survivability and endurability to each element of our deterrent. Most important, it adds to the Soviets' doubts that their attack could succeed. In addition to making hardware improvements, we have devoted a great deal of thought and effort to the development of more selective, discriminating, and controlled responses to the wide and varied nature of potential Soviet acts of aggression. This flexibility which follows directly from the requirements of flexible response as initially set forth in the early 1960s increases our ability to deter both nuclear and nonnuclear attacks against us or our allies. - - - Now and until we deploy an effective SDI, the security of the United States and our interests depends on nuclear deterrence and our maintaining the nuclear umbrella over our allies something we are doing and are prepared to continue. Meanwhile, we are investigating technologies under the SDI that could one day make us less dependent on offensive nuclear arms to deter Soviet aggression. But, clearly, as long as we remain dependent on nuclear weapons for our security, we must continue to test them for safety and reliability, and to ensure the credibility, effectiveness, and survivability of our deterrent. We test neither more frequently nor at levels higher than absolutely necessary to meet our security requirements. At the same time, we must retain the flexibility to adjust our testing to respond to changes in the Soviet threat. Certainly we should not be beguiled by Soviet offers to give up the necessary testing we must do especially in view of past Soviet cheating on so many other agreements. - 2. Conventional Deterrence and Low-Intensity Conflict a. Conventional Deterrence As was discussed in detail in Chapter I.C., to help deter nonnuclear aggression, U.S. strategy emphasizes the role of conventional forces. This emphasis is in preference to reliance on nuclear weapons, whose deterrent value eroded as the Soviet Union matched or exceeded U.S. capabilities in key areas of our nuclear posture. A robust conventional posture provides us with the safest, most reassuring deterrent at the lowest feasible risk of nuclear war, indeed of any major war. The defense program presented in Part III of this Annual Report reflects our commitment to conventional deterrence. America's conventional forces are structured and deployed primarily to counter our most serious global threat: Soviet military power. However, they also must be designed to operate with our special operations forces to counter less ominous threats at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, and when our national interests overwhelmingly require us to commit our troops to combat. Today, the United States confronts several forms of ambiguous aggression in what is popularly referred to as Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC). While terrorism, subversion, and insurgency are as ancient as conflict itself, the growing intensity with which they are pursued by our adversaries in the post-World War II era requires a commensurate increase in the attention we devote to them. Indeed, these forms of ambiguous aggression have become so widespread that they have become the "warfare of choice" over the last 40 years. They represent a long-term challenge to our security, a permanent aspect of the "long twilight struggle" between democracy and its enemies. The increased prominence of terrorism, insurgency, and subversion has several causes. One is that, for better or worse, nuclear weapons have made great power confrontations highly dangerous. The implicit recognition that even if, by their thinking, a nuclear war could be "won," it would exact incalculable costs, has made the Soviet Union look for other means to advance its aggressive designs. Coupled with our nuclear deterrent has also been our conventional deterrent, which has yet to be challenged in Europe and which, with the South Koreans, successfully blocked communist attempts to subjugate South Korea. Thus the very success of our efforts in deterring nuclear and major conventional aggression has driven Soviet efforts, and those of other hostile states, toward more ambiguous forms of aggression. These efforts have been aided, and the challenge we face expanded, by the comparatively recent proliferation of Third World states that coincided with the decline of the great European empires following World War II. These new states, in many cases, have encountered economic, political, and social problems that make them ripe for internal upheaval or external exploitation and subversion. The rampant growth in the international arms trade, coupled with the increased lethality of weapons, have combined to reduce the costs to countries planning to use LIC. All this occurred as the United States' world role increased, both as a consequence of our emergence as the de facto leader of the free world after World War II, and because of our rapidly expanding network of political, economic, and social relationships within an environment of increased global interdependence. This, of course, has made us more vulnerable to these forms of aggression. Indeed, today there seems to be no shortage of adversaries who seek to undermine our security by persistently nibbling away at our interests through these shadow wars carried on by guerrillas, assassins, terrorists, and subversives in the hope that they have found a weak point in our defenses. For them, lowintensity warfare, be it terrorism, insurgency, or subversion, represents a cost-effective means of aggression for advancing their interests, while minimizing the prospect of a forceful response by the United States and our allies. In a sense, we face a dual threat. First, there are the political, social, and economic