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REASON EXAMINED BY INTERROGATORIES—No. II.

THOU sayest thou art "as the eye and the hand to the soul." How canst thou perform functions so diverse as those of the eye and the hand?

Reason. As the eye receives light, so I receive knowledge; and as the eye without light performs no service to the body, so without ideas or knowledge I can perform no service to the mind. The eye cannot create light; it only receives it. I cannot create ideas; I only receive them. So similar is natural light and knowledge, that the latter has been called light in all languages as far as human records inform us. The analogy is the most perfect of all analogies. As light is antecedent to seeing, so the relations and qualities of things are antecedent to perception and reason. As light is extrinsic of the eye and unperceivable without it, so that which constitutes knowledge and creates it is extrinsic of me; and yet it is unattainable without my aid. I am as truly the lamp of the soul as the eye is of the body. But I am greatly misrepresented or misconceived when I am supposed capable of creating a single idea or of originating one perfectly new; and yet without me all nature cannot create in the mind one new idea.

While, however, I am literally the eye of the soul, I am only metaphorically its hand. The hand, guided by the eye, so arranges and disposes of the things within its reach as to place them in new relatious and modifications. thus I so order and arrange the perceptions and ideas which the mind acquires by my aid, as to produce all the new combinations necessary to the attainment of all my designs. This double service is not incompatible with the analogies which abound in nature. To obtain and to modify, classify or arrange materials, is very generally the office of the same agents or organs in nature. Thus I am the hand as well as the eye of the soul. But without light I can do nothing.

When testimony is presented I examine it as I do objects of sense; and when the marks of certainty are discerned in it I place it upon the same footing as my perceptions of things sensible, examined through my ministers, the Senses. I do not mean that I examine it by the same criteria; but with the same care which I apply to objects of my own observatfon. If I have any design to effect by means of testimony, I make that application of it which corresponds with my design, and thus in all respects use the ideas obtained by testimony as I do those obtained by my own senses,

But dost thou comprehend all the ideas which thou obtainest by testimony as fully as those which thou obtainest by sensation, and canst thou apply them to all thy purposes as certainly as those obtained from the sensible qualities of things extrinsic and material?

Reason. My apprehension or comprehension is like that of the eye. When a perfect image of a chair is painted on the retina of the eye, the eye is said fully to perceive it; but when only a partial image of the chair is depicted on the optic nerve, but an imperfect vision of it

can be obtained. Thus my apprehension of an object is just as perfect or as imperfect as the presentation of the object. To comprehend is to embrace an idea in all its relations; to apprehend is simply to perceive it, or to lay hold of it, irrespective of all the attitudes or relations in which it may stand to every other idea perceived by me. The subjects which I comprehend are very few-perhaps not one in the full import of the term. But I use the term comprehend in a loose and indefinite sense; as when I say, 'I comprehend a triangle, or a circle,' when I merely clearly apprehend it in its general properties and can contradistinguish it from all other figures. But my apprehensions and comprehensions are like the sights or views which the eye takes of objects from which light is more or less clearly on one side or on all sides reflected. Therefore, the ideas received by faith are as clear, as apprehensible, and, I might add, as comprehensible as any other.

What! dost thou mean to say that thou comprehendest that God is a Spirit, as thou dost that man is an animal?

Reason. I have no objection to say that if the terms God and Spirit can be defined as accurately as the terms man and animal, my comprehension of the one proposition will be as perfect as that of the other. Define God and Spirit as clearly as man and animal, and my comprehension of the one proposition will be as perfect as my comprehension of the other. But what is a spirit? A being unlike every person or thing presented to the senses. In this way the Bible defines it. There is nothing seen in the heaven above or in the earth beneath to which a spirit can be compared; and, therefore, men were wisely by the Great Spirit, through Moses, commanded not to form an idea of the Great Spirit.

Image thou meanest. or a material similitude to represent God as an object of worship and adoration.

