nature; therefore, there can be no affinity between the body of man already formed, and a piece of unformed stone, of which the statue is to be made. If we apply it to the mind,as it might be supposed is meant, it will be necessary to enquire if" Saceto" is a materialist? If he is, we are at issue-the "Reflector" is not. If "Saceto" himself is not, let him for once descend to argument, and prove that the substance used in forming a statue, possesses some internal power adequate to the mind of man.. "Saceto" used this simile to show the "fallacy of the Reflector's reasoning" a laudable intention doubtless, but he remains unconvinced; and in spite of his utmost endeavours to repress his risibility, he finds it gradually encreasing, while the lovely Venus and godlike Apollo, relaxing the solid muscles of their marble faces into a smile, proceed to grin audibly, and by intuitive sagacity, and internal impulse, at length her immortal ladyship's titter, and his godship's grinning, subsides in an harmonious horse laugh, while the "Reflector," infected by their immortal breath, shakes his sides, and completes the merry trio.

Such a Venus and Apollo, says " Saceto," are seldom seenand seen to laugh, I presume, still more seldom; but when their immortal faces can so far forget their dignity, as to "smile" at such inferior statues, it is rather dubious which will amuse them most-the "Reflector's" ignorance, or "Saceto's" philosophy.

Saceto" thinks" mankind "happier than they were.'

It

is a difficult point to decide :—in the past, there is much to admire; in the present there is much more to bewail. This paper has extended too far to argue the subject now, but it will be resumed at no distant period.

The sarcastic severity of "Saceto," on the style of the "Reflector" is, alike with his attack, illiberal. Was it worthy of a Freethinking Christian to select detached sentences, and not notice the train of argument which supported them? Was it candour to misrepresent him? And above all, was it just to criticise his style? He has done this ambiguously-Ile compares the "Reflector's" eloquence to the "philosopher's of Cyrene." If he intended it as flattery, the "Reflector" would wish him to understand that he possesses a mind which revolts from it with disdain. Flattery ought never to be permitted, out of the precincts of a court; that noxious weed is fostered best by the pestilential breath of power. And if he intended it as a personal insult, he has only to add, that it is beneath the dignity of a public writer, when combating general opinions, to descend to individual reflection.

The "Reflector" has already written more than he intended, bat he trusts not more than the unprejudiced part of his readers will think - necessary. Should "Saceto" attack his opinions

again, let him endeavour first to understand them; should he pursue a similar method, it will be treated as this deservedwith silent contempt.

If the Reflector" has been hurried by the warmth of his own feelings, into intemperate language, let it be remembered that "Saceto" first gave the provocation, by contemptuous insinuations, and illiberal invectives; and has thereby drawn upon himself the castigation he now receives. Had the opinions of the "Reflector" been attacked by arguments, he would have supported them; as it is, such support is unnecessary, and he bids "Saceto" adieu, and offers him a word of "advice" from the ingenious Swift-LEARN NOT TO CENSURE SUPERFICIALLY!

ST. PAUL CHARGED WITH PROSCRIBING HUMAN REASON.

To the Editor of the Freethinking Christians' Magazine.

SIR,

A Correspondent of your's, who signs himself "Paulensis,” (vol. i. p. 325) has honored me with very particular notice, and called on me to disprove the truth of what he firmly, and, Í will say, obstinately believes; and a more determined believer in Christianity I hardly ever met with among those who pretend to have examined its evidences, for he sets up his reason as the standard of all reason, without considering the difference between the reasons which may induce him or any other man to believe in any particular system, and the general reason of mankind—that standard which all men in all ages have with little variation agreed upon, as the criterion of right and wrong, just and unjust, true and false.

To prove that I am not mistaken in accusing him of having confounded two things essentially distinct, I will quote a few of his expressions. In the exercise and improvement of our reason we are as different as in the features of our faces, and the extent of our estates. How different, for example, is reason in Paul and Mr. Burdon; quite as different as it is in Mr. Burdon and his servants. They probably have very different ideas of honesty, equity, generosity, and patriotism, from those of their master; yet, in their own eyes, they are as rational as he is in his own opinion. Reason is a word which may be quite as much abused as faith; indeed, what is faith but an enlargement of our reason-what but divine discoveries communicated to reason?"

Though the improvement and exercise of reason may be different in different men, it does not follow that reason itself is different; for if reason, or that faculty by which we judge of the approximation of different things to the same standard,

VOL. II.

is not the same in all men; there can be no such thing as general principles of reason, but every man's opinion may be different, and yet all may be right; but the same Being who created us with persons generally similar, though differing in particular conformation, gave us faculties to judge of all sensible and moral objects generally similar, though from the incomplete or faulty exercise of these faculties we see the same objects in different lights. Though my servants, probably from a difference of education, may not have the same 'strong and confirmed ideas of rectitude and propriety which, without vanity, I myself possess, they cannot altogether mistake right for wrong, hot for cold, or bitter for sweet; and if they even were, under these false impressions, to boast of their rationality, they would not find their ideas confirmed either by the sentiments of others, or the determinations of the law.

That faith is only an enlargement of reason, is an assertion thoroughly consonant to the doctrines of St. Paul, and such reasoners; but I believe it will be found in truth only as much so as the water is an enlargement of the land; it is in fact a totally different element. For a faith which does not arise from the deductions of reason, and is not consonant to the experience of the senses, is so far at enmity with reason as totally to set aside its most evident deductions. Such faith is not above reason, but contrary to it; in fact, there can be no faith above reason, for reason is the test of faith, and that which is not consonant to reason, is no proper object of faith. I speak not of any individual's reason or opinion, but the general principles of reason, which are, like those of justice, invariable, fixed, and immutable.

