Pagina-afbeeldingen
PDF
ePub

God always have been, and always will be difplayed.

There feems to be no difficulty in these amazing fuppofitions, except what arifes from the imperfection of our faculties; and if we reject these, we muft of neceflity adopt other fuppofitions, ftill more improbable, and involve ourselves in much greater difficulties. It is, indeed, impoffible for us to conceive, in an adequate manner, concerning any thing that is infinite, or even to exprefs ourselves concerning them without falling into feeming abfurdities. If we fay that it is impoffible that the works of God fhould have been from eternity, we may fay the fame concerning any particular thought in the divine mind, or even concerning any particular moment of time in the eternity that has preceded us; for these are all of the nature of particular events, which must have taken place at fome definite time, or at fome precife given diftance from the prefent moment. But as we are fure that the divine being himself, and duration itfelf, must have been without beginning, notwithstanding

this argument; the works of God may also have been without beginning, notwithstanding the fame argument. It It may make this difficulty the easier to us, to confider that thinking and acting, or creating, may be the fame thing with God.

So little are our minds equal to thefe fpeculations, that though we all agree, that an infinite duration must have preceded the prefent moment, and that another infinite duration must neceffarily follow it; and though the former of these is continually receiving additions, which is, in our idea, the fame thing as its growing continually larger; and the latter is constantly suffering as great diminutions, which, in our idea, is the fame thing as its growing continually lefs; yet we are forced to acknowledge that they both ever have been, and always must be exactly equal; neither of them being at any time conceivably greater, or less than the other. Nay we cannot conceive how both these eternities, added together, can be greater than either of them separately taken.

Having demonftrated the existence of God, as the first cause, the creator, and difpofer of all things, we are naturally led to inquire, in the next place, what properties or attributes he is poffeffed of. Now thefe naturally divide them felves into two classes; being either fuch as flow from his being confidered as the original caufe of all things, or fuch as the particular nature of the works of which he is the author lead us to afcribe to him.

[blocks in formation]

Of thofe attributes of the deity which are deduced from the confideration of his being the original caufe of all things.

WIT

ITHOUT any particular regard to the works of God, we cannot but conclude that the original cause of all things muft have been eternal; for, fince nothing can begin to exift without a caufe, if there ever had been a time when nothing existed, nothing could have exifted at present.

Secondly,

Secondly, this original cause must likewife be immutable, or not fubject to change. We feem to require no other proof of this, than the impoffibility of conceiving whence a change could arise in a being uncaused. If there was no cause of his exiftence itfelf, it feems to follow, that there could be no caufe of a change in the manner of his existence; fo that whatever he was originally, he must for ever continue to be. Befides, a capacity of producing a change in any being or thing, implies fomething prior and superior, something that can control, and that is incapable of being refifted; which can only be true of the fupreme cause itself.

or.

The immutability of the divine being, or his being incapable of being acted upon, or controlled by any other, is what we mean when we fay that he is an independent being, if by this term we mean any thing more than his being uncaufed.

SECTION

[blocks in formation]

Of thofe attributes of the divine being which the confideration of his works leads us to afcribe to him.

HAT God is eternal, and immutable,

as we

follows neceffarily, as we have seen, from his being uncaufed; but if we confider the effects of which he is the cause, or, in other words, the works of which he is the author, we shall be led to afcribe to him other attributes, particularly thofe of power, wifdom, and goodness; and confequently all the attributes which are neceffarily connected with, or flow from them.

If we call a being powerful, when he is able to produce great effects, or to accomplish great works, we cannot avoid afcribing this attribute to God, as the author of every thing that we behold; and when we confider the apparent greatnefs, variety, and extent of the works of God, in the whole

frame

« VorigeDoorgaan »