(3) Combatting Terrorism It is safe to say that nothing has so outraged the world's civilized peoples in recent years as the senseless acts of violence carried out by terrorist groups representing radical political and religious views. In its domestic form, terrorism is properly the province of the police forces of a nation. When terrorism becomes international in scope or is aided and abetted by state sponsors, however, the threat posed to U.S. citizens and security interests may require an American military response. This response may occur at two levels. At a lower level, it involves our actions to deter acts of terrorism and, if deterrence fails, to deny the terrorists their objectives. Deterrence, in this case, frequently requires that we not only convey our ability and willingness to punish the perpetrator, but that we convince the terrorist that his objective cannot be achieved; that is, deterrence through denial as well as through the threat of retaliation. Unfortunately, in free societies it is difficult, if not impossible, to impose the kinds of restrictions that might guarantee the denial of all potential targets to terrorists. Nevertheless, we have undertaken numerous active and passive defensive measures to make our military forces, especially those overseas, less attractive targets for terrorist groups. At the same time we have developed highly trained units that are capable of assisting friendly governments defeat terrorist acts that are already under way, as in the case of hostage seizures. When terrorism is sponsored by the leaders of sovereign states as a tool of aggression, however, it moves beyond the realm of an internal police matter to a higher level that of international conflict involving state-to-state confrontation. Here the situation differs from individual acts of terrorism, as we saw this past April when we identified Libya as clearly responsible for an act of terrorism against our military personnel in West Berlin. The military operations executed by U.S. forces in response to this act of aggression were conventional in nature. They were carried out with exceptional skill, daring, and effectiveness, in the best traditions of all our forces. The action demonstrated many things, one being that we are ready, on very short notice, for very difficult actions involving the solution of particularly complex logistical problems. The Libyan action was not carried out by the kind of special operations forces that are involved in combatting specific terrorist acts while they are in progress and, in a sense, this is even a greater tribute to our conventional forces. It also involves the closest coordination at the interdepartmental level and with our allies. The objective of the Libyan operation was both to strike at terrorist support bases, and to teach the state of Libya that providing terrorist groups with the support necessary to conduct their international campaign of aggression against the United States carries with it a terrible cost. Thus, our strategy for precluding and combatting terrorist acts involves a range of general purpose forces as well as special operations forces. (4) Summary Unlike nuclear war or a major conventional war, we must concern ourselves not only with deterring ambiguous aggression, but with actively combatting it, for it is going on all around us. To some extent, it is the product of our success in preventing wars at higher A levels of intensity that has forced our adversaries to pursue these wars in the shadows. With their high mixture of political, economic, and social elements blended into a military threat, these forms of ambiguous aggression demand the closest coordination between the United States and its allies, and within our government itself. multidimensional threat demands a comprehensive response. Other sections of this report consider, in detail, how the Defense Department is improving special operations forces and general purpose forces to contribute to the Administration's national strategy for combatting low-intensity aggression. If the Congress provides us the resources and the unswerving support to execute this strategy over the long haul, the "long twilight struggle" will favor the cause of democracy and freedom. If we fail, these forms of aggression will remain the most likely and the most enduring threats to our security. 3. Reducing and Controlling Arms: A New Realism The United States seeks to negotiate arms reduction agreements with the Soviet Union that will enhance deterrence and stability at lower force levels. Beginning in 1969, the United States attempted to constrain the growth of the Soviet strategic threat through the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT) process. Unfortunately, this attempt failed because the flawed nature of those agreements permitted huge Soviet increases. The Soviets continued their massive military modernization and unrelenting buildup of their nuclear arsenal, intentionally exploiting the arms control process to achieve military advantages. Purported 'arms control agreements" actually legitimized the buildup in Soviet capabilities. The Soviets counted on exploiting America's faith in the arms control process, and our deep desire to reduce the risk of war, to inhibit a U.S. response to the shift in the balance of power. In addition, the Soviets were able to forestall a U.S. response to their treaty noncompliance by veiling their