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Course of the History of Modern Philosophy, Tr. by O.W. Wight
Claude Henri Victor Cousin
Geen voorbeeld beschikbaar - 2016
abstract according action already appear authority begin believe body Born called cause century Chap character conceive condition consciousness consequently contains demonstration died distinct doubt eighteenth century entirely error Essay Europe evident examine existence experience exterior fact faith finite follows four give given hand human mind Human Understanding idea of body idea of space idealism identity important infinite intelligence Italy judge judgment knowledge known language Lecture less Locke material method moral mysticism nature necessary never objects observation operations origin particular pass phenomena phenomenon philosophy present primitive principle produced propositions qualities question reason reflection regard relation represent sensation senses sensible Series simple skepticism solid soul spirit substance succession suppose theory thing thought tion true truth understanding universal wish
Pagina 201 - ... as we do from bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself; and though it be not sense as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called
Pagina 201 - ... within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got ; which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas which could not be had from things without ; and such are perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different actings of our own minds...
Pagina 302 - It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge therefore is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things. But what shall be here the criterion? How shall the mind, when it perceives nothing but its own ideas, know that they agree with things themselves?
Pagina 251 - ... sometimes by the impression of outward objects on the senses, and sometimes by the determination of its own choice; and concluding, from what it has so constantly observed to have been, that the like changes will for the future be made in the same things by like agents, and by the like ways ; considers in one thing the possibility of having any of its simple ideas changed, and in another the possibility of making that change; and so comes by that idea which we call
Pagina 186 - It being that term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks: I have used it to express whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking; and I could not avoid frequently using it.
Pagina 182 - It is of great use to the sailor, to know the length of his line, though he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the ocean. It is well he knows, that it is long enough to reach the bottom, at such places as are necessary to direct his voyage, and caution him against running upon shoals that muy ruin him.
Pagina 305 - For it being manifest that there are bodies and good store of bodies, each whereof are so small that we cannot by any of our senses discover either their bulk, figure, or motion...
Pagina 280 - But yet whatever is pretended, this is visible, that these names virtue and vice, in the particular instances of their application, through the several nations and societies of men in the world, are constantly attributed only to such actions as in each country and society are in reputation or discredit. Nor is it to be thought strange, that men every-where should give the name of virtue to those actions, which amongst them are judged praise-worthy ; and call that vice...
Pagina 181 - I shall not at present meddle, with the physical consideration of the mind, or trouble myself to examine, wherein its essence consists, or by what motions of our spirits, or alterations of our bodies, we come to have any sensation by our organs, or any ideas in our understandings ; and whether those ideas do, in their formation, any, or all of them, depend on matter or not.