of association of ideas is the most prominent and striking. Different philosophers have exhibited different views of this most interesting law; and Hartley, and Hume, and Stewart, have extended or contracted the limits of its operation, according as it suited respectively their particular designs. The view of it which I purpose to exhibit, will direct the attention of the reader to the connexion which uniformly subsists among our thoughts, and the relation which they always bear both to one another, and to their natural and exciting causes.

"That one thought is often suggested to the mind by another; and that the sight of an external object often recals former occurrences, and revives former feelings, are facts which are perfectly familiar, even to those who are the least disposed to speculate concerning the principles of their nature. In passing along a road which we had formerly travelled in the company of a friend, the particulars of the conversation in which we were then engaged, are frequently suggested to us by the objects we meet with. In such a scene, we recollect that a particular subject was started; and, in passing the dif ferent houses, and plantations, and rivers, the arguments we were discussing when we last saw them, recur spontaneously to the memory. The connexion which is formed in the mind between the words of a language and the ideas they denote; the connexion which is formed between the different words of a discourse we have committed to memory: the connexion between the different notes of a piece of music in the mind of the musician; are all obvious instances of the same general law of our nature.*"

cause.

But this is not all: it might easily be shown, not merely that the presence of some external object, or internal feeling, tends to revive some former'impression, but that in reality no thought ever passes through the mind unprompted by some natural Let any one make the experiment upon himself, and try if he is not in a condition to refer every one of his thoughts, as it passes before him in review, to its natural and proper antecedent. Sometimes indeed he will find it necessary to pause a moment, before he is able to recover the thought or the feeling, which immediately preceded the idea which now occupies his attention: and sometimes, though rarely, from the quickness with which some of our transitions are made from thought to thought, the recovery of it is attended with some difficulty but I affirm that it is, in all cases whatsoever, to be accomplished.

:

*See Mr. Dugald Stewart's Philosophy of Mind, p. 277 ; a work equally distinguished by the elegance of its composition, and the justness of its views.

It may be considered, therefore, as an indisputable maxim, That no thought is ever present to the mind, which has not been suggested by its natural and proper cause.

From this fundamental axiom, several important, and perhaps, unexpected consequences necessarily follow. It follows that the vulgar notion of supernatural agency is not only gratuitous, but in direct opposition to a settled law of our na ture. It follows that dreams and presentiments can have nothing in them ominous or foretelling. And it follows too, that the ordinary belief in good and bad spirits, to whose activity the world is under so many obligations, is altogether fanciful and groundless.-I beg always to be understood, as speaking of the present order of the universe, and of the scénes which are spread before the present generation of mankind-A candid writer would, perhaps, add, for the admonition of the incautious reader, that should he feel disposed to subscribe the truth of the foregoing observations, he subscribes, at the same time, the doctrine of necessity.

Nov. 9, 1812.

Your's, &c.

ZETA.

ON FOREKNOWLEDGE.

To the Editor of the Freethinking Christians' Magazine.

SIR,

NO have right ideas and just notions of what is connected with the common affairs of life is desirable, and the acquirement of them is thought praiseworthy; but in matters in which the most important concerns of religion are involved, cannot be unworthy the most exalted character in the world. Having often examined the Freethinking Christians' Magazine with anxious expectation, to find a discussion of the doctrine of Foreknowledge, but nothing having yet appeared directly upon that subject, I now avail myself of the present occasion to drop a few hints to excite the attention of the better informed, that the subject may have a chance of a full and candid examination; because upon it depends the truth or error of what I consider the ridiculous tenets of Calvanism, such as particular election, predestination, final perseverance, and all the minor matters consequent thereupon; the fall of Adam, and the supposed natural depravity of his offspring with all the train of Calvanistic unchristian doctrines, contended for both in and out of the establishment.

I am aware the subject has been much controverted, but it unfortunately happens that nothing has hitherto come to my hands that has any tendency to an elucidation of it: some, intimidated by fear, have made concessions which destroy what

ever they had supported against it, and dared not to pursue the subject thoroughly, lest they should say something deroga tory to the Divine Being, and have thence run and split upon the very rock they dreaded, as will by and by appear; for instance, notwithstanding they find difficulties that are not easily, no nor possibly, got over, yet they will allow that Jehovah (whose name I wish to be understood should not be used irreverently) knew long before time begun, nay from eternity, every thought and action, whether virtuous or wicked that should take place to the consummation of time and the ultimate end of all, and that it could not be possibly otherwise, that to suppose less would undeify him and make him as little or less than ourselves: and thus they suppose they honor God. But let them examine carefully the opposite side of the question, and to their astonishment they will find that it involves the incapaci ty of making a free agent capable of liberty of chusing virtue in preference to vice, and vice versa; upon which, in my apprehen. sion depends all accountableness, and the equity of a future judgment: for if our future actions, as well as thoughts, are all known, there can be no contingencies, no liberty to do or leave undone the track is marked out, and must be trod without deviation. Thus man is made a machine, and is impelled by physical or mechanical, or some such irresistible force as cannot be overcome; and the matter is insisted upon so far by some, that all future ideas which have not ever had any existence in the mind of man, are and ever were known, which is in fact to know a nonentity. Should I be asked, how then! does God not know any thing beforehand? I answer, yes-it is consistent with the doctrine of free agency and accountableness, that he knows what he intends to do to promote the welfare of his creatures, and also what judgments shall be inflicted upon the wicked. These things are clear in the predictions of the prophets, respecting the glorious kingdom he intended to erect by his son, and in the denunciations threatened against disobedience of the wicked. But if all thoughts as well as actions are known, it implies a preordination, and a preordination is a strong city of refuge for the murderer, the thief, the fornicator, the drunkard, and for every other vicious character in the world. They may truly say, in the integrity of my heart have I done this or the other; and it may be asked, why so many prisons, why such severities are executed upon our fellow-creatures?

