Summary of Recommendations

- 14

Let me summarize my overall recommendations.

1. Restore the LWR option through reforms in design,

construction and licensing.

2. Design and construct the Multimegawatt Terrestrial Power Plant as a showcase for the Advanced Light Water Reactor Technologies, while meeting our power needs for military installations.

3. Focus our advanced reactor development on a cost
competitive liquid metal reactor, as a bridge to the

breeder. One effective means of implementing this would
be through a national industrial design team.

4. Continue development of inherently safe cores and
demonstrate those features in FFTF.

5. Develop the full potential of long life core technology, with supporting tests of high burnup fuel in FFTF.

6. Implement effective international collaboration in the development and design of liquid metal reactors to obtain leverage on the available funding.

Thank you for this opportunity to share my thoughts on this very important subject.

Senator DOMENICI. Thank you very much.

Dr. Armijo, I did not make your statement a part of the record. It will be, without objection, made a part of the record, yours and Mr. Arnold.

Dr. ARMIJO. Thank you.

Senator DOMENICI. I would like to also, at the conclusion of the testimony in the record, insert the excellent summary by Jerry Bishop of the Wall Street Journal. What date was this? Dated May 2, where the research breeder reactor number two that you have described was described by Mr. Bishop for the readers of the Wall Street Journal.

We will make that part of the record. He did a pretty good job of making it understandable to even people like me.

[The article follows:]

[From the Wall Street Journal, May 2, 1986]

ENGINEERS TAKE DIFFERENT PATH IN Search for a SAFER REACTOR

(By Jerry E. Bishop)

On the morning of April 3, three weeks before the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in the Ukraine, a small, 20,000-kilowatt atomic reactor in Idaho, operating at full power, suddenly underwent one of the most dreaded occurrences in the production of nuclear power: The fluid that is supposed to cool the reactor stopped flowing.

Had this happened in a commercial power reactor, as it did at Three Mile Island in 1979 and possibly at Chernobyl last Saturday, another nuclear disaster would have been in the making. The cooling fluid would have immediately boiled away and temperatures in the reactor would have soared in minutes. Reactor operators would have scrambled frantically to get control rods pushed into the reactor to stop the atomic chain reaction before a "meltdown" of the uranium fuel core occurred. When the loss-of-coolant incident took place in the Idaho reactor, however, engineers sat quietly, waiting to see what would happen. The temperature of the coolant did rise by 400 degrees Fahrenheit, but it didn't boil and continued to extract heat from the reactor. The atomic reaction stopped, and the coolant temperature dropped within five minutes to its normal 900 degrees.

The incident was the latest test by Argonne National Laboratory engineers of an advanced atomic power reactor that researchers claim is inherently safe. Known as experimental breeder reactor No. 2, or EBR-II, it is markedly different from the reactors that currently power the world's commercial nuclear electric-generating stations. The cooling fluid, which circulates through the reactor core, extracts heat from the reactor and transfers it outside where the heat is used to produce steam, is liquid sodium instead of water. And the uranium fuel is a metallic alloy instead of uranium oxide. These basic changes produce an atomic reactor that, according to the laws of thermodynamics and physics, can't go out of control.

Most commercial power plants use water to cool their reactors. Water boils at 212 degrees. To prevent the water from boiling away and allowing the reactor to overheat and melt, the cooling water has to be kept under pressures more than 100 times atmospheric pressure. Sodium, however, has a boiling point of 1,650 degrees and can keep absorbing the reactor's heat, cooling it, until it reaches that temperature. For this reason, the sodium doesn't have to be kept under pressure, one inherent safety advantage of the EBR-II.

Another safety feature is metallic uranium fuel. The metallic fuel is a far better conductor of heat than the oxide fuel used in commercial reactors. When the metallic fuel begins to overheat, the heat is quickly and efficiently conducted to the sodium coolant instead of building up inside the fuel as it does with the oxide fuel. As the heat spreads out evenly through the fuel, the sodium and the control rods, everything begins to expand. The expansion spreads the uranium atoms apart, slowing down the atomic chain reaction without any human or mechanical intervention. As the reaction slows, the temperature drops back to normal operating levels.

