Per Cur. Nott, J. After referring to the civil law, where a person was allowed what was called actio noxalis, by which a master was made liable for any damage done to another by his slave, such as theft, robbery, or any other damage, Cooper's Justinian, 354., and to Puffendorff, book 3., Grotius, lib. 2. ch. 17. 375. This point has been settled by our own courts in the case of Snee v. Trice, 2 Bay's Rep. 345. In that case, the defendant's negroes had suffered a fire to break out from the field where they were at work, and to burn up the plaintiff's crib of corn. The court held, that the defendant was not liable for the negligence of his servants. And the question was decided upon general principles, and not upon the particular circumstances of the case. Whether the result of the negligence be the burning of the crib of corn, or the breaking of a cart, the principle would be the same. The rule, however, does not extend to slaves who are tradesmen, carriers, &c., for there the master's security for their faithful performance of their duty depends upon his holding them out as capable of performing the work or business undertaken.

(C.) FOR TORTS AND CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE slave.

1.

GURRIERE V. LAMBETH. April T. 1836. 9 Louisiana Rep. 339.

The plaintiff brought an action of damages against the defendant, and alleged, that he rented a store of the defendant, and while he was absent, the defendant ordered one of his slaves to nail up a back window of the store to vex and harass him, the said plaintiff; and the slave, in nailing up the window, spilt a large quantity of ink on the goods of the plaintiff, and damaged them. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant appealed.

slave, acting either by or with

out his authority, and is liable for

all damages occasioned by his offence,

Per Cur. Bullard J. A bill of exceptions was taken to the refusal of the judge to instruct the jury, at the request of defendant's counsel, that the plaintiff could not recover, unless it was proved that the act from which the injury resulted, was done by the order fence."

*The court held, in Snee v. Trice, 2 Bay's Rep. 345., that a master is responsible for the acts of his servants and slaves, in all cases in the way of trade, or public employment, or where any injury is occasioned to another by any act done by a servant, in pursuance of his master's directions, but not for unauthorized proceedings; and it seems that the English law, which holds masters responsible for the negligence of their servants, is not applicable to slavery.

or quasi of

The extent of masters Liability.

agreement

with his

slave to manumit

him is obli

and authority of the defendant, or with his knowledge and approbation; and that even his subsequent knowledge and approbation of such act would not make him responsible. But the court charged, that the master was responsible if the damage had been caused by the slave, acting either by or without the master's order. We are of opinion, the court did not err. The civil code declares, that "the master shall be answerable for all the damages occasioned by an offence, or quasi offence committed by his slave, independent of the punishment inflicted on the slave." Art. 180.

STATE V. FRANCIS ANONE.

2.

May T. 1819. 2 Nott & M Cord's Rep. 27.; S. P. SNEE V. TRICE, 2 Bay's Rep. 345.; STATE V. DAWSON, 2 Bay's Rep. 360.

Per Cur. Richardson, J, The law is well settled, both in this state and abroad, that a master is not liable for the acts of his servants unless done by his authority; and that the principal is not liable for the criminal acts of his mere civil agents we fully recognize. And he cited Middletown v. Fowler, 1 Salk. Rep. 282.; M'Manus v. Cricket, 1 East's Rep. 106.

3.

KETTLETAS V. FLEET. Feb. T. 1811. 7 John's. Rep. 324.

A written This was an action to recover the price of a negro boy sold by by a master the plaintiff to the defendant. The defendant gave notice, with the general issue, that he would give in evidence, that the plaintiff had promised the boy in writing, that he would manumit him in eight gatory-it years from a certain period, upon condition of his faithful service during that period; and that the plaintiff had no right to transfer lence, and the boy for a longer period. The jury, under a charge from the court, found for the defendant.

rests in benenevo

not in con

tract.

On a motion for a new trial it was contended, that the writing was not obligatory.

Per Cur. The covenant of the plaintiff to manumit the negro in eight years, on condition of faithful service, was one that the slave could avail himself of if the condition was fulfilled. What was said by the court in the case of negro Tom, 5 Johns. Rep. 365., is to that effect. The manumission of a slave does not rest upon the principles of a contract, depending upon a consideration; but it is an act of benevolence, sanctioned by the statute, and made obligatory, if in writing.

4.

STEVENSON V. SINGLETON. Feb. T. 1829. 1 Leigh's Rep. 72.

cannot en

Gibbon made a contract with his slave Singleton, that he would Chancery emancipate him on the slave's paying him one thousand dollars, force a and the slave paid him $566. But no deed of emancipation was between executed by Gibbon.

Per Cur. Cabell, J. In the case of Sawney v. Carter, 6 Rand's Rep. 173., the court refused, on great consideration, to enforce a promise by a master to emancipate his slave, where the conditions of the promise had been partly complied with by the slave. It is impossible to distinguish that case from this. The court proceeded on the principle, that it is not competent to a court of chancery to enforce a contract between master and slave, even although the contract should be fully complied with on the part of the slave.

5.

EMERSON V. HOWLAND et al. May T. 1816.

45.

