plaintiff recover the negro from the defendant, and one hundred and eighty-five dollars and twenty-five cents for his damages; and the defendant appealed. The 28th section of the first part of the black code provides, that runaway slaves shall be advertised, in at least two newspapers, in French and English, during three months successively, and, after that time, once a month during the remainder of the year. They shall be employed and kept at work for the county, by whom clothing, medicine, attendance, and maintenance shall be found; but these expenses shall be discharged by the owner, when the negro cannot be usefully employed. The next section provides, that if the owner do not reclaim the negro within two years from the date of the advertisement in the newspaper, in compliance with the preceding section, he shall be sold by the sheriff, with the permission of the judge, after three advertisements, for the payment of the charges, to be fixed by the judge. Now, the case under consideration does not appear, from the petition or order, to be one in which the sale could be ordered. The negro is stated to have been in jail two years; but the law allows only the sale of slaves who have been unreclaimed during two years, not after the arrest, but after the date of the first advertisement. The parish judge can only order the slaves advertised for one year; the case on paper does not show that the negro was advertised at all. Admitting even that the order justified the sale, (which we clearly think it does not,) the testimony on record shows that no legal sale has taken place. The defendant sold to himself. -Wyatt lent his name. This fact results from the evidence spread on the record. A runaway negro is delivered to the jailor, who neglects advertising him according to law; the owner, however, hears of the capture of his slave, makes himself known, claims his property, tenders more than is due, yet the slave is withheld. The jailor obtains an order of sale, without any allegation or proof of the case being one in which the law authorises a sale; he sells the slave after one advertisement, while the law requires three; executes a deed of sale to a man, who instantly transfers all his right to the jailor. We are of opinion, that the order of sale was rendered in a case in which the judge who granted it, from the very proceedings, does not appear to have had any authority to exercise. It consequently must be viewed as a nullity. The defendant, from the testimony in the case, made a fraudulent attempt to divest the plaintiff from his title in the slave. The damages allowed to the latter do not appear to us too high. Judgment affirmed, with costs. 7. PALFREY V. RIVAS. Jan. T. 1820. 7 Martin's Louisiana Rep. 371. If the taker up of a runaway davs in There was word to the owner, of fering to purchase enters into therefor, and in the mean time escapes, the slave and the jury find for the de fendant, the su preme court will not disturb the verdict. Martin, J. The petition charges, that the defendant having arrested the plaintiff's runaway slave, instead of pursuing the means which the law directs, in order to secure him, kept him at work on his own plantation for fourteen or fifteen days; after which the slave escaped, and has never been heard of since. judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed. statement of facts, which consists of the depositions of of witnesses, it appears, that the defendant arrested the plaintiff's slave on a Sunday, secured him in strong iron fetters, and informed the latter the plaintiff of the capture, proposing to purchase the slave. He a treaty also procured a gentleman of the neighborhood to address the plaintiff on the same subject. Both letters reached the plaintiff, who immediately addressed the gentleman who had written, at the defendant's request, enclosing a small sum to defray the expenses of the capture, and requesting him to inform the defendant that he might have the negro for a price which was then fixed. In the meantime, during the night between the Thursday and Friday following the slave's arrest, he effected his escape. In the letter of the plaintiff to his friend, desiring him to offer the slave for sale to the defendant, he requested that, if the offer was not accepted, the slave might be taken to a blacksmith, put in irons, and kept till an opportunity to send him to New Orleans presented itself; but, if none could be had shortly, that he might be sent to jail. The fetters put on him by the defendant are sworn to have been very strong, and in the opinion of the witnesses such as precluded the idea of his escape. The defendant, it appears, treats thus the negroes whom he arrests, and makes no charge against the owners. The plaintiff relies on the act of 1816, 2 Martin's Digest, 514. n. 6., which provides, that whenever a slave shall be apprehended, he shall be taken before the parish judge, or the next justice of the peace, who shall make inquiry as to his name, and that of his owner, and send him to jail, &c. He contends, that as the defendant did not comply with the requisites of the law, he must be liable for the consequences. On the part of the defendant, it is insisted, that the positive charge in the petition, viz. that the slave was kept at work for the defendant is disproven, and the implied charge of a neglect to comply with the requisites of the act cited, is not presented as a substantial cause of action, which the defendant was bound to disprove. We are of opinion that the petition charges the neglect of the defendant in a manner sufficiently positive to put him on his defence. The act requires a person who takes up a runaway slave to carry him before a magistrate, but it does not fix any particular time for doing so. The taker up cannot be expected instantly to abandon his own work, and go, accompanied by his own negroes, to the justice. A reasonable time must be allowed for that purpose. And this is a matter of fact. If he has business of his own pressing on him, which does not admit of a delay, he may secure the runaway during a reasonable time. If the owner resides nearer to him than the justice, he may well send him word to come and take his slave away. If the latter escape in the mean while, it is not clear that the taker up is to bear the loss.