ces, by denying a debt he owes to a rich mifer, faves himfelf and a hopeful family from ruin. In that case, the good effect far outweighs the ill, or rather has no counterbalance: but the moral fense permits not the debtor to balance ill with good; nor gives countenance to an unjuft act, whatever benefit it may produce. And hence a maxim in which all moralifts agree, That we muft not do ill to bring about even the greatest good; the final cause of which shall be given below (a).

SE C T. IV.

Principles of DUTY and of BENEVOLENCE.

H

AVING thus fhortly delineated the moral laws of our nature, we proceed to an article of great importance, which is, to enquire into the means provided by our Maker for compelling obedience to thefe laws. The moral fenfe is an unerring guide; but the most expert guide will not profit those who are not difpofed to follow. This confideration makes it evident, that to complete the moral fyftem, we ought to be endued with fome principle or propenfity, fome impulfive power, to enforce obedience to the laws dictated by the moral fenfe.

The author of our nature leaves none of his works imperfect. In order to render us obfequious to the mo¬ ral fenfe as our guide, he hath implanted in our nature the principles of duty, of benevolence, of rewards and punishments, and of reparation. It may poffibly be thought, that rewards and punishments, of which af terward, are fufficient of themfelves to enforce the laws of nature without neceffity of any other principle. Human laws, it is true, are enforced by these means; becaufe no higher fanction is under command of a terreftrial legiflator. But the celeftial legiflator, with power that knows no control, and benevolence that knows no bounds, hath enforced his laws by means no less remarkable for mildness than for efficacy: he employs no external compulfion; but in order to engage our will on the right fide, hath in the breaft of every individual eftaVOL. IV. blished

(a) Sect. 7.

B

blished the principles of duty and of benevolence, which efficaciously excite us to obey the dictates of the moral fense.

As the reftraining, as well as active duties, are ef fential to fociety, our Maker has wifely ordered, that the principle which enforces these several duties, fhould be the moft cogent of all that belong to our nature. Other principles may folicit, allure, or terrify; but the principle of duty affumes authority, commands, and must be obeyed.

Το

As one great purpose of fociety, is to furnish opportunities without end of mutual aid and fupport, nature feconding that purpose, hath provided the principle of benevolence; which excites us to be kind, beneficent, and generous. Nor ought it to escape obfervation, that the Author of nature, attentive to our wants and to our well-being, hath endued us with a liberal portion of that principle. It enforces benevolence, not only to those we are connected with, but to our neighbours, and even to those we are barely acquainted with. Providence is peculiarly attentive to objects in diftrefs, who require immediate aid and relief. To the general principle of benevolence, it hath fuperadded the paffion of pity, which in every feeling heart is irrefiftible. make benevolence more extenfive, would be fruitless, because here are objects in plenty to fill the moft capacious mind. It would not be fruitlefs only, but hurtful to fociety: I fay hurtful; for inability to procure gratification, rendering benevolence a troublesome guest, would weaken the principle itself, and attach us the more to selfishness, which we can always gratify. At the fame time, though there is not room for greater variety of particular objects, yet the faculty we have of uniting numberlefs individuals in one complex object, enlarges greatly the sphere of benevolence: by that faculty our country, our government, our religion, become objects of public fpirit, and of a lively affection. The individuals that compofe the group, confidered apart, may be too minute, or too diftant, for our be nevolence; but when comprehended in one great whole, accumulation makes them great, greatnefs renders them confpicuous; and affection, preferved entire

and

and undivided, is bestowed upon an abstract object, as upon one that is fingle and visible; but with much greater energy, being proportioned to its fuperior dignity and importance. Thus it appears, that the principle of benevolence is not too fparingly scattered among men. It is indeed made fubordinate to felf-intereft, which is wifely ordered, as will afterward be made evident (a); but its power and extent are nicely proportioned to the limited capacity of man, and to his fituation in this world; fo as better to fulfil its deftination, than if it were an overmatch for felf-intereft, and for every other principle.

SECT.

V.

Laws refpecting REWARDS and PUNISHMENTS.

R

EFLECTING on the moral branch of our nature, qualifying us for fociety in a manner suited to our capacity, we cannot overlook the hand of our Maker; for means fo finely adjusted to an important end, never happen by chance. It must however be acknowledged, that in many individuals, the principle of duty has not vigour nor authority fufficient to ftem every tide of unruly paffion: by the vigilance of fome paffions, we are taken unguarded; deluded by the fly infinuations of others; or overwhelmed with the ftormy impetuofity of a third fort. Moral evil is thus introduced, and much wrong is done.. This new scene fuggests to us, that there must be fome article ftill wanting, to complete the moral fyftem. The means provided for directing us in the road of duty have been explained: but as in deviating from the road wrongs are committed, nothing hitherto has been faid, about redreffing fuch wrongs, nor about preventing the reiteration of them. To accomplish thefe important ends, there are added to the moral fyftem, laws relative to rewards and punishments, and to reparation; of which in their order.

