Pagina-afbeeldingen
PDF
ePub

any events, therefore, be contingent, they cannot be foreknown. Suppose that all at once a world were to start out of nothing into being, without any ground or reason of its existence: here is an event perfectly contingent, and, consequently, destitute of any evidence before-hand. If such an event could take place, will any one say that it could be foreknown? The infinite greatness of God's understanding could not enable him to see evidence where there is none, it would only enable him to see with greater certainty that there is none.

3. There cannot be greater certainty in God's foreknowledge than there is in the event itself. To have certain foreknowledge of any event is just to foreknow it to be certain. And how can God foreknow that to be certain, which, at the same time, he knows to be contingent? How can he foreknow that any thing certainly shall be, which, at the same time, he knows may possibly, and even probably, not be? To affirm that he does, is to say that he knows a proposition to be of certain and infallible truth, which, at the same time, he knows to be of contingent uncertain truth.

Thus even the foreknowledge of God demonstrates that the acts of the human will are not contingent, but have a necessary connection with their motives, and take place according to fixed natural laws. Let then the whole of these arguments be weighed together, and the result must be conviction. A person of strong prejudices, and of

much obstinacy, may, doubtless, refuse his assent, notwithstanding every proof. Even demonstrative evidence has small chance against rooted prejudice. Witness the opposition which was, for a good while, maintained against the doctrines of Sir Isaac Newton's philosophy. Yet it is consoling to reflect that all or most of those who rejected it, did so, not understanding his reasoning. We may, therefore, confidently expect, that whereever there is judgment to comprehend, and candour to admit, the proof of the physical laws of human agency will commend itself to the approbation of

men.

CHAPTER XVIII.

STATEMENT OF DIFFICULTIES. PREPARATORY CONSIDERATIONS.

TRUTH ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE.

THERE is nothing which more forcibly strikes the mind of one who is engaged in the study of philosophy, than the evident contrariety between the preceding doctrine of human agency, and all the natural ideas of men, with regard, especially, to man's responsibility, the Divine justice, and the origin of evil. It is at once discerned that the whole economy of God, and the whole relations of man to his Maker, are affected by it. And rather than undergo the trouble of inquiring how far, and in what respect, our views on these subjects must be modified and corrected, the easier and simpler method is generally adopted, of rejecting the truth altogether, -a proceeding which at once indulges the indolence agreeable to all, and flatters human vanity as to the natural clearness of the judgment, and the correctness of the views first assumed.

Far be it from me to recom

mend any one to take more trouble on the subject than he feels inclined. The simplest way to unravel an intricate knot is to cut it, and the best way of dealing with a troublesome truth is to deny it, and the true mode of not seeing a plain object is to shut the eyes; and if any one be disposed to compromise the plain truth in hand, the best way of fortifying the mind, is to charge all who receive it with atrocious impiety, fanaticism, or blasphemy. Leaving such with these few auxiliary hints, we proceed to state the difficulties as they are. Whoever will be at the pains to investigate truth, need be under no apprehension with regard to its consequences. We may rest assured that whatever the truth is, it will be such as is honorable to God, and, if man could comprehend it, would be satisfactory to man. Men have disputed the point with as much eagerness as if their zeal or their ingenuity could add to the truth of the opinion which they supported. But the truth is immutably fixed: our belief or our disbelief cannot alter it. It becomes us then to inquire into it humbly, and calmly, and seriously. We have no cause for painful anxiety. God is the supreme disposer of all events and shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?

The difficulty is this. If the volitions of man take place according to determinate physical laws, if there be in human events a regular train of causes and effects, if, while man has

[ocr errors]

power to act according to his will, his will is yet invariably determined by the previous state of his mind, by the habits formed in early years through the influence of education or of companions, by dispositions implanted in his nature, and by motives appearing to the understanding,—if there be nothing contingent, but all events which come to pass, are the results of that arrangement of things which God has established, and are either parts of his great universal design, or at least its then does it not necessary accompaniments, follow, that God alone is responsible for the whole, that he is the author not only of all the good, but also of all the evil which exists, both moral and physical, that men are not proper subjects of reward and punishment, either in this life or in that which is to come,—and that the existence of such things is not consistent with justice in the Supreme Arbiter?

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

This is certainly a great difficulty, and I must admit that, in their attempts to repel these charges, many authors have only bewildered themselves with words. They have, however, shown to a demonstration, that consequences, if possible still more shocking, are justly chargeable on the doctrine of moral contingency. But do we, then, admit these consequences of our doctrine to be truly stated, and rightly understood? Far from it, as we hope soon to show. One thing, however, is very plain, that our preconceived notions of reward

« VorigeDoorgaan »