The EBR-II actually was built in 1964 to test out the concept of immersing a reactor in thousands of gallons of liquid sodium. But, says Charles Till, the associate laboratory director in charge of the Argonne program at the Department of Energy's Idaho experimental reactor facility, "Only in the last year or so did it become apparent that the reactor was inherently safe." After extensive experiments and

computer simulations, the engineers decided, perhaps for the first time in history, to subject an atomic reactor to the three most dreaded "postulated hypothetical accidents" that could happen to a nuclear reactor.

In the test on April 3, the circulation of the primary sodium coolant through the reactor was stopped. As predicted, the temperature of the sodium rose, and in minutes the power from the reactor dropped to almost zero as the chain reaction stopped, Mr. Till reports. That afternoon, in a second test, the flow of the secondary cooling system, which removes heat from the main system and transfers it outside the reactor, was suddenly shut down. Again, after a brief temperature rise, the atomic chain reaction came to a standstill and temperatures dropped to normal.

The engineers plan soon to put the EBR-II through the third-worst hypothetical accident, "an uncontrolled acceleration of reactivity," as it's called. If, in a conventional reactor, a vital control rod is accidentally pulled out of the reactor, the atomic chain reaction could get out of control, sending out lethal blasts of radiation and resulting in a core meltdown. The Argonne engineers are certain that when they jerk a control rod out of the EBR-II, the same phenomenon that prevented the other accidents will shut the reactor down.

Argonne, which is operated for the DOE by the University of Chicago, is now developing a prototype commercial power reactor, called the integral fast reactor (IFR), based on the EBR-II concept. If techniques for reprocessing the metallic fuel are worked out, researchers believe such inherently safe reactors could be operating in 15 years.

Dr. TILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DOMENICI. I have a number of questions, but I am afraid we are not going to get to the next panel if I ask them. So I will ask the staff to submit them to you. If you will answer them at your next earliest convenience, perhaps in the next 8 or 10 days, they will be made a part of the record.

I was going to ask you, Dr. Armijo, do you have any relatives in New Mexico?

Dr. ARMIJO. Yes, many. My family has been in New Mexico since the late 1600's, and so we have lots of relatives in New Mexico.

Senator DOMENICI. And I know a lot of Armijo's and I wondered. In fact, I know some named Joe. They are not doctors, however, either medical or-where did you get your education?

Dr. ARMIJO. I attended Texas Western College in El Paso, TX. I am a Texan, and I know that is not very popular with New Mexicans, but my parents are both from New Mexico.

Senator DOMENICI. Are they still in New Mexico?

Dr. ARMIJO. No, sir. They are in Texas now.

Senator DOMENICI. How long ago did they move there? [Laughter.]

I mean, why do we always have to have such brain drains? Dr. ARMIJO. They are right on the border, Senator. They are right on the border between New Mexico and Texas. [Laughter.] Senator DOMENICI. How close? [Laughter.]

We are delighted, in any event, that we claim a part of you.

I do have some general questions, though, for Westinghouse and GE. What have the employment level trends in your reactor program areas been over the last several years?

Dr. ARMIJO. We in our advanced reactor-I will limit my remarks to our advanced reactors, or would you want me to cover both the commercial systems as well as

Senator DOMENICI. Just the advanced is fine.

Dr. ARMIJO. In the advanced, we have suffered lots of cuts as a result of the Clinch River termination, where approximately 46 percent of our technical staff was lost as a result of the Clinch

River program reductions and the reductions in the base technology programs in DOE's program.

The fiscal year 1987 budget, if it holds, the DOE submittal, would pretty much finish the job. We would have cuts from approximately 120 people to something in the order of 30 people if those numbers hold. So that is certainly an unattractive prospect for us.

Dr. ARNOLD. For Westinghouse, the advanced reactor part, I think our story is quite similar to General Electric's, although the mix of specific programs is a little different. In the light water reactor area, the total level of employment has more or less held its own, with a minor cut of about 9 percent in the last year.

But there is a tremendous shift in the mix. There is no longer any original design work. It is trending heavily to service and refueling of existing reactors.