Reason. True, this meant Moses; but this amounts to what I mean; for a prohibition to hang an image upon a wall, representing the personality of the Great Spirit, equally prohibits the placing an idea or image of his personal appearance before the mind, as an object of adoration. This cannot be done more than that with any regard to truth. The attributes of a spirit may be apprehended, because they can be defined. He that comprehends wisdom may comprehend omniscience. He that comprehends power as resident in any person, may comprehend a power almighty, &c. &c. But the term spirit as an attribute of any being, or as the name of its general nature, indicates in our language no more than unlike any thing composed of the elements of the solar system.

It is possible that a spiritual system, or a system of beings unlike mundane beings, may exist, as it is that other beings than those which I have seen may exist. And if testimony come from any of them, and is clearly established, I can admit their existence, and apprehend their attributes as testified of, as clearly as I apprehend the attributes of things seen. Thus from the wisdom, power, and goodness which I now apprehend, I can, on good testimony, admit of power,

REASON EXAMINED BY INTERROGATORIES-No. II.

THOU sayest thou art "as the eye and the hand to the soul." How canst thou perform functions so diverse as those of the eye and

the hand?

Reason. As the eye receives light, so I receive knowledge; and as the eye without light performs no service to the body, so without ideas or knowledge I can perform no service to the mind. The eye cannot create light; it only receives it. I cannot create ideas; I only receive them. So similar is natural light and knowledge, that the latter has been called light in all languages as far as human records inform us. The analogy is the most perfect of all analogies. As light is antecedent to seeing, so the relations and qualities of things are antecedent to perception and reason. As light is extrinsic of the eye and unperceivable without it, so that which constitutes knowledge and creates it is extrinsic of me; and yet it is unattainable without my aid. I am as truly the lamp of the soul as the eye is of the body. But I am greatly misrepresented or misconceived when I am supposed capable of creating a single idea or of originating one perfectly new; and yet without me all nature cannot create in the mind one new idea.

While, however, I am literally the eye of the soul, I am only metaphorically its hand. The hand, guided by the eye, so arranges and disposes of the things within its reach as to place them in new relatious and modifications. thus I so order and arrange the perceptions and ideas which the mind acquires by my aid, as to produce all the new combinations necessary to the attainment of all my designs. This double service is not incompatible with the analogies which' abound in nature. To obtain and to modify, classify or arrange materials, is very generally the office of the same agents or organs in nature. Thus I am the hand as well as the eye of the soul. But without light I can do nothing.

When testimony is presented I examine it as I do objects of sense; and when the marks of certainty are discerned in it I place it upon the same footing as my perceptions of things sensible, examined through my ministers, the Senses. I do not mean that I examine it by the same criteria; but with the same care which I apply to objects of my own observatfon. If I have any design to effect by means of testimony, I make that application of it which corresponds with my design, and thus in all respects use the ideas obtained by testimony as I do those obtained by my own senses,

But dost thou comprehend all the ideas which thou obtainest by testimony as fully as those which thou obtainest by sensation, and canst thou apply them to all thy purposes as certainly as those obtained from the sensible qualities of things extrinsic and material?

Reason. My apprehension or comprehension is like that of the eye. When a perfect image of a chair is painted on the retina of the eye, the eye is said fully to perceive it; but when only a partial image of the chair is depicted on the optic nerve, but an imperfect vision of it

can be obtained. Thus my apprehension of an object is just as perfect or as imperfect as the presentation of the object. To comprehend is to embrace an idea in all its relations; to apprehend is simply to perceive it, or to lay hold of it, irrespective of all the attitudes or relations in which it may stand to every other idea perceived by me. The subjects which I comprehend are very few-perhaps not one in the full import of the term. But I use the term comprehend in a loose and indefinite sense; as when I say, 'I comprehend a triangle, or a circle,' when I merely clearly apprehend it in its general properties and can contradistinguish it from all other figures. But my apprehensions and comprehensions are like the sights or views which the eye takes of objects from which light is more or less clearly on one side or on all sides reflected. Therefore, the ideas received by faith are as clear, as apprehensible, and, I might add, as comprehensible as any other.

