because the effect might be produced by the intervention of this very unknown law-but as it is, how rash must be the conclusions of the writer, pretended to be drawn from the laws of nature, when in reality he knows little or nothing about them!

We are indebted to the gentleman certainly for whatever light he has been pleased to throw on the chaotic gloom which envelopes the laws by which the world is governed; but still we cannot conceive to what purpose it is (except in pity to our ignorance) that we are told that the trees are green in spring-that the longest day is longer than the shortest-that lead sinks in water-that fire burns wood-and that smoke ascends upwards. It certainly is all very true, and we who know so little of the laws of nature might contribute our share of information to what has been just advanced-summer is hot and winter is cold-carrots are red and turnips are white-sprats live in the water, and elephants on land; and, as the gentleman justly observes, "nothing surely is easier than to demonstrate the constancy and universality of these and similar laws.' Well! and what then, Mr. Editor?-Why! nothing, Sir. Cannot "a Deist" perceive that he is strugling with a phantom? Nobody, that I know of, has disputed with him the immutability of the laws of nature; but we who think as well as talk about the laws of nature, are led to believe that they must necessarily be so various and complicated, that in many instances they will appear to counteract and even violate each other. We then do not presume to affix their limits and ascertain their boundaries-the subject is infinitely above our comprehensions, though perfectly simple to "a Deist."

Pursuing this kind of argument, I had attempted in my first letter to shew, that, on the principles assumed by your correspondent, an Indian would be as much justified in rejecting, as false and contrary to nature, the narration of a process perfectly simple and consonant to philosophy, as" a Deist" is in discrediting the resurrection of Jesus on a similar ground; and to the illustration 1 had given, his reply is, "let the experiment be made before competent witnesses, and the testimony received or rejected accordingly." It is strange that the writer could not see that this is what we have been all along contending for; by this very criterion, we say, let the truth or falsehood of the testimony of the witnesses of the death and resurrection of Jesus be tried. The rule which he has laid down is a just one; but at the same time it is at war with every part of his system, for it has been his express object to frame an argument utterly subversive of human testimony. But the truth is, there are a variety of facts, which, from their own nature, must depend on testimony alone.

To convince the reader that the writer has confounded him.

a

self, let me suppose any given event is reckoned to-day, contrary to the usual course of events, and that to-morrow an experiment is made before competent witnesses, which convinces them of its truth-these witnesses communicate it to others, but they of course, according to the previous argument of " Deist," ought to reject it, because to them there is nothing in the whole range of their observations which bears any analogy to such a process. In this dilemma I would ask the writer, if the experiment is to be repeated to everybody to whom they relate it? If he says, 'No! Why then it follows, that human testimony is sufficient to establish a fact manifestly inconsistent with the usual course of events. If he says, Yes! What's to

be done if the experiment cannot be repeated? Not to multiply instances, how could the Aeronaut, in the situation I had described him, procure the balloon and necessary apparatus to convince the doubting Indian? But, says "a Deist," in cases where a direct experiment is not possible, we may often make considerable approaches towards certainty, by reflecting on the particular circumstances of the case in point, and by comparing these particular circumstances with the known and acknowledged course of events." But how could the sceptic Indian do this; how could he make such advances towards certainty? when to his experience there is not only nothing in nature which bears analogy to such a process, but the known and acknowledged course of nature is in direct opposition to the particular circumstances of the case in point. Let the writer candidly and fairly review his reasoning, and he must be convinced of its weakness. 1 am sure he could readily detect the fallacy of such kind of argument on the side of Christianity, where, I confess, 1 should be sorry to find it.

Determined to destroy revelation, at all events, and in defiance of all consistency, your correspondent, after he had stated the testimony of competent witnesses to be a ground for receiving or rejecting the truth of any fact, tells us that no human testimony whatever can warrant a belief in miraculous agency or divine interposition." This is one of his old" preli-minaries" with a new coat on: we will examine whether it looks more tolerable for the alteration. But, first of all, to the broad assertion of the writer, I would oppose this simple observation-that if it should be more difficult to believe the evidence in favour of "miraculous agency or divine interposition" to be false, than to admit the existence of such "miraculous agency and divine interposition, no man could be so sceptically credulous as to reject it. Much of the argument will depend on what is meant by a miracle"a Deist" has found a very convenient definition: "a miracle (says he) has very properly been defined a transgression

of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity." The definition may suit the gentleman's purpose, no doubt; but I have yet to learn that it is the true one. Whether a miracle is in reality a transgression of a law of nature, or merely the change of ordinary effects by the efficacy of some antecedent law or governing principle in nature, can only be known to God, whose omniscience can scan these multitudinous laws in all their bearings and relations; and to the learned gentleman, I suppose I must add, whose system proceeds on a knowledge equally unbounded. Definitions are at all times difficult to give, even on simple subjects; in the present instance it must be infinitely more so. The objection to "a Deist's" definition of a miracle is, that it pre-supposes a knowledge which nobody has but himself; the definition which I shall submit is, the only one which I shall feel bound at present to defend, viz. that a miracle is a remarkable phenomenon, contrary to the usual operation of nature, and not within the compass (or apparently so) ofany of its KNOWN LAWS. This definition will form the only answer I consider necessary to the objections on this branch of the dispute.

