tiff to act as a freeman without any claim or pretence that he was a slave, until this suit was brought, would authorize the inference of manumission by the other tenant in common. All presumptions in favor of personal liberty ought to be made. 14. HAMILTON V. CRAGG. June T. 1823. 6 Har. & Johns. Rep. 16.;. cannot be Under the statute of 1796, ch. 67. § 13., the court held, that an An infant infant unable to gain sufficient maintenance and livelihood, cannot emancipabe manumitted; nor can a slave be set free who is not both ted. under the age of 45 years, and able to work and gain a sufficient maintenance and livelihood at the time the freedom is intended to commence. 15. MOSES V. DENIGREE. Nov. T. 1828. 6 Rand's Rep. 561. The Court, Carr, J., held, in this case that a deed of emancipation of the slave executed in 1781, declaring the slave free when he should arrive at full age, which would be in 1796, is void by the act of 1723, by which emancipation is prohibited except for meritorious services, and by permission of the governor and council; that the case of Pleasants v. Pleasants, 2 Call's Rep. 319., carried the law far enough, although it violated no statute. The will merely directed, that his slaves should have their freedom whenever the laws would permit it, and created a trust to support the devise. And the court said, that emancipation by deed or will, made before May, 1782, of a slave, even where freedom is to take effect at a future time, is unlawful and void. (B) BY WILL. 1. MARY V. MORRIS, et al. Aug. T. 1834. 7 Louisiana Rep. 135. A bequest of liberty to slaves in contraven The plaintiff claimed freedom under the will of one Marshall, who held her in slavery in the state of Georgia. The testator died, and the slave was taken by the testator's daughter to Louisiana, and there sold by the executors of her husband after his state is decease. tion of the law of the void. So where the will is declared void. The defendant pleaded, that the will of Marshall devising freedom to his slaves was void; that by the laws of Georgia a slave could only be set free by a legislative act. The district judge thought, that slaves, being passive in their situation and character, it was the duty of the executor to see the will executed, which he viewed in the light of a contract. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal. But the court reversed the judgment, and held, that the bequest in the will being prohibited by the laws of Georgia, where it was made, is null and void; that the bequest of liberty to slaves, which is made in contravention of the law of a state enacted for the security of the public peace and good order of the community, is absolutely null and void, and such slaves do not, ipso facto, become free under the will, or being brought into this state where slavery is tolerated, but in which slaves may be manumitted by will. And see Pleasants v. Pleasants, 2 Call's Rep. 319., where a devise of freedom to depend upon a subsequent contingency (as where the state should grant a right to emancipate) was valid. 2. CHASTEEN V. FORD. Spring T. 1824. 5 Little's Rep. 268. Trespass, by Ford, a man of color, against Chasteen, to recover his freedom. It appeared, that Lewis Chasteen made his will, and devised, that all his slaves should be set free on their arriving at 25 years of age. The children of the testator exhibited a bill in equity against the executors, alleging the invalidity of the will, and praying a decision of the court thereon. The court pronounced against the validity of the will. Ford arrived at the age specified in the will after the court had pronounced against its validity. And the question on these facts is, whether Ford was entitled to his freedom or not. Per Cur. Owsley, J. Ford claims his freedom under the will; and was the question of his right governed exclusively by the import of the will, we should have no difficulty in pronouncing Ford a freeman. He had arrived at the age of 25 years, the commencement of this action, and the will expressly declares he should be emancipated at that age. But the will has been declared to be inoperative, by the decree of a court of equity, and that decree was, in argument, contended to be conclusive in the present case. But Ford was no party to that suit; and it was insisted in argument, that as to him the decree can have no operation in this contest. It must not be forgotten, that at the time the decree was pronounced, Ford had not arrived at the age to which, by the will, he had to arrive before he was entitled to his freedom. He could not, therefore, have been made a party, and the failure to have made him a party, cannot be alleged to render the decree inoperative as to him. 3. CHEW V. GARY. June T. 1825. 6 Har. & Johns. Rep. 526.; Suit for freedom. Mary Ann Wood devised as follows: "My will and desire is, that all my negroes shall be free, except my negro woman Nanny; and my will is, that she shall serve my mother Ann Brown during her life, and at her death, my said negro woman Nanny to enjoy her freedom." The petitioner for freedom was the child of Nanny, and was born after the death of Mary Ann Wood, and during the life of Ann Brown. The defendant demurred to the petition, and the court ruled the demurrer sufficient, and the petitioner appealed. Judgment affirmed. 4. In the Matter of NAN MICKEL, a Negro Girl. Aug. T. 1817. 