instabilities endemic to many Third, World nations that make them ripe for exploitation by radical or disenfranchised internal elements. Often these elements foment hostility focused on the so-called "neocolonialist" West, particularly the United States. Secondly, the Soviet Union is eager to exploit this instability directly or through its proxies, to promote terrorism, subversion (as in Grenada, Ethiopia, Afghanistan in 1978, and South Yemen) and insurgency, thereby undermining U.S. security interests through this "indirect approach." Essentially, we are also faced with another conflict potential, different from either nuclear war or more traditional, conventional military operations. We must combat this threat to our security by assisting those friendly states that rely on our help at a time when our defense resources are already stretched to their limit. But we all should recognize that here, as elsewhere, the most cost-effective defense for the United States is to help others. Thus, an "economy of force" strategy is mandated. Furthermore, we are working to integrate our military strategy, to an unprecedented degree, within an overall interagency and intergovernmental approach to address the problem in its political, economic, and social dimensions, as well as its military form. Finally, each major kind of low-intensity warfare requires its own strategic approach, since more traditional forms of deterrence are not likely to dissuade those who practice these subtle, ambiguous methods of aggression. (1) Combatting Insurgencies The problems of decolonization and nation building associated with the emergence of Third World states from colonial rule has led in many cases to political, social, and economic instabilities that threaten the survival of legitimate governments, and compromise U.S. security interests. These conditions also exist in older independent nations of the Third World. Generally, these instabilities, combined with popular dissatisfaction and the target government's inability to respond effectively, lay the groundwork for exploitation by internal elements who seek to effect through violence what they cannot change through peaceful, orderly means. Frequently in these instances we find the Soviet Union and its surrogates capitalizing on a nation's misfortunes by supporting these insurgents in their attempts to overthrow the existing order. When they have succeeded, as we have seen, the result is the imposition of a far more odious form of government, as occurred in Vietnam, Cuba, and Nicaragua. In other examples, insurgencies secure support by promising freedom from repression, and then impose far more repressive governments than any the world has seen since the Middle Ages. Iran is the prime example in this category, and the lesson for the United States is that we should be reluctant indeed to join an apparently popular revolution against a government friendly to the United States, as was the Shah's government in Iran, and only after asking ourselves whether the people involved actually will benefit by any change in rulers. In the Philippines, we satisfied this test and the results now more than justify our actions. Our response to all these challenges generally has been, and should be, to assist friendly governments threatened by externally supported insurgents in alleviating those legitimate grievances levied against them. At the same time, we are helping the host country regime combat those insurgent groups whose aim is not reasoned reform, but rather the seizing of power to impose their own agenda by force. Since the root problems of insurgency are primarily political, social, and economic, assisting the host country combat the military threat is but one element in a comprehensive strategy that must address the conflict's multiple dimensions. The key to success in this kind of war is the host country's willingness to make those changes and reforms required to preempt the insurgents' cause thereby frustrating their attempts to intimidate the people and cripple the economic infrastructure. This approach requires a long-term effort on our part. Insurgencies are typically protracted conflicts, and therefore our strategy must be designed for the long haul. It is not so much our objective to help these nations win battles against insurgent military forces as it is to assist their military in buying the time necessary for needed reforms to take root and flourish under govern ments friendly to the United States. Unless the host government succeeds in eliminating the underlying causes of insurgency, any military successes won in the field will prove fleeting. Our specific role is to work with the other appropriate U.S. government agencies and host country organizations, as necessary, to integrate our effort into a comprehensive strategy to combat the insurgency when that is indicated, and, where possible, identify at an early stage those conditions that foster insurgency. Our support typically involves training indigenous host country forces, providing assistance in technical areas like communications and intelligence, and ensuring that the armed forces have the equipment needed to exploit the training they receive. In discussing the proper "Uses of Military Power" in last year's Annual Report and in earlier speeches, I noted that the United States should not treat lightly the prospect of employing American combat forces. From the point of view of one who bears a large part of the responsibility for the lives of American troops, I do not believe the country is ill-served by the requirement that, before we commit military personnel, our national interests be so heavily involved that the only way left to serve those interests is by the commitment to combat of our troops. This