There are others again who contend that, to foreknow whatever comes to pass, does not impel or influence the action in any sense whatever; and this is one of those wretched means by which they pretend to honour God and justify his conduct towards man, while in fact they do him the greatest dishonour

and make him who is righteous in all his ways, and holy in all his works, the very author of all the wickedness that has or ever shall take place. Such reasoning has often made me wonder how it could please the writers, but the clearness of which I could never comprehend or understand. Others contend again that the unchangeableness of God prevents there being any thing like foreknowledge in him, for when that comes to pass which was foreknown, it is only known and implies a liableness to change. In support of this they state that many things are said of God which are not applicable to him, as that he has no "hands, eyes, ears, repentance, &c. but are spoken of him by. way of accommodation to our understandings." In this way might the most obvious facts be explained away; but let such as support their ideas of Jehovah in this way, say what we are to understand by his predictions, but that he does actually foreknow whether it implies liableness to change, or is any ways derogatory to him or not, for I am certain that no other ideas can be attached to them but that he actually foreknew. Let them prove to the contrary who can, for I candidly confess it is above my conceptions.

The case of Judas will no doubt be levelled against me here; and with it, I acknowledge, I am not a little perplexed, but yet believe there is something in the history of Judas hid in obscurity, which may, by the assistance of literature, appear as clear as the sun in his meridian splendour, and which I trust you or some of your correspondents will bring to light. Should any say to the law and to the testimony, such I would inform, the scriptures are not barren upon this subject in positive declarations, and may be supported by the uniformity and equitableness of the conduct of the Divine Being in all his dispensations towards man.

It will be thought strange by some, when I tell them I am also contending for the honour of God, and shall use the very arguments of my opponents for that purpose. In the first place then, an attempt to infringe upon any one attribute of Deity is equally derogatory to an infringement upon another. Now to contend that God has not exerted all his power, but that he can create worlds, and exercise his providential influence, is no infringement upon his omnipotence, nor any denial of his almighty power; then why should it be thought an infringement upon his omniscience in the denial of his knowing nonentities? Nay, I contend that the capacity of creating, magnifies his omnipotence, which would otherwise be limited, and not be omnipotence at all. And the possibility of extending or knowing more than he at present does, is no ways de rogatory of him, but the only and very perfection of his omniscience, which could not possibly be otherwise omniscience at all. To support the opposite would be, in fact, a limita

tion of his omnipotence or power, and a limitation of his omniscience or knowledge, and be derogatory to that Being for whose honour I wish to live and die.

These, Mr. Editor, are the means I have used, designing to bring the subject into agitation, that it may undergo a free, full, and candid examination; hoping that none that engage in it will satisfy themselves with mere affirmations, but prove by arguments, as they proceed, that the subject which has been dreaded investigating may be made clear and intelligible to the weakest capacity; and whether it ever is proved, wil! be highly satisfactory to AN ENQUIRER AFTER TRUTH.*

ON THE FAITH AND TEMPTATION OF ABRAHAM.

To the Editor of the Freethinking Christians' Magazine.

SIR,

To aid the cause of free enquiry, to remove stumbling blocks which lie in the way of unbelievers, and to represent Christianity in a manner that is engaging and acceptable, appears to be the design of your Magazine.

If to entertain the most rational and consistent ideas of Deity; to relieve the minds of men from erroneous conceptions, and false conclusions, concerning the sacred scriptures, and the conduct of the Divine Being, be consistent with and favourable to the cause of Christianity; then I conclude that every such attempt is admissible in your publication. If the following thoughts" on the faith and temptation of Abraham" be deemed compatible with your design, and suited to answer the purposes above mentioned, you will give them a place in some ensuing number of your work.

In entering on this subject, permit me first to observe, that it is common to find when a phrase or sentence recorded in the sacred scriptures does not agree with the system which has been espoused by any particular denomination of Christians, that then it is readily concluded to be a mistranslation, or an interpolation to the sacred text. The different parties alternately accuse each other of attempting by violence to make the scriptures speak what they wish, rather than to understand them as they are. They each labour to guard against any meaning that would show their favourite system unpleasing to the eye of

common sense.

By way of bringing this interesting and important subject into discussion, we have given a ready insertion to the above; though we are free to express it as our opinion, that the writer has not taken that view of the divine prescience which can be reckoned either scriptural or philosophical. We hope the enquiry will attract the attention of some of our correspondents, who will be able to handle it in a way suitable to the delicacy of the subject.-EDITOR.