though drawn from him with great reluctance. But let us fuppofe, that after the firmeft refolution to revealTM nothing, his mind is unhinged by exquifite torture; the difcovery he makes may be justly termed involuntary: he fpeaks indeed; but he is compelled to it abfolutely against his will. Man is by his nature an accountable being, anfwerable for his conduct to God and man. In doing any action that wears à double face, he is prompted by his nature to explain the fame to his relations, his friends, his acquaintance; and above all, to those who have authority over him. He hopes for praife for every right action, and dreads blaine for every one that is wrong. But for what fort of actions does he hold himself accountable? Not surely for an instinctive action, which is done blindly, without intention, and without will: neither for an involuntary action; because it is extorted from him against his will and leaft of all, for actions done without consciousness, such as thofe which prefrve life. What only remain are voluntary actions, which are either right or wrong. Such actions are done wittingly and willingly for these we must answer, if at all accountable; and for thefe every man in confcience holds himself bound to answer. And now more particularly upon voluntary actions. To intend and to will, though commonly held fynonymous, fignify different acts of the mind. Intention refpects the effect: Will refpects the action that is exerted for producing the effect. It is my intention, for example, to relieve my friend from diftrefs: upon feeing him, it is my will to give him a fum for his relief: the external act of giving follows; and my friend is relieved, which is the effect intended. But thefe internal acts, though in their nature different, are always united: I cannot will the means, without intending the effect; and I cannot intend the effect, without willing the means Some effects of voluntary action follow neceffarily: Awound is an effect that neceffarily follows the ftabbing A 3 a perfon To incline, to refolve, to intend, to will, are acts of the mind relative to external action. Thefe feveral acts are well under ftood; though they cannot be defined, being perfectly fimple. a perfon with a dagger: death is a neceffary effect of throwing one down from the battlements of a high tower. Some effects are probable only: I labour in order to provide for my family; fight for my country to refcue it from oppreffors; take phyfic for my health. Ine fuch cases, the event intended does not neceffarily nor always follow. A man when he wills to act, must intend the necessary effect a person who ftabs, certainly intends to wound. But where the effect is probable only, a man may act without intending the effect that follows: a ftone thrown by me at random into the market-place, may happen to wound a man without my intending it. One acts by instinct, without either will or intention: voluntary actions that neceffarily produce their effect,: imply intention: voluntary actions, when the effect is probable only, are fometimes intended, fometimes not, Human actions are diftinguished from each other by, certain qualities, termed right and wrong. But as thefe make the corner ftone of morality, they are referved to the following fection. SECT. II. Divifion of Human. A&tions into RIGHT, WRONG, and` INDIFFERENT. HE qualities of right and wrong in voluntary actions, are univerfally acknowledged as the foundation of morality; and yet philofophers have been ftrangely perplexed about then. The hiftory of their various opinions, would fignify little but to darken the fubject: the reader will have more fatisfaction in feeing thefe qualities explained, without entering at all into controversy. No perfon is ignorant of primary and fecondary qualities, a diftinction much infifted on by philofophers. Primary qualities, fuch as figure, cohefion, weight, are permanent qualities that exist in a fubject whether perceived or not. Secondary qualities, fuch as colour, tafte, fmell, depend on the percipient as much as on the fubject, being nothing when not perceived. Beauty and uglinefs are qualities of the latter fort: they have no existence exiftence but when perceived; and, like all other fecond dary qualities, they are perceived intuitively, having no dependence on reafon nor on judgment, more than colout has, or fmell or tafte (a)." The qualities of right and wrong in voluntary ac tions, are fecundary, like beauty and uglinefs, and the other fecondary qualities mentioned. Like them, they are objects of intuitive perception, and depend not in any degree on reafon or on judgment. No argument is requifite to prove, that to rescue an innocent babe from the jaws of a wolf, to feed the hungry, to clothe the naked, are right actions: they are perceived to be fo intuitively. As little is an argument requifite to prove, that murder, deceit, perjury, are wrong acti ons: they are perceived intuitively to be fo. The Deity has bestowed on man, different faculties for dif ferent purposes. Truth and falfehood are investigated by the reafoning faculty, Beauty and ugliness are objects of a fenfe, known by the name of tale. Right and wrong are objects of a fenfe termed the moral fenfe or confcience And fuppofing thefe qualities to be hid from our perception, in vain would we try to difcover them by any argument, or procefs of reasoning: the attempt would be abfurd; no lefs fo than an attempt to difcover colour, by