activities in secrecy, then counting on our domestic politics and our public opinion to keep the issues clouded in ambiguity for years. The Reagan Administration's approach to arms control is a direct result of the failures of the SALT process. During the 1970s, the substitution of unwarranted optimism for responsible analysis resulted in the negotiation of two agreements that were arms control in name only. As President Reagan has recently observed: It is clear that SALT II and I both "legalized" and offered our agreement to a very major arms increase including a quadrupling of Soviet strategic weapons (warheads and bombs) since SALT I was signed in 1972 and a near doubling of Soviet ballistic missile warheads from about 5.000 to more than 9,000 since SALT II was signed in 1979. a. Real Reductions From our first arms control proposal in November 1981 to the present, this Administration has insisted that arms control agreements involve real reductions of a substantial nature. We have also insisted that the reductions lead to increased strategic stability. Our immediate goal has been, and continues to be, significant reductions in those nuclear systems most suitable for a first strike ballistic missiles in particular, large, multiple-warhead, landbased intercontinental ballistic missiles. We have also proposed the - elimination of the entire inventory of U.S. and Soviet longer-range intermediate-range nuclear forces (LRINF). Moreover, we have proposed the ultimate elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles. We have been criticized for not signing any agreement with the Soviets. We have no doubt whatever that it is far better to wait patiently for real reductions rather than to seek easy political acclaim by signing arms agreements that permit more increases. Our persistence has paid off. Our progress did not happen by accident. It came about because we learned from the mistakes of the 1970s. We learned that we cannot induce the Soviets to agree to arms reductions by first unilaterally limiting U.S. forces. In 1981. the Reagan Administration adopted a strategic modernization program that gave the United States back its deterrent capability as well as negotiating leverage. We did not attempt to use alleged arms control as a substitute for a defense strategy, nor did we use arms control negotiations as an excuse for allowing our deterrent capability to erode. Then, in 1983, we announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which also was instrumental in bringing the Soviets back to the bargaining table they had said they would not rejoin. b. Verification and Soviet Noncompliance The Reagan Administration has recognized that we must be able to verify complete Soviet treaty compliance to detect both Soviet cheating and use of ambiguities that, in the past, have allowed Moscow to use the "arms control process" for its own ends. The importance of effective verification is crucial, given the Soviets' record of noncompliance with existing arms control agreements. In his December 1985 report on this issue, President Reagan confirmed that the pattern of Soviet noncompliance continued largely uncorrected. Moscow has violated its legal obligations under, or political commitments to, the SALT II agreement, the SALT I interim agreement, the ABM treaty, the Limited Test Ban treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, and the Helsinki Final Act, and has likely violated the Threshold Test Ban treaty. In his report, the President noted how the Kremlin has made military gains through its noncompliance with arms control agreements in the area of strategic offensive arms as well as chemical, biological, and toxin weapons. The President also highlighted the extent of Moscow's military gain by virtue of noncompliance with the ABM treaty. The illegal construction of the ballistic missile detection and tracking radar at Krasnoyarsk, combined with other Soviet ABM-related activities, suggests that the Soviets might be preparing an ABM defense of their national territory. This is prohibited by the ABM treaty. Soviet unilateral deployment of a territorial defense system would have profound adverse consequences for the strategic balance that has preserved the peace. The clear pattern of Soviet noncompliance with the legal obligations and political commitments of their arms control agreements signals an intent to achieve strategic superiority. Moreover, Soviet noncompliance, as the President has stated, "has raised fundamental doubts about the integrity of the arms control process itself. A country simply cannot be serious about effective arms control unless it is equally serious about compliance." While the United States has scrupulously complied with its arms control obligations, Moscow has continued towards its military and political objectives unconstrained by its arms control obligations. C. A New Course On May 27, 1986, President Reagan made an important decision on arms control and strategic policy. Because of Moscow's continuing arms control violations and refusal to reciprocate our restraint, the President announced that the United States will henceforth base our decisions regarding our strategic offensive force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on the flawed standards contained in the SALT II agreement of 1979 or the SALT I Interim Agreement of 1972. In addition, the President committed the United States