the medical world were undecided? Yet the conduct of the Geneva pastors is not less arbitrary and unwise in prohibiting what they are pleased to term discussions' in the pulpit, but which means promulgating any doctrine which is to the pharisee a stumbling block, or to the philosopher foolishness.

The attempt to restrain the liberty of prophecying under the pretence of maintaining inviolate the right of private judgement, proceeds altogether upon a mischievous fallacy. M. Sismondi would rest that right on the impossibility of arriving at the truth, and he argues as if what is certain might be authoritatively imposed. Thus he knows of no better foundation, apparently, for universal toleration, than universal scepticism. The Papist he seems to think consistent, because he claims, on behalf of his church, infallibility. He cites with high approbation the following remarks from a recent pamphlet by M. Chastel of Geneva.

The doctrines of Christianity may be reduced to two classes. The first are recognised as anterior to the interpretation of the Gospel, without which Christianity could not exist: to this class belong the belief in the existence of God, the Divine mission of Jesus Christ, and the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures; these we term primitive. The others are derived from a fixed interpretation of the Gospel, after it has been recognised as a rule of faith: these we will term doctrines of interpretation. On the primitive doctrines, all Christians are agreed; for they would cease to call themselves Christians, if they disowned God, Jesus Christ, or the Holy Scriptures. On the doctrines of interpretation, the Catholics are equally agreed, because they attribute infallibility to their church, and the right of settling the true meaning of the Scriptures. But the Reformers, when they separated themselves from the Romish Church, adopted the following principles: That the word of God is the only rule of our faith; that, as there is no infallible judge on earth, no one has the right of imposing a fixed interpretation of the Scriptures; but that every Christian is at liberty to adopt that which appears to him the best. By virtue of these principles, each person interpreting the Scriptures in his own way, different creeds will arise; they will agree on the primitive doctrines, but will differ on those derived from interpretation.'*

This division of doctrines into primitive and interpretative, will not bear examination; since it can hardly be said that all Christians are agreed respecting even the former; and assuredly the Catholics are still further from being agreed respecting the latter. The infallibility of the Romish Church has never precluded an infinite diversity of dogmas. But if an

"De L'Usage des Confessions de Foi dans les Communions re formées, par Etienne Chastel. Genève. 1823. 1

infallible judge of controversy, other than the Holy Scriptures, existed,if there were an authorized interpreter, and demon strative certainty could, in the view even of philosophers, be predicated of certain doctrines,-this would make not the slightest difference as to the right of imposing those doctrines of interpretation upon the consciences of men,-a right which cannot attach to any church or body of men, because the conscience cannot be the subject of human legislation.

M. Sismondi would perhaps admit, that the Christian religion is certainly true, and that the existence of One God is infalli bly certain. Still, he would have no right to impose the one tenet upon a Deist, or the other upon an idolater, by penal enactments or any other species of compulsion. It would be as repugnant to every principle of reason and religion to impose, in this sense, the most certain and fundamental article of be lief, as the most doubtful doctrine of interpretation. Every man' is at liberty to adopt that which appears to him the best,' -because for this he is accountable to God. But does it follow that the infidel is under no moral obligation to listen, to inquire, and to follow out his convictions, or that he is not to be told this? Does instruction imply coercion, or is the denunciation of the moralist against vice, an intolerant and presumptuous invasion of a man's personal liberty? In this light no doubt it is often viewed by the ignorant. The idolater resents the exclusive dogmas of the Christian priest, and the libertine spurns at the interference of the intolerant moralist. And it seems to us, that M. Sismondi's indignation at the presumption of the modern prophets, springs from a similar source, and involves a similar mistake. In both cases, self-love is wounded by the assumption of superior knowledge on the part of the teacher, an assumption which is generally found to offend in proportion as it finds a person insensible of his own ignorance; and in both, the wish to benefit is imputed as a wrong.

The question of creeds and confessions is perfectly distinct from the one under consideration. But M. Sismondi does not appear to discriminate very clearly between the moral obligation to believe, and the political obligation to subscribe to certain articles independently of believing them. We entirely agree with him, that confessions of faith, far from establishing a unity of faith, have raised discussions and divisions on the most intricate questions; that they have multiplied heresies; and that they are as much opposed to Christian charity, as to the right of free inquiry, which is the basis of the re formed religion. We transcribe with pleasure the following sentiments from M. Chastel's pamphlet.

A Christian, well convinced of his proneness to error, will never compel others to adopt his principles, especially if he believe that salvation depends on his belief; it seems to me that he would be afraid of their eternal damnation. He would have some repugnance to driving people from his communion...... people whom Jesus perhaps prefers to himself. He will always respect the sentiments of his brethren; he will never treat them as heretics; he will never hate them, he will never reject them on account of their belief.”,

All religious persecution of any description or on any pretence, has our cordial abhorrence; and we wish that the venerable Pastors and others had uniformly been guided by such Christian views. But here is the distinction which M. Sismondi has lost sight of. Because a Christian, rightly instructed, will never seek to compel others to adopt his principles, since his object is to gain their hearts, not to triumph over their understandings,-it does not follow that he will not be earnest in his endeavours to place those principles in their true light, both as regards their certainty and their importance. It may be very annoying to literati and men of science to be told, that they are far astray on the subject of religion,—that their principles are erroneous, that religion is a matter of experience, not of criticism,-of obedience, not of speculation,— and that in the school of Christ, the philosopher must become a pupil,-must become as it were a fool that he may be wise.' It may be to them very mysterious information, that belief is connected with the disposition of the heart, or the state of the affections towards the objects of faith; and that thus a moral element, which the Scriptures (putting the cause for the effect) denominate grace,-that is, a Divine influence on the affections,-enters into the capacity for prosecuting religious inquiries. Yet, believing in these principles, a Christian would act a very base and unworthy part, who should be indifferent to their most extensive and universal adoption.