reafoning, or tafte, or smell. Right and wrong, as mentioned above, are qualities of voluntary actions, and of no other kind. An inftinctive action is beneficial, is agreeable: but it cannot properly be denominated either right or wrong An involuntary act is hurtful to the agent, and difagreeable to the fpectator but in the agent it is neither right nor wrong. A 4. (4) Elements of Criticism, vol. 1. p. 207. edit. 5. Thefe Every perception muft proceed from fome faculty or power of perception, termed fenfe. The moral fenfe, by which we perceive the qualities of right and wrong; may be confidered either as a branch of the fense of seeing, by which we perceive the actions to which thefe qualities belong, or as a fenfe diftinct from all others. The fenfes by which objects are perceived, are not feparated from each other by distinct boundaries; and the forting or claffing them, feems to depend more on tåfte and fancy, than on nature. I have followed the plan laid down by former writers; which is to confider the moral fense as a fense diftinct from others, because it is the eafieft and cleareft manner of conceiving it. Thefe qualities alfo depend in no degree on the event. Thus, if, to fave my friend from drowning, I plunge into a river, the action is right, though I happen to come too late. And if I aim a ftroke at a man behind his back, the action is wrong, though I happen not to touch him. The qualities of right and of agreeable, are inseparable; and fo are the qualities of wrong and of difagreeable. A right action, accordingly, is agreeable, not only in the direct perception, but equally fo in every fubfequent recollection. and in both circumftances equally, a wrong action is difagreeable. Right actions are diftinguished by the moral fenfe into two kinds, viz. what ought to be done, and what may be done, or left undone. Wrong actions admit not that diftinction: they are all prohibited to be done. To fay that an action ought to be done, means that we are tied and obliged to perform; and to fay that an action ought not to be done, means that we are reftrained from doing it. Though the neceffity implied in the being tied or obliged, is not phyfical, but only what is commonly termed moral; yet we conceive ourfelves deprived of liberty or freedom, and neceffarily bound to act or to forbear acting, in oppofition to every other motive. The neceffity here defcribed is termed duty. The moral neceflity we are under to forbear harming the innocent, is a proper example: the moral fenfe declares the restraint to be cur duty, which no motive whatever will excuse us for tranfgrefling. The duty of performing or forbearing any action implies a right in fome perfon to exact performance of that Cuty; and accordingly a duty or obligation neceffarily infers a correfpond ng right. A promife on my part to pay £100, confers a right to demand performance. The man who con mits an injury, violates the right of : the perfon injured, which entitles him to demand reparation of the wrong. Duty is twofold; duty to others, and duty to ourfelves. With refpect to the former, the doing what we ought to do, is termed juft: the doing what we ought not to do, and the omitting what we ought to do, are termed unjust. With refpect to ourselves, the doing what what we ought to do, is termed proper: the doing what we ought not to do, and the omitting what we ought to do, are termed improper. Thus, right, fignifying a quality of certain actions, is a genus; of which juft and proper are fpecies: wrong, fignifying a quality of other actions, is a genus; of which unjust and improper are fpecies. Right actions left to our free will, to be done or left undone, come next in order. They are like the former, right when done; but they differ, in not being wrong 1 when left undone. To remit a juft debt for the fake of a growing family, to yield a fubject in controversy rather than go to law with a neighbour, generously to return good for ill, are examples of this fpecies. They are univerfally approved as right actions: but as no perfon has a right or title to oblige us to perform fuch actions, the leaving them undone is not a wrong: no perfon is injured by the forbearance. Actions that come under this clafs, fhall be termed arbitrary, for want of a more proper defignation. So much for right actions, and their divifions. Wrong actions are of two kinds, criminal and culpable. What 7 are done intentionally to produce mifchief, are criminal: fuch rash or unguarded actions as produce mischief with-out intention, are culpable. The former are restrained by punishment, to be handled in the 5th section; the latter by reparation, to be handled in the 6th. The divifions of voluntary actions are not yet exhausted. Some there are that, properly fpeaking, cannot be denominated either right or wrong. Actions done merely for amufement or paftime, without intention to produce good or ill, are of that kind; leaping, for example, running, jumping over a ftick, throwing a stone to make circles in the water. Such actions are neither approved nor difapproved: they may be termed indifferent. There is no caufe for doubting the existence of the moral fenfe, more than for doubting the existence of the fenfe of beauty, of feeing, or of hearing. In fact, the perception of right and wrong as qualities of actions, is no lefs diftinct and clear, than that of beauty, of colour, or of any other quality; and as every perception is an A 5 act |