The gentleman says, I have given a good reason for not becoming a clergyman, but none for having neglected to expound the Scriptures, and awaken the pious and benevolent affections of my fellow-creatures. The fact is, that when I gave up the idea of becoming a minister of the church of England, I thought that in order to teach the doctrines of Christianity, it was requisite to be a minister of some other church; and therefore I never pretended to what I thought was not duly authorized, and in a few years after, I ceased to be a member of any church. But I trust I have not been altogether without attempting to awaken the "benevolent affections of my fellow creatures," though without preaching to them the doctrines of any sect or religion; and so far was my plentiful inheritance from rendering me indifferent, and abating the ardor of enquiry, that I have sought after-truth with a degree of zeal and ardor I believe not generally found in persons who possess this world's goods even in tolerable abundance; but my enquiries have terminated in a conviction different from that of Paulensis, and therefore he conceives that I have not arrived at the truth; and because I have ceased to be a

believer in the divine origin of Christianity, he very uncharitably doubts whether I have been faithful in any thing; for that is what is meant by the phrase of" faithful in all things.'

The puritanical sentiments of Paulensis are sufficiently evident, when he joins with Paul in proscribing the heathen classics, because they do a world of mischief to our youth. 1 should be glad to know from whence our youth can derive more noble and exalted sentiments of morality, of patriotism, and of heroism, than in those very classics which the narrow spirit of sectarian bigotry proscribes as unfit for the instruction of our youth. If we are all to sink, as Christianity, literally understood, would sink us, into mere passive subjects of insult and oppression-if, when we are smitten on one cheek, we are to turn the other to receive the same affront; if, when a man takes from us our coat, we are to give him our cloak also-then indeed the spirit of the classics, which teaches us to resist oppression, to rise up against tyrants, to avenge not only our own, but our country's wrongs, is a spirit which ought not to be infused into our youth, lest it should tend to raise the hero on the ruins of the Christian; but if human nature will ever remain such as it is found in the writings of the classics, and not in the discourses of Jesus Christ, then I should recommend the study of the classics, in preference to the study of the New Testament, though some good and useful precepts may be found in it; for it is by no means to be adopted as a general system.

But, the gentleman says, "It is a groundless charge against Paul, that he proscribes the light of human learning. The whole tenor of the two first chapters of the first epistle to the Corinthians, is to shew the superiority of the light of the spirit, to the light of reason; and as a proof of it I will quote the most material passages to that effect that being established, it cannot be any longer denied that Paul proscribed the searching light of human reason.

Chap. i. 17. "Christ sent me to preach the gospel not withwisdom of words.-(19.) I will destroy the wisdom of the wise. -(20). Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of the world?(22). The Greeks seek after wisdom, but we preach Christ crucified.—(27). God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise, and the weak things of the world to confound the mighty."-Chap. ii. 7. "We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery.-(10.) God hath revealed these things unto us by the spirit; for the spirit searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God.-(11). The things of God knoweth no man, but the spirit of God.-(13). Which things we speak not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the holy ghost teacheth; comparing spiritual things, with spiritual.-(14.) But the rational man (or human reason) receiveth not the things of the spirit, neither can be know them, for they are

spiritually discerned.-(15). He that is spiritual judgeth all things, yet he himself is judged of no man.-Chap. xii. 3. No man can say that Jesus is the lord, but by the holy ghost." Let any impartial man determine what all this means. Does it, or does it not, set up a kind of faculty, or power of judging the truth of divine revelation superior to the light of human reason? and what is this faculty? It is the faculty by which we received the revelation, for spiritual things must be spiritually discerned, and therefore to judge of revelation, we must judge it by itself, which is arguing in a circle. The thing revealed is revealed by the spirit, and we are to judge of it by the spirit, and not by our reason. Can any thing more effectually open a door for enthusiasm and infatuation? For if the power of reason is superseded in judging as to the evidence of revelation, any man may believe whatever he pleases to be a revelation.

My antagonist tells me, that St. Paul appeals to reason as often as myself, but where he has not told me; but if he does, it matters not, if he proscribes the use of reason in judging revelation. I have accused St. Paul of introducing ridiculous and irrational doctrines, and Paulensis dares me to prove it, and I will prove it.

The doctrine of election, or a particular calling by the special. kindness of God, is expressly declared in the 11th of Romans, v. 7. What then? Israel hath not obtained it, that which he seeketh for; but the election hath obtained and the rest were blinded." Does this verse, or does it not, make God the author of iniquity? He is said to call or elect a certain portion of mankind, and to blind or reject the rest. Is this doctrine suitable to the great parent of all, or does it originate from the narrow selfish spirit of a mortal, anxious to obtain his protection, and exclude all others from a similar kindness? The Jews, who followed after righteousness, by the works of the law, are represented as not having attained that righteousness, and being rejected by God. It is true, they rejected the knowledge of Christ, they refused to admit the first principle of Christianity, which is thus stated by the apostle (Rom. x. 9.) "If thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in thine heart that God raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved." They refused to believe this, and therefore they were rejected by God; so that according to St. Paul, let their works be what they will, they cannot be saved, they are doomed to everlasting perdition.

This is the doctrine of St. Paul, but it is not the doctrine of reason, nor of nature, nor of common sense; for if there be a God, the father and creator of all mankind, he must regard them all with an equal eye of kindness, considering that whatever they are they are such by his special will and pleasure; and therefore he can no mere punish a man for believing in one thing than he can for believing in another. He cannot, if he