It is not easy to reconcile M. Sismondi's exultation at the general revival of religious feeling which he considers as characteristic of the present age, with his morbid jealousy of the operations of religious zeal. But the unhappy misapprehension which pervades his pamphlet, that latitudimarianism is the only basis of Christian charity, and that Civil toleration implies respect for all varieties of opinion, leads him into all sorts of inconsistencies. Toleration regards the duty of States towards their subjects, or the duty of men towards each other as citizens, as Charity regards the general Claims of the whole human family to our benevolence. But opinions, true or false, cannot be the objects of benevolence, 'charity, or toleration, or their contraries. A respect for all

varieties of opinion, if it means any thing, implies not a tolerant spirit, but a reckless indifference to truth, a sort of pyrrhonism which is seldom found in combination with a sound understanding. We may respect a man's honestly avowing or conscientiously adhering to an erroneous creed; but if the creed be erroneous, and, as all error must be, pernicious in its tendency, it can claim no portion of our respect; and as lovers of truth, it is our duty to employ every legitimate means of combating it. But we shall let M. Sismondi explain himself on this head.

A toleration of, and respect for, all creeds, is, we have said, the peculiar character of the religious spirit of the present day. It seems to be universally acknowledged, that all religions are true, so far as they are as so many different languages in which the feeble creature expresses its respect, its gratitude, and its love for the great Creator.'

What is here said to be universally acknowledged, stripped of its mystification, is this; that natural religion,-comprising a belief in a Supreme Being, a faith blindly reaching after an invisible state, fear and a feeling of our need of help, and a desire to secure the favour of the Deity, is the universal dictate of reason and conscience; and this dictate is true, for God has impressed it on the heart. This identity of religious 'feeling' is said to be the foundation of all religious forms.' In other words, the conscience is the foundation of religion in the mind of the individual,-a discovery which we should not have imagined it remained for any philosopher to make in the nineteenth century. But let us go a step further; and we claim from M. Sismondi the acknowledgement, as an inference from his first proposition, that all religions are more or less true, according as they harmonize or consist with this fundamental principle of love to the great Creator, and make this the mainspring both of devotion and of virtue. But the truth or falsehood of a religion in this point of view, cannot be a matter of indifference. The false religion must tend, by false views of the object of worship, to repress the religious sentiment, or, considered as a language, to mislead the worshipper. Religion, it is most true, 'does not consist in dogmas, but in the connexion of man with the Deity; it is a feeling, not a 'science.' But if M. Sismondi means to say that our feelings and our worship will not take their character and complexion from our views of God and of man's connexion with him,— whether the dogmas embraced be those of priests, poets, or philosophers, he does not argue very wisely. And if this be the case, then the truth or falsehood of those, dogmas, by which

the form and character of our religion are determined, must be a matter of infinite concern, and I can have no respect for a false creed, which must tend to injure and mislead, in a point of such vast interest, the friend I respect or the multitude. whom I commiserate.

But it is proper that our readers should know the lengths to which M. Sismondi carries his notions on this subject. It is, he assures us, a religious as well as a charitable feeling, which leads him to undertake the philosophical defence of that ' re'ligious form' called polytheism.

It was God whom the savage adored under those gross symbols termed fetiches by our priests. It was God whom the Greek and the Roman adored, even when every one of his attributes was exalted into divinity; and it is the same God whom we adore as Jews, Mahometans, and Christians, for there is no other?

St. Paul then was mistaken when he told the Corinthians," that "the things which the Gentiles sacrificed, they sacrificed "to devils, and not to God; and I would not," he adds, “ that "ye should have fellowship with devils." He was equally mistaken when, in writing to the Christians at Rome, he represented the heathen as "changing the truth of God, into a lie,” -for which cause, even as they did not like to retain God in "their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind." Venus, the deification of lust, Bacchus and Belial, Moloch and Juggernaut, are all (we shudder at the blasphemy) attributes of the True God exalted into divinity. Such is the catholicism of modern philosophy!

It is scarcely worth mentioning after this, that M. Sismondi represents the controversy respecting the Deity of the Son of God as a mere quarrel about words, in which his blindness can be of no consequence. He professes to believe in the inspiration of the Scriptures, and he boldly impugns their clearest declarations! That, with such opinions, he should regard with little complacency the exertions and operations of the Societies which have for their sole object to circulate the sacred volume, is not to be wondered at. But it is remarkable how completely opposed his representations on this subject are to those of Mr. Haldane. Instead of viewing the Bible Society as in alliance, on the Continent, with infidels and neologists, he complains of its being a powerful instrument in the hands of the Methodists and Evangelicals; and it is evident that he regards the Institution as the offspring of a zeal which is the very antagonist of the liberal philosophy.