting needed reforms. Without this kind of commitment on their part, any military effort on our part will ultimately prove fruitless. Nor will the American people or their elected representatives in the Congress sustain support for regimes that refuse to do what is needed while the lives of American servicemen are at risk. For this reason we must also have a clear grasp of how the regime targeted by insurgents represents a long-term and absolutely vital interest to our security. Without this condition, we stand little chance of prevailing in a protracted conflict. This also ensures that we will commit the requisite resources to sustain our strategy over the long haul.
Also, we must have a clear understanding with the country we seek to assist, and within our own councils, of how our forces will work to achieve clearly defined strategic objectives. The assisted nation must seek to assume the full burden for its defense at the earliest possible moment. Indeed, this is the ultimate measure of our strategy's success. In the past six years we have done much to enhance our special operations forces and general purpose forces to operate effectively in this unique conflict environment. Yet this effort does not eliminate the need to constantly reassess the relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed. If the host regime will not address itself to the task at hand, U.S. combat forces cannot be expected to remain indefinitely. Finally, we should commit combat forces only as a last resort, after diplomatic, economic, and other political options have been exhausted.
The history of the past 40 years indicates that, whether it goes by the name of insurgency, a war of national liberation, or revolutionary warfare, this kind of ambiguous aggression poses a major threat to U.s. security interests. This threat defies a strictly military solution, although there is a clear military dimension to the conflict. Given its ambiguous and protract
s ambiguous and protracted nature, and the decisive role played by the regime targeted by insurgents, we must
Of course, we oppose those who seek to impose totalitarianism in the Third World, but we must recognize that there are many who fight to restore the liberty and independence they have lost to communist aggression. These peoples, be they from Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, Cambodia, or other countries suffering the effects of totalitarian oppression, deserve our support; not only because it is right, but because as President Kennedy observed, "If men and women are in chains anywhere in the world, then freedom is endangered." Thus, as President Reagan has stated, our policy is not "just the prevention of war, but the extension of freedom as well." We are prepared to support those who fight for freedom, not only because it is morally right, but because it is one of the best ways to safeguard the security of the world's democracies.
(2) Combatting Subversion
While insurgency involves protracted warfare to achieve its ultimate goal of toppling a government, subversion involves actions taken by an external power to recruit and assist indigenous political and military forces to overthrow their government through a coup d'etat. The Soviet Union has utilized subversion as a means of ambiguous aggression since Lenin's time. Some of their more recent successes include Ethiopia and Afghanistan. Had we not responded promptly and forcefully, Grenada would have been added to the list. This form of low-intensity aggression is not limited to the Soviet Union; it has also been embraced by others, among them Qaddafi's Libya and Castro's Cuba, in attempting to advance their aims.
The key to combatting this subtle form of aggression, which manifests itself in open conflict only at the last possible moment, is the quality and reliability of a nation's indigenous military forces, along with its legitimate political institutions. Although we in this country take for granted the supremacy of civilian authority, this is frequently not the case in many third World states. Nevertheless, a cornerstone of our strategy to combat subversion concerns our efforts to enhance the capabilities of friendly nation military forces, and to assist them in effecting those reforms that augment their professionalism and emphasize the importance of an apolitical military leadership supportive of free institutions. Countering subversion requires a long-term commitment to creating shared values through exchange programs, training and education, civic action, and related activities. This kind of preventive medicine wards off penetration and subversion of the military by hostile powers bent on effecting a violent change in the established order. In so doing, it reduces the likelihood that our combat forces will ever be requested by a legitimate government under attack by indigenous forces influenced by malevolent external powers. Although we seek to counter subversion through the methods noted above, the United States has, in the past, responded effectively with force to blunt this kind of aggression in Lebanon (1958), the Dominican Republic (1965), and Grenada (1983), and retains the capability and the will to do so again should it be deemed necessary. Surely, no one can contend that it is to our advantage to allow communist-supported subversion to convert a friendly government into a communist enemy, and particularly not in our own hemisphere.