What! dost thou mean to say that thou comprehendest that God is a Spirit, as thou dost that man is an animal?

Reason. I have no objection to say that if the terms God and Spirit can be defined as accurately as the terms man and animal, my comprehension of the one proposition will be as perfect as that of the other. Define God and Spirit as clearly as man and animal, and my comprehension of the one proposition will be as perfect as my comprehension of the other. But what is a spirit? A being unlike every person or thing presented to the senses. In this way the Bible defines it. There is nothing seen in the heaven above or in the earth beneath to which a spirit can be compared; and, therefore, men were wisely by the Great Spirit, through Moses, commanded not to form an idea of the Great Spirit.

Image thou meanest, or a material similitude to represent God as an object of worship and adoration.

mean;

Reason. True, this meant Moses; but this amounts to what I for a prohibition to hang an image upon a wall, representing the personality of the Great Spirit, equally prohibits the placing an idea or image of his personal appearance before the mind, as an object of adoration. This cannot be done more than that with any regard to truth. The attributes of a spirit may be apprehended, because they can be defined. He that comprehends wisdom may comprehend omniscience. He that comprehends power as resident in any person, may comprehend a power almighty, &c. &c. But the term spirit as an attribute of any being, or as the name of its general nature, indicates in our language no more than unlike any thing composed of the elements of the solar system.

It is possible that a spiritual system, or a system of beings unlike mundane beings, may exist, as it is that other beings than those which I have seen may exist. And if testimony come from any of them, and is clearly established, I can admit their existence, and apprehend their attributes as testified of, as clearly as I apprehend the attributes of things seen. Thus from the wisdom, power, and goodness which I now apprehend, I can, on good testimony, admit of power,

wisdom, and goodness in degrees extending to infinitude; and the fountain of these attributes I can apprehend as a being above all beings, the Father or Creator of them all.

An agent there is which I fear, and yet I cannot define it. Of its existence I am certain, though I never saw it. It is, too, the most pervading and potent of all the material agents in nature. In combination with other substances I have seen its power and experienced its effects, but never saw nor experienced itself. I allude to electricity, which, when combined with other substances, produces lightning, animal heat-and, perhaps, it is itself animal life. But in its simple and uncombined existence it escapes all the criteria which I have in the magazines of the universe to apply to its detection and developement. I know it only by its effects in combination with other agents; yet I doubt not its separate existence, and fear it as I do a lion or a tiger. I know as much of God as I know of electricity. I am equally certain of the existence of both. I apprehend some of the attributes of both, especially when clothed with other substances; and when I regard the testimony which came from the Great Spirit in its import, I feel the same certainty of his being and perfections as I feel of any other existence in all the universe.

But canst thou love a being of whom thou knowest nothing, of whom thou canst form no idea other than that he is possessed of certain attributes, and canst propose to thyself no idea or image of his existence?

Reason. It is no attribute of my nature to love. I told thee I am not love, nor passion, nor affection of any name. But I might ask thee, Dost thou admire Solon, Plato, Socrates, Cesar, Hannibal, or Napoleon? Dost thou love or fear any of the living whom thou hast not seen? And what is it which thou admirest, lovest, or fearest in such persons? Nothing which thou hast seen or canst define, thyself being judge, upon thy own premises.

Thou hast not seen these persons; nor is it their flesh and blood which thou admirest. Their character alone, or their deeds, fill thee with admiration; but what is the substantive existence of this character thou canst not comprehend. If, then, thou canst admire that which thou canst not define in its essence or substantive existence, why may not one so constituted as thou art admire, adore, and love the Spirit which thou hast introduced to test my powers.

The existence of a spirit, or of any simple agent of more refined matter, or of an essence which pervades the grosser matter, is quite apprehensible; but that the being who built the universe cannot be fully compared to any being in it, is as plain as that in no instance the cause is similar to the effect. But if thou wilt fully test my powers, and rescue me from the hands of infidels and sceptics, and all the enthusiasts of every name, I will answer thee a thousand questions; but seek not to make me contradict myself: for without me thou canst know nothing.

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