ON THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THAT OF PREDESTINATION.

To the Editor of the Freethinking Christians' Magazine.

SIR,

1

THERE HERE are some subjects which, beyond others, are involved in difficulty and embarrassment: to this class belongs the topic on which I now enter. An attempt, therefore, to introduce into it clearness and precision of thinking, if not entitled to praise, merits, it will be allowed, a friendly reception; especially if it should appear, in the prosecution of our inquiry, that the subject is in itself yery curious, and, at the same time highly interesting to mankind.

To Lord Bacon, it is very well known, the world is greatly indebted for many discoveries, and many solid accessions to its knowledge. The name of Bacon, however, is chiefly illustrious for his new and admirable method of philosophising. Before his time, a race of learned men had appeared, each in his turn launching a system of opinions, fitted at once to overturn and destroy the theory of his predecessor, and to be overturned and destroyed by the next in succession. And it was at that time the prevailing opinion with men of sense, that the human understanding was in fact doomed by Providence to be the sport and victim of every daring adventurer; the possession of truth being placed in reality beyond the reach of our faculties, and every effort for its attainment to be looked upon as a vain and idle speculation. Better things notwithstanding were reserved for us the night is now past away; and our intellectual horizon is lighted up with the blaze of noon. The genius of inductive philosophy advances with a cautious, indeed, and slow, but determined step, towards the elevation of science, trampling under her feet the symbols of superstition, and bursting asunder the chains of despotism and ignorance.

It is by withdrawing the attention of the student from primary or metaphysical causes, and restricting it to the contemplation of facts alone-fo the contemplation of mechanical or apparent causes, that the method of induction has been enabled to achieve of late years such amazing wonders. And if any improvement has taken place, during the present age, in the philosophy of mind, our success should be attributed wholly to the introduction of a similar method of inquiry. No advances indeed can ever be made in this department of knowledge, any more than in physical disquisitions, except by confining our attention rigidly to the examination of facts. As to efficient causes, we know nothing of them; we never

can know any thing. With regard to us, they are the dreams of a prolific imagination, the ignis-fatuus of the philosopher. Yet even the contemplation of facts can never substantially promote the ends of enquiry, unless it be admitted, that both in the moral and intellectual worlds, as well as in the material, a steadiness and regularity of operation do every where obtain.

The attribute of prescience is indissolubly connected in our minds with every notion of God. At the moment when the universe came fresh from its Creator's hands, every possible combination of the laws destined to govern it must have been immediately present to his mind. No incident in the lapse of time could in any case arise to disconcert the original plan; to baffle the superintendant spirit; or to create a pause or interruption in the continuous succession of causes and events. It is not possible to conceive, without divesting the Deity of Almighty power and unerring foresight, that any occurrence whatever can take place, either in the material or intellectual world, which was not at first distinctly perceived and intended.

It is this firm concatenation, this indissoluble series of causes and effects, which, flowing like a river deep and broad, consti tutes the doctrine of necessity. Predestination, on the other hand, supposes an original purpose to depart, in a multitude of cases, from this beautiful and magnificent order.

This exposition of the doctrines, it will be admitted, I presume, is clear and ingenuous. Now to apply to it the rules of philosophising and, in order to exclude as much as possible all differnce of opinion, I will confine myself strictly to the present age; passing over in profound silence the reported wonders of antiquity.

The inquiry offers itself to our examination in the simplest form. Be it always remembered that we must confine ourselves to FACTS. All facts naturally range themselves under one or other of the two following heads.

First. Facts which obviously and allowedly result from established laws; or,

Secondly. Facts, the connexion of which with any stated and regular cause, appears to some doubtful and uncertain.

Of each of these in its order.

Under the first head, undoubtedly, we must comprehend all operations in the physical or material world, such as the known properties of fire, and air, and water--the revolutions of the year-the ebb and flow of the tides-and, in general, the force, and direction, and combination of all solid bodies. Let an old and crazy ship strike impetuously on the rocks in a fearful tempest, and I believe, in the judgment of a sober pilot, it would signify but little whether his cargo consisted

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of saints or sinners. If I wish to be conveyed safely to a distant part of the earth, I will place myself in a strong vessel, navigated by skilful men; and I will set out at a favourable time of the year; this is all I can do: I entertain not the slightest expectation, that the laws of nature will be suspended on my account. The vast machine of the world continues to roll on; and, every day, 66 men and flies" are crushed

beneath its wheels.