Senator DOMENICI. Let me ask one last one for all of you. Is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission doing enough in its safety research program or its licensing activities towards advanced reactor licensing efforts, as you see it?

Dr. ARMIJO. Senator, there is a review of the advanced reactors by NRC, including the liquid metal reactors and the HTGR Program, that NRC and DOE have reached agreement on. Year by year that has to be looked at again depending on the relative budgets of the two organizations.

But there is NRC review of these ideas that we discussed today. Senator DOMENICI. Is it sufficient, as you view it?

Dr. ARMIJO. At this time I think it is sufficient. What we worry about is what happens next year with their budget as well. Senator DOMENICI. Any other observations? About the same? [Witnesses nod in the affirmative.]

Senator DOMENICI. All right. We will submit questions to you. We will take the next panel, please: Mr. Fred Mynatt, Associate Director, Nuclear and Engineering Technologies, Oak Ridge; Dr. Richard Dean, senior vice president, GA Technologies, Inc., from San Diego, CA; Mr. Warren P. Chernock, vice president of advanced nuclear systems, Combustion Engineering, from Windsor, CT; and Mr. Richard F. Walker, chairman of Gas-Cooled Reactor Associates, of San Diego.

Let us proceed with Mr. Fred Mynatt first. Am I saying your name right or wrong?

STATEMENT OF FRED R. MYNATT, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR AND ENGINEERING TECHNOLOGIES, OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY

Mr. MYNATT. Yes, that is very close, Mr. Chairman.

I am Fred Mynatt, Associate Director of Oak Ridge National Laboratory for the areas of Nuclear and Engineering Technologies. I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you today. I have submitted my written testimony and I will summarize in the time available.

I want to speak on behalf of our reactor technology programs, including the consolidated fuel reprocessing program, the reactor technology programs for the Department of Energy, and some as

pects of the reactor safety research program for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

All of these programs are severely impacted by the proposed 1987 budget. The reprocessing program is reduced from current year funding of $12.5 million to $1.5 million. The DOE reactor technology programs are reduced from $9 million to $6.5 million, with only $700,000 specifically identified for the high temperature gascooled reactor program.

The NRC reactor safety program is reduced from $14 million to $12 million. The net reduction in all of these programs which we call the civilian reactor programs is about $17 billion, which would mean the loss of approximately 290 staff members to the program.

The 1987 cuts are very deep and continue what has been the rapid elimination of the ORNL programs which prior to fiscal year 1984 were at over $65 million a year. The graph on page 2 of the material that I have submitted gives very dramatic and graphic evidence of these cuts, and unfortunately the extrapolation a year from now looks dysmal indeed.

The consolidated fuel reprocessing program has led reprocessing technology development in the United States for the past decade. It is a very effective and well focused program having obtained worldwide recognition in advanced technologies, including remote operation, remote maintenance, computer-controlled operation, proliferation resistant safeguards, waste reduction, and data from reprocessing of high burnup FFTF fuel.

For several years the program has focused on the development of advanced machines capable of remote operation, automation, and remote maintenance that have application to many areas beyond reprocessing. Well over $100 million over the years has been invested in developing the advanced machine technology.

Program termination will result in the loss of much of that technology because the loss of staff will prevent further development and technology transfer.

The Japanese plan to spend approximately $1 billion on reprocessing for their MONJU reactor, which will be completed in 1992. Considering their large program and the lead in areas of advanced remote technology which we presently have, the Japanese can save time and money by supporting continued development here in a collaborative program and by buying equipment here when the technology is transferred to U.S. industry.

While we in the United States are no longer committed to nearterm commercialization of the breeder, we will also benefit greatly from a collaboration. We should continue, rather than lose the lead we have in advanced machine development, which will benefit U.S. industry, first in direct sales to Japan and later in applications other than reprocessing.

This collaboration over the next decade will provide a means for the United States to positively influence the emerging worldwide plutonium fuel cycle from a nonproliferation perspective.

By 1987, we need an absolute minimum of $5 million of DOE support to match a comparable amount provided to us by Japan. We will rapidly lose our technology lead and the funding reduction now in the 1987 budget will result in loss of the staff in the very near future without this action.