as ourselves. We are therefore required to love our neighbour, as ourselves: viz. because his happiness is of the same importance, as our own: not indeed mathematically, but generally, and indefinitely; as the words of the command import.

It is to be observed, here, that Benevolence is the only object of this command. The greater part of those, who are included, here, under the word neighbour, are wholly destitute of virtue, in the Evangelical sense. But towards any, and all, of these, it is physically impossible to excercise Complacency: this affection being no other than the love of such virtue.

4thly. This affection is Disinterested.

If the preceding positions be allowed, this follows, of course. Nothing is more evident, than that the mind, which loves happiness wherever it is, and in proportion to the degree in which it exists, must of course be disinterested. In other words, it must be without any partiality for its own enjoyment, or any preference of it to that of others. Its delight in the happiness, enjoyed by others, will be the same with that, which it finds in its own enjoyment; so far as it is able to understand, and realize, it in the same manner. We cannot, I acknowledge, either understand, or feel, the concerns of others in the same degree, as our own; and from this imperfection would arise, even if our benevolence were perfect, a difference in our estimation of these objects, which so far as I see, could not be avoided. But in cases, not affected by this imperfect state of our minds, cases, which even in this world are numerous, no reason can, in my view, be alleged, why the estimation should not be the same. In a more perfect state of being, it is probable, the number of such cases may be so enlarged, as to comprehend almost all the interests of Intelligent creatures.

5thly. This love is an Active principle.

By this I intend, that, in its nature, it controls all the faculties in such a manner, as to engage them supremely in the promotion of the great object, in which it delights. Of this truth we have the most abundant proof in the Scriptural exhibitions of the character of God; of the Redeemer; and of those saints, whose history they record. God, saith St. John, is love. Every good gift, saith St. James, and every perfect gift, is from above; and cometh down from the Father of lights. Nevertheless, saith St. Paul, he left himself not without witness; in that he did good, giving us rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness. Thou art good, says David, and dost good; and thy tender mercies are over all thy works. Jesus Christ, says St. Peter, a man who went about doing good. It is hardly necessary to observe, that the whole body of worthies, presented to us in the Scriptures, were in this respect followers of God, as dear children; or that the same mind was in them, which was also in Christ. The Epistles of St. Paul, particularly, and his whole history, after his conversion, as given to us by St. Luke, are one continued proof, that this was

his ruling character. The love, which exists in word, and in tongue, the Scriptures reprobate; and approve, and enjoin, that only, which, in their emphatical language, exists in deed and truth. We hardly need, however, look to this or any source, for evidence concerning this subject. Love, in all cases, so far as our experience extends, prompts him, in whom it exists, to promote the happiness of the object beloved. So plain is this to the eye of common sense, that no person believes love to exist in any mind, which does not labour to accomplish happiness for the object, which it professes to love. Thus a parent, who neglects the happiness of his children, is universally pronounced not to love them; and thus persons, professing friendship for others, and inattentive at the same time to their welfare, are with a single voice declared to be friends in pretence merely. What is true, in this respect, of these natural affections, is altogether true of Evangelical love. Its proper character is to do good, as it has opportunity.

6thly. This principle is the only Voluntary Cause of happiness. The benevolence of Intelligent creatures is the same, in kind, with the benevolence of God; and for this reason is styled the image of God. But the Benevolence of God is the single original cause, the sole, as well as boundless, source, of all the happiness found in the creation. In the great design of producing this happiness he has required Intelligent creatures to co-operate with himself. Of their labours to this end their own benevolence is the only immediate cause. Benevolence, therefore, in God and his Intelligent creatures, considered as one united principle of action, is the only voluntary source of happiness in the universe. therefore, none but voluntary beings can produce, nor even contrive, happiness; and as no voluntary beings, except benevolent ones, are active to this end; it is plain, that happiness is ultimately derived from benevolence alone; and but for its exertions would never have existed.

7thly. This principle is One.

:

As,

By this I intend, that the same love is exercised by a virtuous mind towards God, towards its fellow-creatures, and towards itself. The affection is one. The difference in its exercises springs only from the difference of its objects. Love is the fulfilling of the law that is, one affection exercised towards God, and towards man, is alternately the fulfilling both of the first and second commands. He who is the subject of one of these exercises is of course a subject of the other also. He, who loves God, loves mankind he, who loves mankind, loves God. There are not two affections of the mind, in the strict and metaphysical sense; one of which is called love to God, or Piety; and the other love to mankind, or Benevolence: but there is one love, now exercised toward God, and now toward mankind.

II. I shall now proceed to prove the Existence of this principle.

The evidence, which I shall adduce for this purpose, will be de rived,

1st. From the Scriptures; and,

2dly. From Reason.

The first argument, which I shall allege from the Scriptures, is the Moral Law: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with all thy heart; and thy neighbour as thyself.

I have already observed, that Benevolence, or love to happiness, or to Intelligent beings as capable of happiness, is the object, and the only object, of the second of these commands. Should any doubt remain on this subject, it may easily be removed by the consideration, that our Saviour has taught us to consider our enemies, universally, as included under the word, neighbour. The enemies of a good man, knowing him to be such, are always wicked men; and, having no holiness, or evangelical virtue, cannot, in the physical sense, be loved with Complacency, or the love of virtue. The love of happiness, therefore, or Benevolence, is the principle, especially, if not only, enjoined in this law. Accordingly, our Saviour called the command, enjoining brotherly love, that is, the love of his disciples toward each other, or, in other words, Complacency, a New commandment.

