Return to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1981-1999Oxford University Press, 20 feb 2003 - 320 pagina's When the Cold War ended, the world let out a collective sigh of relief as the fear of nuclear confrontation between superpowers appeared to vanish overnight. As we approach the new millennium, however, the proliferation of nuclear weapons to ever more belligerent countries and factions raises alarming new concerns about the threat of nuclear war. In Return to Armageddon, Ronald Powaski assesses the dangers that beset us as we enter an increasingly unstable political world. With the START I and II treaties, completed by George Bush in 1991 and 1993 respectively, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), signed by Bill Clinton in 1996, it seemed as if the nuclear clock had been successfully turned back to a safer hour. But Powaski shows that there is much less reason for optimism than we may like to think. Continued U.S.-Russian cooperation can no longer be assured. To make matters worse, Russia has not ratified the START II Treaty and the U.S. Senate has failed to approve the CTBT. Perhaps even more ominously, the effort to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by nonweapon states is threatened by nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan. The nuclear club is growing and its most recent members are increasingly hostile. Indeed, it is becoming ever more difficult to keep track of the expertise and material needed to build nuclear weapons, which almost certainly will find their way into terrorist hands. Accessible, authoritative, and provocative, Return to Armageddon provides both a comprehensive account of the arms control process and a startling reappraisal of the nuclear threat that refuses to go away. |
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Pagina
... deployment of key nuclear weapon systems. The bomber gap of the mid-1950s was followed by other alleged, and false, gaps: the missile gap in the late 1950s, the ABM gap of the late 1960s, and a missile throw weight (payload capacity) ...
... deployment of key nuclear weapon systems. The bomber gap of the mid-1950s was followed by other alleged, and false, gaps: the missile gap in the late 1950s, the ABM gap of the late 1960s, and a missile throw weight (payload capacity) ...
Pagina
... deployment of antiballistic missile systems. In addition, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which went into effect in 1970, did much to curb the acquisition of nuclear weapons by nonweapon states. But as the 1980s arrived, the ...
... deployment of antiballistic missile systems. In addition, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which went into effect in 1970, did much to curb the acquisition of nuclear weapons by nonweapon states. But as the 1980s arrived, the ...
Pagina
... deployments and as few as possible on one's own. In addition, the U.S. negotiating posture was almost always based ... deployment of weapon systems developed for bargaining—or for intimidation—purposes. One example of this was the U.S. ...
... deployments and as few as possible on one's own. In addition, the U.S. negotiating posture was almost always based ... deployment of weapon systems developed for bargaining—or for intimidation—purposes. One example of this was the U.S. ...
Pagina
... deployment of the MX ICBM, the Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), and the Tomahawk cruise missile in order to gain Pentagon support for the SALT II Treaty. The Soviet Role In many respects, the factors that drove ...
... deployment of the MX ICBM, the Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), and the Tomahawk cruise missile in order to gain Pentagon support for the SALT II Treaty. The Soviet Role In many respects, the factors that drove ...
Pagina
... deployment, but not development, Carter had rejected in 1978. To provide nuclear warheads for these systems, the Reagan administration significantly expanded the U.S. nuclear stockpile. Spending on production of nuclear materials for ...
... deployment, but not development, Carter had rejected in 1978. To provide nuclear warheads for these systems, the Reagan administration significantly expanded the U.S. nuclear stockpile. Spending on production of nuclear materials for ...
Inhoudsopgave
The Reagan AboutFace | |
Bush and START I | |
Clinton START II and the ABM Treaty | |
Clinton and Counterproliferation | |
Overige edities - Alles bekijken
Return to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1981-1999 Ronald E. Powaski Gedeeltelijke weergave - 2000 |
Return to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1981-1999 Ronald E. Powaski Gedeeltelijke weergave - 2000 |
Return to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1981-1999 Ronald E. Powaski Geen voorbeeld beschikbaar - 2003 |
Veelvoorkomende woorden en zinsdelen
Able Archer 83 ABM Treaty addition administration’s agreed agreement ALCMS American announced argued Arms Control Today attack ballistic missile defense billion bombers Bush administration Bush’s capability China Clinton administration Congress congressional Control Today 22 cruise missiles CTBT defense system deployed deployment deterrent dismantlement Dunbar Lockwood eliminate fissile material Gorbachev hard-liners Ibid ICBMS India INF Treaty Initiative interceptors Iran Iraq Kazakhstan kilometers launch launchers limited military MIRved Moscow MTCR National Security negotiations Nonproliferation nonweapon North Korea nuclear arms race nuclear arsenal nuclear forces nuclear materials nuclear testing nuclear warheads nuclear weapons October Pakistan percent permitted plutonium president president’s proliferation proposal ratified reactors Reagan administration Republican Russian SALT II Senate September Shevardnadze Shultz sides SLBMS Soviet Union space-based START II Strategic Defense Strategic Defense Initiative strategic forces strategic nuclear summit targets THAAD threat TMD systems treaty’s U.S. nuclear Ukraine United verification Yeltsin