14 John's. Rep. 324.; S. P. PETRY V. CHRISTY, 19 Johns. Rep. 53. The testator, by his last will, devised as follows: "I manumit and give freedom to my negro woman, Mott, and her daughter Nan, immediately after my decease." After the date of the will the testator sold Nan. On a habeas corpus to the assignee of the purchaser, the question before the court was, whether Nan was entitled to her freedom. The act of manumis be perfected, as by delivering sion must a certificate or writing to the slave or some son for his Per Cur. The sale made by the testator after making his will third perwas, pro tanto, a revocation of his will. The will has no effect be- benefit. fore the death of the testator. Although a manumission of a slave does not rest upon the principles of a contract, but is an act of benevolence, sanctioned by the statute, and made obligatory if in 314 writing; yet such writing ought to pass out of the hands, and from 5. PLEASANTS v. PLEASANTS. 2 Call's Rep. 319. 357. No The testator, by his will in 1771, directed, that "all his slaves should be free, when they arrived at the age of 30 years, and the laws of the land would permit them to be free without being transported out of the country; that is, all his slaves now born, or hereafter shall be born, whilst their mothers were in the service of him or his heirs, to be free at the age of 30 years, as above mentioned, their age to be adjudged of by his trustees." He then gave his son Robert eight negroes, "on condition he allowed them to be free at the age of 30 years, if the laws of the land would admit of it;" and then devised the residue of the slaves to sundry persons under similar conditions. Held by the court, that the limitations were good in the event of such a law being passed, while the slaves remained in the possession of the family, without change by the intervention of creditors or purchasers; it being considered too rigid to apply the rule respecting the limitation of the remainder of a chattel upon too remote a contingency, with all its consequences, to the present case; but that a reasonable principle ought to be adopted to suit its peculiar circumstances. And, therefore, after the passage of the act of 1782, permitting the emancipation on certain conditions imposed to prevent persons emancipated from becoming burdensome to the community, the court being of opinion that the limited manumission, according to the modifications in the will could alone take place, and that the terms for securing the public against the maintenance of the aged and infirm, could not be equitably imposed upon the devisees, it was decreed that all the slaves (not subject to the claims of creditors or purchasers) who at the date of the decree were above the age of 45, and their increase born after their respective mothers had attained the age of 30 years, should be emancipated so soon as the executor of the several trustees, or any other person, should, in the courts of the several counties in which the slave respectively resided, enter into bonds with approved sureties, payable to the justices then sitting in each court, and their successors, with condition, that the said slaves should not become chargeable to the public, or should enter into one such bond for the whole in the general court; that all who, at the same date were abve 30 years, and under 45, should be immediately emancipated and set free to all intents and purposes, as if born free; and that all who at the same date were under the age of 30, and whose mothers had not attained that age at their birth, and all their future descendants, born while their mothers were in such service, should serve their several owners until they should arrive at 30 years of age, and then be free. 6. WALTHALL'S EX'RS V. ROBERTSON et al. 2 Leigh's Rep. 189. June T. 1830. A condi is effective when the condition is performed. In the year 1819, Francis Walthall made his will, and devised as tional follows: "Item, if it be agreeable to the laws of this state, (Virginia) emanci pation is in which I live, that after the death of my said wife Mary, it is my valid, and will and desire, that the following slaves owned by me, viz. Joan, Sen'r, Gary, Jack, Tom, and Peter, shall, as soon as they attain the age of thirty-one years, be freed; and I appoint my friends, J. Morris and E. H. Hendrick, trustees for the liberation of said slaves, and for them to make the necessary application to the court on said slaves' behalf, both as to their freedom and remaining in the state. If the laws of the state be against such procedure, then my will is, that said slaves be equally divided among my children." After the death of the testator's widow, his children brought a bill against the executor, Morris, in the county court of Buckingham, who decided they were not entitled to their freedom, and decreed a division among the plaintiffs. The executor appealed to the superior court of chancery of Richmond, which affirmed the decree, and then he appealed to this court. Per Cur. Cabel, J. The testator, by his will says, if the law will suffer my slaves, if emancipated, to remain in Virginia, I free them. If the laws will not suffer it, I give them to my children. Per Green, J. The question is, whether the testator intended that the slaves in question should be freed (to use his own expression) upon his wife's death at all events, unless the law in force |