to a policy of restraint consistent with protecting strategic deterrence. The President said that, assuming no significant change occurs in the threat, we would not deploy more strategic nuclear vehicles or ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union. Critics of this decision fail to recognize that the President has no prudent alternative to putting our policies toward Moscow on a more realistic footing. In addition, critics fail to acknowledge that the Soviets have had ample opportunity to redress the situation. Since 1983, we have repeatedly made clear to Moscow our grave concerns regarding Soviet noncompliance. Nevertheless, in 1985 the President ordered the dismantling of a Poseidon submarine to remain within SALT II limits, thereby giving the Soviets even more time to comply with their obligations. At that time, he made it clear that the United States could no longer tolerate a double standard of compliance, whereby we were bound by an agreement that Moscow was violating. Regrettably, the Soviets have neither corrected the situation nor chosen to join the United States in a framework of mutual restraint. d. Continuing the Search for a Stable and Secure Future In his May 1986 announcement, the President reaffirmed our commitment to strive for an agreement on deep and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms provided that we can be confident of Soviet compliance with it. The United States has not given up on the arms control process. We have only become more realistic in our approach to negotiating with Moscow, and we have made it clear we want arms reductions, not more agreements that allow enormous Soviet expansion. In the October meeting at Reykjavik between the President and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev, further progress was made in the preliminary discussions on both START and INF (intermediate-range nuclear forces). The Soviet Union again apparently agreed to specific 50 percent reductions in strategic nuclear forces, including significant reductions in their destabilizing SS-18 force. There seemed also to be agreement that strategic forces should be reduced to 1,600 delivery vehicles and 6,000 warheads for each side. Substantial progress was made on the issue of counting bomber weapons. Unfortunately, progress was not made on some important outstanding issues, such as various categories of sublimits that would serve to enhance stability. An INF agreement in principle was reached on the complete elimination of U.S. and Soviet longer-range INF missiles in Europe and a global limit of 100 warheads on such missiles. The two sides also agreed (1) to constrain shorter-range INF missiles pending negotiation of their reduction and (2) to a basic approach for verification. Disagreement, however, remains on other key issues including an equal right for the United States to match Soviet shorter-range INF missile deployments at constrained levels. However, on the second day at Reykjavik, the Soviets made it clear they would not agree to anything unless we give up SDI. In short, the Soviets are still trying to hold progress in all areas of arms control hostage to acceptance of their proposals on the SDI. Although the President demonstrated flexibility regarding the timing of any strategic defensive systems' deployment, the Soviets learned that he will not forsake U.S. national security by crippling the SDI in pursuit of an arms agreement. The SDI is a key element of the U.S. approach to a more secure world. It remains essential even with an agreement on reductions and the ultimate elimination of ballistic missiles. Although further work is required to reconcile fundamental U.S./ USSR differences, the Iceland discussions created very important opportunities for more productive arms control negotiations. Any successful negotiations, however, will be founded on the three elements discussed below. e. Three Formidable Tasks First and foremost, we must maintain a strong deterrent posture to guarantee a stable future, while providing the Soviets with incentives to reduce their nuclear arsenal and ensuring that violations of their solemn treaty agreements will entail real costs. This calls for sustaining our strategic modernization program and vigorous pursuit of the SDI. Second, we must be able to verify Soviet treaty compliance without the ambiguities that have allowed Moscow to exploit the arms control process in the past. The issues of mobile missiles, constraints on both quantitative and qualitative characteristics of ballistic missiles, and problems inherent to cruise missiles, all will present difficult challenges for the verification of future treaties. We must, throughout the negotiation process, insist on greater cooperation and openness in future agreements including on-site inspection - - and not settle for anything less than effective verification of our arms agreements. Finally, in making decisions affecting U.S. national security, we must not assume that the Soviet Union will faithfully comply with its treaty obligations. Nor can we allow any future arms control agreement to be a substitute for the maintenance of a strong U.S. defense posture. 4. Competitive Strategies for Long-Term Security In last year's report I discussed competitive strategies and my intention to make them a major DoD theme for the remainder of this Administration. The central idea of competitive strategies is simple |