As the moral law, then, enjoins, especially, the love of happiness; that is Benevolence; so it evidently enjoins this disposition in a proportion, corresponding with that, which has been insisted on in this discourse. We are required in it to love God with all the heart; and our neighbour as ourselves. In other words, we are required to exercise this love proportionally to the importance, or greatness, of the object loved: supremely towards that object, which is supremely great and important; and equally towards those objects, whose importance is equal.

With this view of the law perfectly accords our Saviour's practical comment on the second command: Whatever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so to them; for this is the Law and the Prophets. In this command, our own equitable wishes for good to be done to ourselves are made the measure of the good, which we are bound to do them.

2dly. As another proof, I allege Luke vi. 32, 33, 35, For if ye love them, that love you, what thank have ye? for sinners, also, love those, that love them. But love ye your enemies; and do good, and lend, hoping for nothing again: and your reward shall be great; and ye shall be the children of the Highest: for he is kind to the unthankful and to the evil.

In these declarations of our Saviour, it is manifest, First, that the love, which he enjoins, is Disinterested love: for it is productive of beneficence, without reference to a reward. Secondly; we learn from them, that even this is not sufficient to constitute the disinterestedness of the Gospel. It is still further required, that the benevolence shall operate towards enemies; overcoming all hostil

ity towards those, who hate us; requiring us, instead of being enemies, to become friends to our enemies; to render good for their evil; and blessing for their cursing. Unless we do this, we are elsewhere informed in the Gospel, we are not and cannot, be the children of our Father, who is in heaven. Thirdly; we are taught that the disposition, with which we do good to others, for the sake of gaining good at their hands; or the spirit, with which we do good merely to those who do good to us; that is, Selfishness, in its fairest and most reputable form, neither merits, nor will receive, a reward; and is only the spirit of publicans and sinners.

3dly. I allege, as another proof, the declaration of the Apostle, 1 Cor. xiii. 5, Love seeketh not her own.

In this declaration, St. Paul has asserted the disinterestedness of Evangelical love, not only in the most explicit manner, but with the force, peculiar to himself. Literally, he declares, that love does not seek her own interest at all; but is so absorbed in her care for the common good, as to be wholly negligent of her personal concerns. This, however, I do not suppose to have been the meaning of the Apostle. But he plainly intends, that this spirit is wholly destitute of any selfish character. Less than this, it will, I think, be impossible to consider as meant by him in this passage.

With these three passages the whole volume of the Scriptures accords and that these clearly determine the love, required in the Gospel, to be the love of happiness, proportioned to the importance of the object loved, and disinterested in its nature; the points, relative to this subject, which are chiefly disputed; cannot, I think, be denied without violence.

To this decisive voice of Revelation, Reason adds its own unqualified testimony: as I shall endeavour to show in the following observations.

1st. The Benevolence, which I have described, is the only equitable spirit towards God and our fellow-creatures.

That the interests of God are inestimably more valuable than our own, will not be questioned by any man. This being allowed; it can no more be questioned, that they deserve incomparably more regard, than our own. Nor can it any more be doubted, that the interests of our neigbour are, at a fair average, equally valuable with our own. The fact, that they are ours, certainly adds nothing to their value. For what, then, it may be asked, can they be more valuable, than those of our neighbour? God unquestionably regards them alike; and it will not be denied, that He regards them equitably, and in the very manner in which we ought to regard them.

A public or common good, therefore, is more valuable, and ought to be more highly regarded, than the good of an individual; for this plain reason, that it involves the good of many individuals. This has ever been the only doctrine of common sense. In free countries, particularly, where men have had the power, as well as

the right, to act according to their own judgment, a majority of votes has always constituted a law: obviously because a majority of interests ought ever to be preferred to those of a minority, and still more to those of an individual. On the same principle, laws, which consult the general good, are ever pronounced to be right; although they may operate against the good of individuals. On the same principle, only, are individuals required to devote their labour, their property, and at times their lives, for the promotion, or security, of the general welfare. Selfishness, on the contrary, which always prefers private good to public, would, if permitted to operate, produce an entire subversion of public good. All the views, affections, and operations, of selfishness, are unjust; the interests of an individual being invariably estimated more highly by this disposition, and loved more intensely, than their comparative value can ever warrant. It can never be a just estimation, which prefers the private good of one to the good of many, the interests of each of whom are just as valuable, as those of that one; or which prefers the interests of man to those of God. If this estimation is right; and the regard, which accompanies it; then God ought to give up his own kingdom, purposes, and pleasure, for the sake of the least of his Intelligent creatures: and the good of the universe ought to be sacrificed to the good of one.

2dly. It is reasonable to suppose that God would create, and that he has created, Intelligent creatures with this just disposition.

That there should no where exist, in the Intelligent kingdom, a disposition, regarding things according to their value, is a supposition too absurd in itself, and too dishonourable to the Creator, to be made by a sober man. Such a disposition, it is plain, must be more estimable, and lovely, to the eye of the Divine Mind, than any other, which is supposable. If, then, God made his works, with a design to take pleasure in them; or to be glorified by them, he could not fail to give existence to such a disposition; unless it was because he was unable. But this will not be pretended, Such a disposition, therefore, certainly exists.

3dly. If there be no such disposition, there can be no pure or last ing happiness.

For, in the first place, there is no original cause of happiness, but the action of minds. Minds are the only active beings in the universe. Matter, if eternal, must have been eternally quiescent. But minds never act, to the production of that, which they do not love. If, then, they did not love happiness, they could not act, to the production of it. Of course, If God had not been benevolent, that is, if he had not loved happiness; he never could have produced it; nor created those beings, who were to be made happy.

In the second place; without the same disposition, Intelligent creatures could never produce happiness for each other. Under the divine government, happiness, in an endless variety of forms, is produced by Intelligent creatures for each other. The degree,