1 Mason's Rep.

contract

master and slave, tho'

the slave perform his part.

mariner

from on

The plaintiff shipped his slave on board the Ann Alexander, for Where a Norfolk to Liverpool, and from thence to ports in Europe. The slave ship was captured on her passage from Liverpool to Archangel in charged Russia, and carried into Norway, and the slave discharged by his own consent. The ship was restored, and arrived in Boston, when this suit was commenced by the master for his wages.

board a ship illegally, the mas

ter may re

cover wa

ges up to

the time

when he might have

Per Cur. Story, J. Capture does not dissolve the contract for wages. The slave could not consent to be discharged. The contract was entered into, by the owner in Virginia, and must be con- returned to strued with reference to the lex loci contractus. In Virginia, slavery States.

is expressly recognized, and the rights founded upon it, are incorporated into the whole system of the laws of that state. The owner of the slave has the most complete and perfect property in him. The slave may be sold, or devised, or pass by descent, in the same manner as other inheritable estate. He has no civil rights or privileges. He is incapable of making or discharging a contract, and the perpetual right to his services belongs exclusively to his owner. The slave was illegally discharged, and the master is entitled to recover his full wages up to the time when he might have returned to the United States.

30

the United

6.

An owner who has

THE STATE v. JONES. Dec. T. 1828. 2 Devereaux's North
Carolina Rep. 48.

Negro Charles, the property of the defendant, had been convicted notice of a of a rape, and executed.

capital charge against his

slave, in

case of a conviction is not only bound to pay the

prison fees, butalso the

of 1797,

(Rev. ch. 484.) for

carrying the sen

tence into

A question was made before his honor Judge Norwood, whether the defendant, as the owner of the slave, was liable to his prison charges, and to the fee of ten dollars allowed for carrying the sentence of death into execution. Both questions were decided for the state, and the defendant appealed.

Per Cur. Hall, J. From the two acts of assembly recited in fee allowed the case of the State v. Isaac, decided at this term, 2 Dev. Rep. by the act 47., the defendant, Jones, the owner of the slave, is liable for the costs of prosecution against him, because if the slave had been a freeman, his estate would be liable. With respect to the fee of £5 for executing Charles, it is included, I think, in the costs of execution. prosecution. In the act of 1797, (Rev. ch. 484,) amongst other fees to which the sheriff is entitled, for apprehending and carrying criminals to jail, ten shillings is allowed for carrying any sentence or decree of the court into execution, where the convict is to be corporally punished, and £5 for the execution and decent burial of any one. By the same act, provision is made for the payment of such fees by the state, provided they cannot be got out of the estate, or body of the prisoner.

The owner may be

prosecuted civilly for damages

for theft,

But it declares, that no such claim shall be allowed, until a fieri facias shall have issued to the county in which the prisoner may be supposed to have owned property, and the sheriff's return thereon, that nothing was to be found, nor until a capias ad satisfacendum, shall have issued, and if it was executed upon the body of the criminal, not until he discharged himself by taking the oath of insolvency. From this act it appears that the estate of the slave would be liable in case he was a freeman. It follows, of course, that his owner is so. Judgment affirmed.

MOFFIT V. VION.

7.

March T. 1833. 5 Louisiana Rep. 346.

The plaintiff sued the defendant to recover the value of goods stolen from his store by the defendant's slave. The defendant exslave be- cepted on the ground, that no previous criminal prosecution of the

&c. of his

fore a criminal pro

slave had taken place. secution is dismissed the petition.

instituted.

The judge sustained the exception and Plaintiff appealed.

Per Cur. Mathews, J. In pursuance of the articles of the code, we are of opinion, that a person who suffers damages by the theft or robbery of a slave, may proceed immediately and directly against the owner of such slave, and obtain judgment in the civil suit, to ascertain the amount of damages without a previous criminal prosecution; and that, on a judgment thus rendered, an execution regularly issue, unless the owner of the slave should choose to abandon within three days after the rendition of the judgment.

8.

THE STATE v. ISAAC. Dec. T. 1828. 2 Devereaux's North

Carolina Rep. 47.

been confi

An indictment for murder had been found against the prisoner, Where a a slave. On the last circuit, a nolle prosequi was entered; and slave has upon the motion of the owner, who had been duly notified of the charge, the prisoner was discharged. But his honor, Judge Martin, ordered the jail fees and other costs to be paid by the owner, from which the latter appealed to this court.

Per Cur. Hall, J. By the act of 1793, (Rev. ch. 381, sec. 2,) it is declared, that where a slave is charged criminally, his owner, provided he has notice of it, is bound to pay all costs attending the trial, provided also, that the slave, if a freeman, would be liable to pay them.

ned in jail dictment and a nolle

upon an in

for murder,

prosequi is entered,

the owner having had due notice charge is liable un

of the

der the acts of 1793 and 1795,

381. sec. 2., and ch.

433. sec. 7.) for the jail fees, as

well as the

court costs.

By the act of 1795, (Rev. ch. 433. sec. 7,) it is declared, that (Rev. ch. every person who shall be committed to a public jail, by lawful authority, for any criminal offence, or misdemeanor against the state, shall bear all reasonable charges for carrying and guarding them to the said jail, and also for their support therein, until lawfully released. And all the estate which the person possessed at the time of committing the offence, shall be subject to the payment of the aforesaid charges and other prison fees, in preference to all other demands. From these acts of the Legislature, it appears that Isaac, if a free man, would be liable for his prison fees, and, consequently, his owner is bound for them. Judgment affirmed.

9.

CALDWELL V. SACRA. Spring T. 1811. 6 Littell's Rep. 118. Per Cur. Logan, J. In an action of trepass against Caldwell, A man is upon the allegation that he had, or caused to be, tied to the tail of a certain horse of the plaintiff, large sticks of wood, and had so beat and caused the said horse to run as thereby to occasion his slave.

liable for a trespass committed

by his