The design of this letter has been just to brush away the dirt the gentleman has thrown up in passing so hastily by my argument; in my next, 1 shall offer a few observations on what the writer has advanced concerning the scriptures, and the character of Deity as gathered from those writings. On the laws of nature it is most likely I have concluded all that I shall have to offer, of a controversial kind at least, as it is not very probable that the gentleman either will or can furnish that information which can alone he reckoned to meet my argument. On that argument, whether weak or strong, I rest, and leave it as a sufficient refutation of all that has been, or may be, advanced by "a Deist."

Two or three remarks on the controversy generally shall conclude this communication: Christianity is or is not from heaven-its divine origin was attested by men like ourselveswe know something of man-we have some settled notions of the laws of the human mind-if they bore testimony to a falsehood, they have acted contrary to the principles inherent in our natures, and violated the most clear and acknowledged laws of human action. The truth of revelation would not be at all affected, even if it could be proved to involve a distur bance of the laws of nature-the Being who gave nature its laws can annul or modify them agreeable to his will, and the disturbance of such laws to accomplish a general design is less a miracle than calling them originally into existence. Whether miracles are occasioned by an immediate act of Deity, or spring from some settled law in nature, is a question only suit

ed for the vanity of speculation-at, the contemplation of the immensity of the subject, human reason shrinks into itself, and into nothing-system and hypothesis yanish before THE SOVEREIGN DISPOSER OF ALL THINGS-nature bows to the omnipotence of his will-revelation declares the benificence of his designs-and philosophy, expanded by religion, rests on the IMMUTABILITY OF THE LAWS OF GOD.

Blackfriars.

W.C.

THOUGHTS ON THE TRIAL OF MR. D. I. EATON, FOR PUBLISHING THE THIRD PART OF PAINE'S AGE OF REASON.

"The truth is, Christianity is the proteus image of every varying country and taste, debased with the impurest mixtures of man; now shackled by superstition, then as falsely sublimed by fanaticism; often forging chains for the person or the conscience; always made subservient to the established policy; seldom enlightened or strong enough to influence the conduct, and as rarely looking to the real happiness or interests of mankind."--Srictures, &c. BY A CLERGYMAN OF THE ESTABLISHED CHURCH.

To the Editor of the Freethinking Christians' Magazine.

SIR,

THE extracts I shall have occasion to give, of the speeches of the Attorney-general and Lord Ellenborough, at this trial, will be taken from the report in the Times newspaper. In the Court of King's Bench (March 6) this case came on before a full special jury. Mr. ABBOTT, in opening the pleadings, merely stated that this was an information filed against the defendant, for publishing a blasphemous and prophane libel on the holy scriptures, to which he had pleaded-Not Guilty.

And here, Mr. Editor, at the opening of this business, two or three questions naturally present themselves-what is it that constitutes a blasphemous and prophane libel on the holy scriptures" Did the gentlemen of the jury make up their minds on this point, before they gave their verdict? We might have expected from the Attorney-general some clear and lucid statement as to the meaning to be attached to the terms of the information; but for this I have looked through his speech in vain. It is true the learned gentleman observed that "blasphemy had always been held by the common law, of which the scriptures were considered a part, as one of the highest misdemeanors;" but unless we are first given to understand what "blasphemy" is, it is mere idle talk to tell us what rank it holds among the various classes of offences which swell our

* Learned Gentleman--a phrase commonly applied in the courts of law to an ill-looking man in a frightful wig and gown, of disgusting and overbearing manners, and only skilful in perverting truth, insulting innocence, and bewildering common sense.

statute books--it is in fact saying that there is a somethingnobody knows what-that is reckoned by the law of the land as the highest misdemeanor; and for ought I know, Mr. Editor, I may be guilty of this something at this moment.

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If by blasphemy" be meant whatever tends to bring religion into ridicule and contempt, a few points must first be ascertained before we can determine what is blasphemy, and what not. Does the definition apply to some particular system of religion exclusively, or to any religion whatever? If the latter, it will follow that the Lord Chief-Justice, and the gentlemen of the jury, and the Attorney-general, are all guilty of blasphemy, because they would feel it their duty to bring into ridicule and contempt any religion whose doctrines appeared to them absurd and unreasonable-Mahometanism, for example. But if by "blasphemy" be understood the attempt to bring into ridicule and contempt some particular system of religion, the question occurs to us at once-what particular system? If it should be answered, the established religion of the country-the reply is, that as England was once Papal, of course whatever tended to bring Catholicism into ridicule and contempt must have been adjudged by the laws of the land "blasphemy;" and we good Protestants, who have so happily succeeded in producing this desirable effect, must be all blasphemers-unless indeed the laws of blasphemy (if there are any such laws) have been altered, and then it is indispensably necessary that every man should know when such alteration took place, and what was the precise form and tenor of these laws, after they had been thus altered. But what do I say! the idea of the laws of blasphemy being altered must not be entertained for a moment, because it would involve a supposition that they are not founded on the broad and immutable principles of justice, but merely arise out of the floating opinions and fluctuating sentiments of mankind; so that what is blasphemy to day may be perfectly innocent to-morrow.

But perhaps it may be said that "blasphemy" consists in endeavouring to bring the CHRISTIAN RELIGION into ridicule and contempt; but who, 1 pray, shall determine what the Christian religion is? The Roman Catholic- the member of the establishment-each of the various sects of Protestant Dissenters, will tell you that their own particular mode of faith is the Christian religion; and I, if asked, would say that none of them have any claim to that character. One thing is certain that system which supports itself by civil authority, and punishes with pains and penalties those who oppose itis not the Christian religion.

But to keep to the technical terms of the indictment-we are still in the dark as to what this crime can be the "pub.