duty of prayer. Mr. Chubb expressly denies the doctrine of a particular providence, and not only fpeaks of the impropriety of praying to God, but even fuggefts a fufpicion that it may be difpleafing to the divine being.

Bolingbroke, who has been much extolled as a writer and philofopher, blames even the Pagan theists for flattering human nature, when they taught that a good man imitates God. He will admit of no proof that God is a lover of mankind, and made man to be happy. He altogether rejects the fcripture doctrine of a particular providence, and the notion that God is attentive to the prayers and wants of men. He acknowledges that God is a being of almighty power, and infinite wisdom; but he fays, that we must not pretend to afcribe to him any moral attributes, as holiness, justice, or goodness. He fays that he neither has thefe qualities, nor any thing equiva

lent to them.

VOL. I.

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SEC

SECTION III.

Of the moral fentiments of the Heathens.

AVING taken a view of the ftate

HA

of theology in the Gentile world, I fhall proceed to confider fome of their general maxims relating to morals, and efpecially fuch as were patronized by the philofophers; and we cannot but be fenfible that they were by no means favourable to virtue, taken in its juft extent. At the clofe of this I fhall alfo fhew how modern unbelievers have relapfed into the fame loofe kind of morality.

Many of the philofophers maintained that there is nothing juft or unjust by nature, but only by pofitive law and cuftom. This was the opinion of Theodorus, Archelaus, and Ariftippus, of the Alexandrian school,

which

which prevailed the most a little before the time of Chrift. All the earlier philofophers allowed too much to the obligation of pofitive law. Even Socrates himself reprefents it as effential to the character of a good man to obey, without referve, the laws of his country. On the other hand, Epicurus taught that a man is to do every thing for his own fake, his own happiness being the great rule of life.

The most diftinguished fyftem of morals among the Greeks was that of the Stoics, and it is generally efteemed to have been peculiarly favourable to virtue. It carries, indeed, an air of greatnefs and fublimity in it; but when examined will be found to be no friend to the humane and pleafing virtues. It was the great maxim of the Stoics that the foul of man, being of the fame nature with God, is felf fufficient for virtue and happiness, infomuch that it. is not in the power of the Gods themselves to make a good man unhappy. Nay, fo arrogantly did fome of them talk, that they reprefented men as fuperior to the Gods,

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Gods, faying that these are wife by the neceffity of their nature, but men by choice. Such notions as thefe could not but lay a foundation for a very dangerous and infufferable pride.

To fupport this ftrange hypothefis, with refpect to a world in which the wifeft and best of men are fubject to pain and death, they were obliged to maintain, and they did it refolutely, that pain is no evil, and that length of time makes no addition to happiness. To promote an infenfibility to pain, they maintained that men must supprefs all paffions, whether they be of the nature of love or hatred. They would not allow of anger, even at vice or injustice; and to make it the easier for perfons to stifle their refentment on thefe occafions, they frequently reprefented all crimes as involuntary, and confequently fuch things as no perfon could have any reafon to be furprized or offended at, especially since no body could be a sufferer but the injurious perfon himself. For it was the great maxim of Epictetus, that it is naturally impoffible

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for one man to be in fault, and another to be the fufferer. It is certainly very hard to conceive what real virtue fuch maxims as these could produce; and we shall see their mischievous tendency in feveral respects hereafter.

It is not difficult to point out several general maxims relating to morals, among modern unbelievers, which bear as unfriendly an afpect upon human virtue, if the idea that was given of it in the first part of these Inftitutes be juft. Mr. Hume, the most acute of all modern unbelievers, confounds natural and moral qualities; reprefenting virtue to confift of any agreeable difpofition or accomplishment, without diftinction. Among the virtues, he particularly mentions wit, ingenuity, eloquence, quickness of conception, facility of expreffion, delicacy of tafte, politeness, cleanliness, and even force of body. On the other hand he excludes from the rank of virtues humility and self denial, faying that they are rejected by men of sense, because they serve no manner of purpose.