caution is especially relevant when contemplating their use to assist regimes threatened by insurgency. For one thing, the deterioration of the host country's situation that could result in a call for U.S. troops is, in itself, an indication that the regime is not making progress in enacting needed reforms. Without this kind of commitment on their part, any military effort on our part will ultimately prove fruitless. Nor will the American people or their elected representatives in the Congress sustain support for regimes that refuse to do what is needed while the lives of American servicemen are at risk. For this reason we must also have a clear grasp of how the regime targeted by insurgents represents a long-term and absolutely vital interest to our security. Without this condition, we stand little chance of prevailing in a protracted conflict. This also ensures that we will commit the requisite resources to sustain our strategy over the long haul. Also, we must have a clear understanding with the country we seek to assist, and within our own councils, of how our forces will work to achieve clearly defined strategic objectives. The assisted nation must seek to assume the full burden for its defense at the earliest possible moment. Indeed, this is the ultimate measure of our strategy's success. In the past six years we have done much to enhance our special operations forces and general purpose forces to operate effectively in this unique conflict environment. Yet this effort does not eliminate the need to constantly reassess the relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed. If the host regime will not address itself to the task at hand, U.S. combat forces cannot be expected to remain indefinitely. Finally, we should commit combat forces only as a last resort, after diplomatic, economic, and other political options have been exhausted. The history of the past 40 years indicates that, whether it goes by the name of insurgency, a war of national liberation, or revolutionary warfare, this kind of ambiguous aggression poses a major threat to U.S. security interests. This threat defies a strictly military solution, although there is a clear military dimension to the conflict. Given its ambiguous and protracted nature, and the decisive role played by the regime targeted by insurgents, we must have a unique strategy and force capability to counter it. Of course, we oppose those who seek to impose totalitarianism in the Third World, but we must recognize that there are many who fight to restore the liberty and independence they have lost to communist aggression. These peoples, be they from Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, Cambodia, or other countries suffering the effects of totalitarian oppression, deserve our support; not only because it is right, but because as President Kennedy observed, "If men and women are in chains anywhere in the world, then freedom is endangered.' Thus, as President Reagan has stated, our policy is not "just the prevention of war, but the extension of freedom as well." We are prepared to support those who fight for freedom, not only because it is morally right, but because it is one of the best ways to safeguard the security of the world's democracies. (2) Combatting Subversion While insurgency involves protracted warfare to achieve its ultimate goal of toppling a government, subversion involves actions taken by an external power to recruit and assist indigenous political and military forces to overthrow their government through a coup d'etat. The Soviet Union has utilized subversion as a means of ambiguous aggression since Lenin's time. Some of their more recent successes include Ethiopia and Afghanistan. Had we not responded promptly and forcefully, Grenada would have been added to the list. This form of low-intensity aggression is not limited to the Soviet Union; it has also been embraced by others, among them Qaddafi's Libya and Castro's Cuba, in attempting to advance their aims. The key to combatting this subtle form of aggression, which manifests itself in open conflict only at the last possible moment, is the quality and reliability of a nation's indigenous military forces, along with its legitimate political institutions. Although we in this country take for granted the supremacy of civilian authority, this is frequently not the case in many Third World states. Nevertheless, a cornerstone of our strategy to combat subversion concerns our efforts to enhance the capabilities of friendly nation military forces, and to assist them in effecting those reforms that augment their professionalism and emphasize the importance of an apolitical military leadership supportive of free institutions. Countering subversion requires a long-term commitment to creating shared values through exchange programs, training and education, civic action, and related activities. This kind of preventive medicine wards off penetration and subversion of the military by hostile powers bent on effecting a violent change in the established order. In so doing, it reduces the likelihood that our combat forces will ever be requested by a legitimate government under attack by indigenous forces influenced by malevolent external powers. Although we seek to counter subversion through the methods noted above, the United States has, in the past, responded effectively with force to blunt this kind of aggression in Lebanon (1958), the Dominican Republic (1965), and Grenada (1983), and retains the capability and the will to do so again should it be deemed necessary. Surely, no one can contend that it is to our advantage to allow communist-supported subversion to convert a friendly government into a communist enemy, and particularly not in our own hemisphere. |