— Nemimi debet suum officium esse noceosum. Taking up a runaway slave is generally a kindly office. No private man is bound to undertake it. It is true, the law provides a compensation, but few persons demand or accept it, and the defendant appears to be one of those. The law of this case is pretty plain; and the jury who passed on it had but two facts to consider: Did the defendant neglect to carry the slave to a magistrate for too long a time? Did not the plaintiff approve of the slave being kept as he was? They have found for the defendant generally; and we are far from seeing that they erred. This is certainly a very hard action, and every allowance must be made in favor of the defendant, who acted with the best intentions, desirous of avoiding any useless expense to the plaintiff, and who treated the slave in the very manner in which plaintiff desired he might be treated, if the defendant did not purchase him. The jury, who knew the situation of the defendant, his distance from the next magistrate, and his ability to spare hands to guard the slave on the way, have said the plaintiff ought not to recover. The plaintiff, in two letters, before and after he heard of the escape of the slave, does not appear to have disapproved-did not complain of the conduct of the defendant. On the contrary, he used expressions therein, which might be construed into an approbation of his conduct; and if the verdict was grounded on a belief that it was approved and ratified by the plaintiff, we cannot say that the jury erred. Upon the whole, the verdict and judgment appear to us correct. SKINNER V. FLEET. 8. Aug. T. 1817. 14 John's. Rep. 263. The court held, that where a slave ran away from his master, who was an inhabitant of the state of Connecticut, and came to New-York, where he was taken and sold by his master to a person in New-York, but whose residence was in Connecticut, and who was temporarily engaged in business in the city of New-York, the sale was valid under the act of 1801. 1 K. & R. 614.; and the slave was not entitled to his freedom. The case is not within the mischief intended to be guarded against by the statute. 9. Hogg v. KellER et al.. Nov. T. 1819. 2 Nott and M'Cord, 113. Trespass for whipping the plaintiff's negro. Defendants, to jus- The pass tify under the patrol law, that the negro's pass did not state where he was going. Verdict for defendant. need not state where the slave is to go; it is sufficient if it express a leave of absence for a specified Per Cur. Colcock, J. The law does not require a master to state, in every pass, to what place the negro shall be permitted to go. It is sufficient if it express a leave of absence for such a time; 2 Brev. 231. The defendants, therefore, were guilty of a trespass time. on the plaintiff's property, and he is entitled to a verdict. New trial granted. (XIX.) OF THE EMANCIPATION OF SLAVES. (A.) BY DEED. 1. M CUTCHEN et al v. MARSHALL et al. January T. 1834. 8 Peter's Rep. 220. Justice Thompson, in speaking of the right of owners to eman- Emancipacipate their slaves, uses these words: "As a general proposition, tion of, may be reit would seem a little extraordinary to contend, that the owner of strained or qualified. property is not at liberty to renounce his right to it, either absolutely, or in any modified manner he may think proper. As between the owner and his slave, it would require the most explicit prohibition by law to restrain the right. Considerations of policy, with respect to this species of property, may justify legislative regulation, as to the guards and checks under which such manumission The owner only may emanci pate. shall take place, especially, so as to provide against the public's becoming chargeable for the maintenance of slaves so manumitted. 2. FERGUSON et al. v. SARAH. June T. 1830. 4 J. J. Marshall's Rep. 103. Enoch Smith, an abolitionist, bought Sarah, the wife of negro Ben, a free man of color, and sold her to Ben, in 1809, for the purpose of being emancipated, and took Ben's notes at long credits in payment. Smith, the vendor, wished Ben to liberate his wife without delay, as he was becoming embarrassed, and he might be eventually unable to do it in consequence of the claims of his creditors. A deed was prepared by Smith in the year 1813, and executed by Ben, in which he emancipated his wife and her children. Ben had not paid Smith the amount of the notes given for Sarah. Smith lived some years after, and always recognized Sarah and her children as free persons. Ben died intestate in 1818, and Smith in 1825. Ferguson was his executor, and was also appointed administrator of Ben, and took Sarah and her children, and was about selling them for the purpose of satisfying the debt due from Ben to Smith, for the price of Sarah. A bill was filed, alleging these facts, and an injunction awarded restraining the sale. The answer alleges, that the rights of the testator, as creditor, were not impaired by his agency in effecting the emancipation. The circuit court perpetuated the injunction. Per Cur. Robinson, Ch. J. Ferguson, as administrator of Ben, had no interest in the plaintiffs, nor any right to control them. Pre-existing creditors of Ben, who did not assent to the deed of emancipation, might disregard it so far as their just claims might be affected by it. For the maxim, that a man must be just before he is generous, was applied to the emancipator by the act of assembly of 1798, (2 Dig. 1155.,) whereby the rights of creditors, and all others, except "the heirs or legal representatives" of the emancipator are saved. But after manumission, the person so liberated is free as against the emancipator, and the world besides; excepting only bona fide creditors, or some other person who had a better right to the slave than the person had, who attempted the liberation; and as to such creditor, his right does not nullify the act of emancipation, nor |