(3) Combatting Terrorism
It is safe to say that nothing has so outraged the world's civilized peoples in recent years as the senseless acts of violence carried out by terrorist groups representing radical political and religious views. In its domestic form, terrorism is properly the province of the police forces of a nation. When terrorism becomes international in scope or is aided and abetted by state sponsors, however, the threat posed to U.S. citizens and security interests may require an American military response. This response may occur at two levels. At a lower level, it involves our actions to deter acts of terrorism and, if deterrence fails, to deny the terrorists their objectives. Deterrence, in this case, frequently requires that we not only convey our ability and willingness to punish the perpetrator, but that we convince the terrorist that his objective cannot be achieved; that is, deterrence through denial as well as through the threat of retaliation. Unfortunately, in free societies it is difficult, if not impossible, to impose the kinds of restrictions that might guarantee the denial of all potential targets to terrorists. Nevertheless, we have undertaken numerous active and passive defensive measures to make our military forces, especially those overseas, less attractive targets for terrorist groups. At the same time we have developed highly trained units that are capable of assisting friendly governments defeat terrorist acts that are already under way, as in the case of hostage seizures.
When terrorism is sponsored by the leaders of sovereign states as a tool of aggression, however, it moves beyond the realm of an internal police matter to a higher level -- that of international conflict involving state-to-state confrontation. Here the situation differs from individual acts of terrorism, as we saw this past April when we identified Libya as clearly responsible for an act of terrorism against our military personnel in West Berlin. The military operations executed by U.S. forces in response to this act of aggression were conventional in nature. They were carried out with exceptional skill, daring, and effectiveness, in the best traditions of all our forces. The action demonstrated many things, one being that we are ready, on very short notice, for very difficult actions involving the solution of particularly complex logistical problems. The Libyan action was not carried out by the kind of special operations forces that are involved in combatting specific terrorist acts while they are in progress and, in a sense, this is even a greater tribute to our conventional forces. It also involves the closest coordination
nterdepartmental level and with our allies. The objective of the Libyan operation was both to strike at terrorist support bases, and to teach the state of Libya that providing terrorist groups with the support necessary to conduct their international campaign of aggression against the United States carries with it a terrible cost. Thus, our strategy for precluding and combatting terrorist acts involves a range of general purpose forces as well as special operations forces.
Unlike nuclear war or a major conventional war, we must concern ourselves not only with deterring ambiguous aggression, but with actively combatting it, for it is going on all around us. To some extent, it is the product of our success in preventing wars at higher levels of intensity that has forced our adversaries to pursue these wars in the shadows. With their high mixture of political, economic, and social elements blended into a military threat, these forms of ambiguous aggression demand the closest coordination between the United States and its allies, and within our government itself. A multidimensional threat demands a comprehensive response. Other sections of this report consider, in detail, how the Defense Department is improving special operations forces and general purpose forces to contribute to the Administration's national strategy for combatting low-intensity aggression. If the Congress provides us the resources and the unswerving support to execute this strategy over the long haul, the "long twilight struggle" will favor the cause of democracy and freedom. If we fail, these forms of aggression will remain the most likely and the most enduring threats to our security.
3. Reducing and Controlling Arms: A New Realism
The United States seeks to negotiate arms reduction agreements with the Soviet Union that will enhance deterrence and stability at lower force levels. Beginning in 1969, the United States attempted to constrain the growth of the Soviet strategic threat through the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT) process. Unfortunately, this attempt failed because the flawed nature of those agreements permitted huge Soviet increases. The Soviets continued their massive military modernization and unrelenting buildup of their nuclear arsenal, intentionally exploiting the arms control process to achieve military advantages. Purported "arms control agreements" actually legitimized the buildup in Soviet capabilities. The Soviets counted on exploiting America's faith in the arms control process, and our deep desire to reduce the risk of war, to inhibit a U.S. response to the shift in the balance of power. In addition, the Soviets were able to forestall a U.S. response to their treaty noncompliance by veiling their activities in secrecy, then counting on our domestic politics and our public opinion to keep the issues clouded in ambiguity for years.
The Reagan Administration's approach to arms control is a direct result of the failures of the SALT process. During the 1970s, the substitution of unwarranted optimism for responsible analysis resulted in the negotiation of two agreements that were arms control in name only. As President Reagan has recently observed: It is clear that SALT II and I both "legalized" and offered our agreement to a very major arms increase including a quadrupling of Soviet strategic weapons (warheads and bombs) since SALT I was signed in 1972 and a near doubling of Soviet ballistic missile warheads from about 5,000 to more than 9,000 since SALT II was signed in 1979.
a. Real Reductions
From our first arms control proposal in November 1981 to the present, this Administration has insisted that arms control agreements involve real reductions of a substantial nature. We have also insisted that the reductions lead to increased strategic stability. Our immediate goal has been, and continues to be, significant reductions in those nuclear systems most suitable for a first strike -ballistic missiles -- in particular, large, multiple-warhead, landbased intercontinental ballistic missiles. We have also proposed the