We have significantly improved our power-projection capabilities in the 1980s. Airlift capacity has been expanded with the acquisition of the C-5B, the KC-10,, the procurement of increased stocks of spare parts, and the stretching of the C-141 fleet. Additional power-projection enhancements are programmed with the advent of the C-17 and improvements to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) (see Chart I.B.4). Sealift is a mixed picture, as the decline of the U.S.-flag merchant marine has continued, and the mix of ships remaining in that dwindling force is not ideally suited to military purposes. The majority of our sealift shortfalls have been addressed by increasing the size of the Ready Reserve Force (RRF). Eight large and fast (SL-7-class) container ships have been converted to rollon/roll-off (RO/RO) configurations, and the Army and Navy are jointly working the problem of unloading and moving cargo once it arrives. The third contributor to mobility, in addition to airlift and sealift, is prepositioning. Three squadrons of maritime prepositioning ships with unit equipment and stores have been procured to support Marine Corps deployments in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans.

In addition to these mobility improvements, forces are being reconfigured to support rapid deployment more readily. The Army, for example, is fielding rapidly deployable light divisions. Amphibious lift will be increased with the advent of the new LSD-41 and LHD-1class ships, and the Navy is accepting delivery of their first air cushion vehicles which will greatly enhance ship-to-shore movement of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces.

Soviet power-projection forces are also improving, although some programs are moving more slowly than we had anticipated. Two aspects of the power-projection balance provide reason for concern. First, new Soviet force developments significantly enhance their ability to compete with the United States for influence in areas far from its

borders; second, the Soviets are employing a variety of other means (such as ambiguous aggression) to gain access to, and make inroads in, Third World areas where there is little danger that they will encounter United States or competent local forces.

Important Soviet power-projection developments include: new and, in some cases, unique systems to move or support forces; continued upgrading of their merchant marine with militarily capable shipping; modest improvements and near-term additions to sea-based air forces; their continued role as a major arms supplier to the Third World; and expansion of Soviet facilities and bases overseas to support deployments.

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The Soviets have developed and will be deploying the C-5A-size CONDOR heavy airlifter. Coupled with the C-141-size CANDID that has been replacing AN-12 CUBS in Military Transport Aviation, this will considerably expand the capacity and extend the range of those forces. The CANDID is also being deployed in a tanker version. Soviets are also in the early stages of operationally deploying the first of a new class of vehicles, "wing-in-ground-effect" or WIG craft, that apparently will enter the force as amphibious transports. The speed and range of these units could provide the means for a relatively small (regimental perhaps) but significant intervention of naval infantry beyond the immediate Soviet periphery. The Soviets continue to lead the world in the deployment of air cushion vehicles in their amphibious forces. These capabilities allow them to use merchant lift to augment organic naval assault shipping in deploying naval infantry or army units.

The Soviet merchant marine continues to expand and modernize, in stark contrast to that of the United States (see Chapter III.E.). For example, the current Soviet inventory of roll-on/roll-off and roll-on/float-off ships comprises over 100 units. This represents an addition of eight to nine ships per year since they first entered the inventory in 1974. The average RO/RO in the Soviet merchant marine can carry 125 medium tanks. The RO/RO ships alone can move up to five Soviet Motorized Rifle Divisions in a one-time lift. This would be in addition to the large remaining pool of merchant ships in the Soviet inventory, most configured with military use in mind.

Additionally, while Soviet sea-based aviation is still in its infancy, over the long term it could provide a significant complement to Soviet power-projection forces. Work continues on the new, possibly nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, which we anticipate will be the vanguard of a follow-on generation of larger, more capable carriers. The Soviets also continue to explore the possibilities of using V/STOL aircraft on rapidly reconfigured RO/RO ships. rently, the Soviet power-projection forces cannot realistically operate outside of land-based air protection, or where our sea-based air might intervene. With the integration of Soviet sea-based air support, power-projection forces will operate with increased confidence at greater distances from the Soviet homeland.

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The Soviets have been very active in indirect forms of power projection. Using their merchant marine the Soviets have become a leading supplier of arms to the Third World. These arms transfers are but one element in a concerted effort that includes propaganda, aid, trade, covert and overt (Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Angola) activities, security advisers, and proxy troops. That the Soviets are engaged in a determined effort to project power worldwide is aptly illustrated by Chart I.B.5.

The Soviets have also expanded their presence in Vietnam, and continue to have access to facilities in Southeast and Southwest Africa as well as in the Horn of Africa, all areas of significant Western concern due to the resources in these areas and the sea lines around them.

In summary, while U.S. programs in place will enhance our ability to move and support significant forces, as in the reinforcement of Europe, the Soviets emphasize more subtle, indirect forms of power projection. Moreover, the military capabilities of the Soviet merchant marine, the expansion of the Soviet airlift force, the advent of new and unique platforms, like WIGS, and the expansion of Soviet sea-based air capability could allow the Soviets to compete more realistically in areas of U.S. concern in the absence of continued U.S. attention to power projection.

Most importantly, our power-projection effectiveness depends not only on our own capabilities and programs but also on close cooperation with regional allies and friends. Successful power projection requires allied assistance in the areas of basing and staging facilities, overflight rights, prepositioning sites ashore, and host nation support.

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