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These at last, in conjunction with the papal power, intirely extinguifhed the fpirit of liberty in that country, and established that abuse of the fine arts which has fince been propagated over all Europe.

(f) Line 30. Thus from their guardians torn, &c.] Nor were they only lofers by the feparation. For philofophy itself, to use the words of a noble philofopher, being thus fever'd from the sprightly arts and sciences, must onfequently grow dronish, infipid, pedantic, ufelefs, and diectly oppofite to the real knowledge and practice of the world. Infomuch, that a gentleman, fays another excellent writer, cannot easily bring himself to like fo auftere and ungainly a form: fo greatly is it changed from what was once the delight of the finest gentlemen of antiquity, and their recreation after the hurry of public affairs! From this condition it cannot be recovered but by uniting it once more with the works of imagination; and we have had the pleasure of obferving a very great progrefs made towards their union in England within thefe few years. It is hardly poffible to conceive them at a greater distance from each other, than at the revolution, when Locke ftood at the head of one party, and Dryden of the other. But the general fpirit of liberty, which has ever fince been growing, naturally invited our men of wit and genius to improve that influence which the arts of perfuafion give them with the people, by applying them to fubjects of importance to fociety. Thus poetry and eloquence became confiderable; and philofophy is now of course obliged to borrow of their embellishments, in order even to gain audience with the public.

(g) Line 157. From paffion's power alone, &c. ] This very myfterious kind of pleasure which is often found in the exercife of paffions generally counted painful, has been taken notice of by feveral authors. Lucretius

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refolves it into felf-love. Suave mari magno, &c. 1. II. I. As if a man was never pleas'd in being moved at the the distress of a tragedy, without a cool reflexion that tho' these fictitious perfonages were fo unhappy, yet he himself was perfectly at cafe and in fafety. The ingenious and candid author of the reflexions critiques fur la poefi & fur la peinture, accounts for it by the general delight which the mind takes in it's own activity, and the abhorrence it feels of an indolent and unattentive state: and this, join'd with the moral applause of it's own temper, which attends thofe emotions when natural and juft, is certainly the true foundation of the pleasure, which as it is the origin and basis of tragedy and epic, deferv'd a very particular confideration in this poem.

(b) Line 304. Inhabitants of earth, &c.] The account of the œconomy of providence here introduced, as the most proper to calm and fatisfy the mind, when under the compunction of private evils, seems to have come originally from the Pythagorean fchool: but of all the ancient philofophers, Plato has moft largely infifted upon it, has established it with all the ftrength of his capacious understanding, and ennobled it with all the magnificence of his divine imagination. He has one paffage fo full and clear on the head, that I am perfuaded the reader will be pleased to see it here, tho' fomewhat long. Addreffing himself to fuch as are not fatisfied concerning divine providence, The being who prefides over the whole, fays he, has difpos'd and complicated all things for the happiness and virtue of the whole, every part of which, according to the extent of its influence, does and fuffers what is fit and proper. One of thefe parts is yours, O unhappy man! which tho' in itself most inconfiderable and minute, yet being_connected with the universe, ever seeks to co-operate with that fu

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preme order. You in the mean time are ignorant of the very end for which all particular natures are brought into exiflence, that the all comprehending nature of the u bole may be perfect and happy; exifting, as it does, not for your fake, but the cause and reafon of your existence, which, as in the fymmetry of every artificial work, must of neceffity concur with the general defign of the artist, and be fubfervient to the whole of which it is a part. Your complaint therefore is ignorant and groundless; fince according to the various energy of creation, and the common laws of nature, there is a conflant provision of that which is beft at the fame time for you and for the whole. For the governing intelligence clearly beholding all the actions of animated and felf-moving creatures, and that mixture of good and evil which diverfifies them, confidered first of all by what difpofition of things, and what fituation of each individual in the general fyftem, vice might be depressed and fubdued, and virtue made fecure of victory and happiness with the greateft facility and in the highest degree poffible. In this manner he order'd thro' the entire circle of being, the internal conftitution of every mind, where should be its ftation in the univerfal fabric, and thro' what variety of circumftances it should proceed in the whole tenour of its exiftence. He goes on in his fublime manner to affert a future ftate of retribution, as well for those who, by the exercife of good difpofitions being harmonized and affimilated to the divine virtue, are confequently removed to a place of unblemish'd fanctity and happiness; as of those who by the most flagitious arts have arifen from contemp tible beginnings to the greatest affluence and power, and whom therefore you look upon as unanswerable inftances of negligence in the gods, because you are ignorant of the Purposes to which they are fubfervient, and in what manner they contribute to the Jupreme intention of good to the whole. Plato de Leg. x. 16. This

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This theory has been deliver'd of late, especially abroad, in a manner which fubverts the freedom of human action; whereas Plato appears very careful to preserve it, and has been in that refpect imitated by the beft of his followers.

(i) Line 322. One Order, &c.] See the meditations of Antoninus, and the characteristics, paffim.

(k) Line 335. The best and faireft, &c.] This opinion is fo old, that Timaus Locrus calls the fupreme being, daugos 7 Clior, the artificer of that which is beft; and represents him as refolving in the beginning to produce the most excellent work, and as copying the world from his own intelligible and effential idea; fo that it yet remains, as it was at the first, perfect in beauty, and will never ftand in need of any correction or improvement. There is no room for a caution here, to understand thefe expreffions, not of any particular circumstances of human life feparately confidered, but of the fum or univerfal fyftem of life and being. See also the vision at the end of the Theodicée of Leibnitz.

(k) Line 350. As flame afcends, &c.] This opinion, tho' not held by Plato or any of the ancients, is yet a very natural confequence of his principles. But the difquifition is too complex and extenfive to be enter'd upon here.

(1) Line 726.

---when the pious band, &c.] The reader will here naturally recollect the fate of the facred battalion of Thebes, which at the battle of Charonéa was utterly destroyed, every man being found lying dead by his friend.

(m) Line 755. Philip.] The Macedonian.

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LEASURE in obferving the tempers and manners of men, even where vicious or abfurd v. 1, to 14. The origin of vice, from falfe reprefentations of the fancy, producing falfe opinions concerning good and evil V. 14. to 62. Inquiry into ridicule; v. 73. The general fources of ridicule in the minds and characters of men, enumerated, v. 14. to 240. Final caufe of the fenfe of ridicule; v. 263. The refemblance of certain afpects of inanimate things to the fenfations and properties of the mind; v. 282, to 311. The operations of the mind in the production of the works of imagination, defcribed; v. 358, to. 414. The fecondary pleafure from imitation; to v. 436. The benevolent order of the world illuftrated in the arbitrary connexion of thefe pleasures with the objects which excite them; v. 453, to 514. The nature and conduct of taste; v. 515 to 567. Concluding with an account of the natural and moral advantages refulting from a fenfible and well-form'd imagination.

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