Many animals are qualified for fociety by instinct merely; fuch as beavers, fheep, monkeys, bees, rooks. But men are feldom led by instinct: their actions are commonly prompted by paffions; of which there is an B 2 endlefs

(a) Sect. 7.

endless variety, facial and felfish, benevolent and malevolent. And were every paflion equally intitled to gratification, man would be utterly unqualified for fociety: he would be a fhip without a rudder, obedient to every wind, and moving at random, without any ultimate deftination. The faculty of reafon would make no oppofition: for were there no fenfe of wrong, it would be reafonable to gratify every defire that harms not ourfelves and to talk of punishment would be abfurd; for punishment, in its very idea, implies fome wrong that ought to be redreffed. Hence the neceffity of the moral fenfe, to qualify us for fociety: by inftructing us in our duty, it renders us accountable for our conduct, and makes us fufceptible of rewards and punishments. The moral fenfe fulfils another valuable purpose: it erects in man an unerring ftandard for the application and measure of rewards and punishments.

To complete the fyftem of rewards and punishments, it is neceffary that a provifion be made, both of power and of willingness to reward and punish. The Author of our nature hath provided amply for the former, by entitling every man to reward and punish as his native privilege. And he has provided for the latter, by a noted principle in our nature, prompting us to exercise the power. Impelled by that principle, we reward the virtuous with approbation and efteem, and punish the vicious with difapprobation and contempt. So prevalent is the principle, that we have great fatisfaction in rewarding, and no lefs in punishing.

As to punishment in particular, an action done intentionally, to produce mifchief, is criminal, and merits punishment. Such an action, being difagreeable, raises my refentment, even where I have no connection with the perfon injured; and the principle under confideration impels me to chaftife the delinquent with indignation and hatred. An injury done to myself raises my refentment to a higher tone: I am not fatisfied with fo flight a punishment as indignation and hatred: the author muft by my hand fuffer mischief, as great as he has made me fuffer.

Even the most fecret crime efcapes not punishment. The delinquent is tortured with remorfe: he even de

fires

fires to be punished; fometimes fo ardently, as himself to be the executioner. There cannot be imagined a contrivance more effectual, to deter one from vice; for remorfe is itself a grievous punishment. Self-punishment goes ftill farther: every criminal, fenfible that he ought to be punished, dreads punishment from others; and this dread, however fmothered during profperity, breaks out in adverfity, or in depreffion of mind: his crime ftares him in the face, and every accidental misfortune is in his difturbed imagination interpreted to be a punishment." And they faid one to another, We "are verily guilty concerning our brother, in that we "faw the anguith of his foul, when he befought us; "and we would not hear: therefore is this diftrefs

་་

66 come upon us. And Reuben anfwered them, faying, Spake I not unto you, faying, Do not fin against the "child; and ye would not hear? therefore behold "alfo his blood is required (a)" *. B 3

(a) Genefis xlii. 21.

No

John Duke of Britany, commonly termed the Good Duke, illuftrious for generofity, clemency, and piety, reigned forty-three years, wholly employed about the good of his fubjects. He was fucceeded by his eldest fon Francis, a prince weak and fufpicious, and confequently fit to be governed. Arthur of Montauban, in love with the wife of Gilles, brother to the Duke, perfuaded the Duke that his brother was laying plots to dethrone him. Gilles being imprisoned, the Duke's best friends conjured him to pity his unhappy brother, who might be imprudent, but af furedly was innocent; but in vain. Gilles.being profecuted bes fore the three eftates for high treafon, was unanimously abfolved; which irritated the Duke more and more. Arthur of Montauban artfully fuggested to his master to try poifon; which having mifcarried, they next refolved to starve the prifoner to death. The unfortunate prince, through the bars of a window, cried aloud for bread, but the paffengers durft not fupply him. One poor woman only had courage more than once to flip fome bread within the window. He charged a priest, who had received his confeffion, to declare to the Duke, "That feeing justice was "refufed him in this world, he appealed to Heaven, and called upon the Duke to appear before the judgment-feat of God in "forty days." The Duke and his favourite, amazed that the prince lived fo long without nourishment, employed affaffins to fmother him with his bed-cloaths, The priest, in obedience to the orders he had received, prefented himself before the Duke, and with a loud voice cited him in the name of the deceafed Lord Gilles to appear before God in forty days, Shame and re

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