And with regard to the second class of facts-I mean those facts the causes of which are less manifest and striking; 1 believe it would be difficult to point out even any one of these, which an attentive consideration of all the circumstances would not satisfy a candid mind of its immediate connexion with some natural and adequate cause. The argument, on the efficacy of which the advocates for predestination appear chiefly to rely, is drawn from the fact of the sudden conversion of certain individuals from one set of opinions to another. -How else can we explain, say they, a fact which every body allows; namely, that a man shall preach for a whole hour to a crowded assembly, consisting perhaps of 500 people; all so arranged as to hear distinctly every part of the discourse, and listening with the profoundest attention to every sentence of the sermon; and yet, notwithstanding this agree ment of circumstances, not more, out of so large a multitude, than one or two shall be converted; that is, shall be persua ded to adopt the opinions of the preacher? This case is confi dently appealed to almost every day, as decisive and satisfac tory.-Now, to an understanding like mine, accustomed, on all occasions, to look for natural causes, the instance in point involves no difficulty whatever-not even the colour or shadow of an exception to the general rule. And is it indeed a marvellous thing, that one man shall adopt the opinions of another? Does any thing of this kind ever happen in private company in courts of justice, or in the House of Commons? And shall men change their views and sentiments in all these places, and yet remain perfectly invulnerable if the scene of discus sion happens to be laid in a church or a meeting-house! Au accomplished orator, a man who is in complete possession of every avenue that leads to the understanding and to the heart, shall stand up before a numerous congregation, and declaim on the most important and rousing topics-scattering the lightning and the thunders of impassioned eloquence-now, unveiling to the sinner the "sweet fields of Canaan," and its "gently-rolling waters"-and now disclosing to h view, in hideous prospect, death, hell, and the judgment come; and shaking the pale and trembling wretch over as of brimstone, whose waves of liquid fire undulate and da

amid the infernal rocks;-and yet, if our orator, with all these arts, with all these engines of persuasion, succeeds in alarming but a single transgressor, why truly his success must be referred immediately to the special influence of the divine spirit!

But it may be demanded, how comes it to pass then that all are not converted, if we exclude spiritual influence, since the same means are evidently employed with respect to all? I reply, precisely because men are differently constituted, and differently educated. And even the same man, we may ob serve, is, under different circumstances, quite a different being. A recent death in a family, a sudden reduction from wealth to poverty, or a severe illness, commonly affects greatly the individuals concerned, and disposes them to hearken with more seriousness to every thing which comes to them in the shape of advice or consolation.

But here perhaps I shall be reminded, that these occurrences are, in truth, among the very dispensations which a merciful Deity employs to improve the characters of the men in question. Very good: this is all I contend for. This, in effect, however, is to acknowledge the doctrine of necessity; for it is, virtually, to class the means and instruments of conversion with the settled train of occurrences, and to disavow the authority of predestination or spiritual agency.

Another fact supposed to militate against the doctrine of necessity, is the ordinary succession of our ideas. Persons who have not attended to this subject take it for granted, generally I believe, that this succession is, for the most part, irregular and fortuitous. If such persons, however, will take the trouble to examine with any degree of care the train and connexion of their own thoughts, they will soon find that the succession of their ideas is as much under the controul of physical laws, as any part of matter, even the most familiar to us. The phenomena of dreaming supplies no exception whatever to this representation of things. Dreams, in reality, are nothing but our sleeping thoughts; diversified remarkably, no doubt, by circumstances peculiar to themselves; but still, governed constantly and equally by the operation of

FIXED LAWS.

I conclude, therefore, upon a view of the whole case, that. if we apply to the doctrine of predestination the just rules of philosophising, it will appear incontrovertibly, that it is totally void of foundation; and that the doctrine of necessity, as stated and explained in this article, is placed on a firm and immovable basis, and receives additional strength and evidence, in proportion to the accuracy and extensiveness of our research. 1 am, Sir, &c.

Sept. 6, 1812.

ZETA.

IT

ON UNITY OF FAITH.

To the Editor of the Freethinking Christians' Magazine,

SIR,

T has been sometimes urged, to the discouragement of those who would avail themselves of the greater liberality of the times, for attempting to dispel the clouds of superstition and prejudice, that still darken the minds of such numbers, that sad experience has shewn such attempts in discourses and writings to have been ineffectual; therefore the consequence of so many attempts should teach us that all plans of a reform in inward and outward religion, and all projects for uniting the minds of men, separated by creeds and opinions, are downright folly.

per

At such logic as this, however, we can only shrug up our shoulders. What is there futile or foolish in it? That haps a single man, or a few individuals (it is the same thing) have made attempts that have not succeeded? Who promised them success? How can any man, individually, have a call to be a reformer-a church-broom? That would indeed be folly, absolute folly, which must necessarily prove folly in the result, But, for reflecting, enlightened men, provided with the necessary talents, without destroying themselves and their abilities, wherever they can to raise the voice of reason, and frankly confess the truth-for every one, without laying claim to the personal honour of a reformer, to contribute what he has to the explosion of superstition, communicate his correc ter perceptions, strew the seeds of truth (to the extent of what he has) and avail himself of a season of liberty as the boon of God-and then leaving it to his providence how, when, where, that seed shall shoot up, and yield beneficial fruits-is that likewise folly? Verily, if that is folly, then is the boon itself of God also folly.

Or shall we be silent and conceal our correcter perceptions, because it is impossible, abstractedly considered, to reduce mankind to a unity of faith in religion? It sounds plausible indeed when it is said, all men differ in their understandings; every one has his peculiar degree of ability, his own mode of mental representation, his own proportion of susceptibility to truth and error; consequently, so long as the world endures, differences of ideas, of judgment, and of opinion, will remain; consequently, religious union is nothing more than a delightful dream, a phantom that he alone can take for a reality, who is totally unacquainted with human nature, and confounds the actual with the possible world. Plausible it sounds: but hear what I have to say.