a specified a negro for After the time of payment, Murrel sued on the covenant, and retime is obli- covered the full amount of the hire. Harrison filed a bill, and obgatory where the tained an injunction against the judgment; but the circuit court was of opinion no deduction ought to be made, and dissolved the injunction; and dismissed the bill. negro dies before the time. And he is Per Cur. Owsley, J. The principle is not perceived upon which Harrison can be relieved from any part of the hire which he covenanted to pay for the negroes. Though it may, at first blush, seem hard that Harrison should be compelled to pay hire for the negro that died before the expiration of the term for which he was hired, it will, upon mature reflection, be found not to be unjust in Murrell to exact the full hire of the negro. The uncertainty of the negro's life was equally known to both Harrison and Murrell when the contract for hire was entered into between them. With that knowledge it was competent for them to contract in the way most acceptable to themselves, and when fairly made, the court possesses no power to alter or change the import of the contract. 6. GRUNDY'S HEIRS V. JACKSON'S HEIRS. Spring T. 1822. 1 Little's Rep. 11. The court held, that the hirer of slaves is chargeable with physician's fees, and the expenses of their sickness, unless there is an express agreement to the contrary, between him and the owner. 7. BAIRD V. BLAND et al. March T. 1817. 5 Munf. Rep. 492. The court held, that when a person who bought a slave with liable for knowledge of a better title, and is decreed to deliver him up and the interest on the pay the profits, interest ought to be charged against him upon the hires when hires actually received by him from other persons from the date of he purcha ses with le- the receipts, but not upon the profits of such slave while in his posgal notice of a better session without being hired; the same being unliquidated, and merely conjectural sums, which he was in no default in not paying. title. And is not entitled to 8. REDDING V. HALL et al. Fall T. 1809. 1 Bibb's Rep. 537. Held by the Court, Boyle, J, that the hirer of a slave is not enabatement titled to abatement of hire for sickness, or for the physician's bills, for sickness. unless there is a stipulation in the contract, and he is bound to pay a proper attention to the health of the slave, or he will be responSee Pollard v. Shaffer, 1 Dall. Rep. 210. sible to the owner. MIMS V. MIMS. 9. Fall T. 1829. 3 J. J. Marshall's Rep. 389. of hire. Held by the court, Underwood, J., that the bailee of slaves is only Limitation liable for five years' hire anterior to the suit; but where slaves are mortgaged, or pledged, hire must be accounted for from date of mortgage or pledge, until debt and interest are discharged; then hire ceases till within five years before suit. 10. GRIGSBY V. CLEARY. Oct. T. 1827. 5 Monroe's Rep. 514. Grigsby, the testator, devised slaves to his wife and his sons Enoch, Mack, and Smith, during their lives, remainder over to others. Cleary, the plaintiff, hired Malinda of Enoch, the tenant for life, for one year. Enoch died before the end of the year, and Grigsby, the remainderman, took the slave; for which this action of tresspass was brought. Verdict for plaintiff. Where tenant for life of slaves dies after 1st March, his lessee them for will hold the remain der of the year, by virtue of the act Dig. 532. And the declar ations of for life of the tenant the nature terest in them is pro dence a Per Cur. Bibb, Ch. J. If the tenant for life had hired Malinda to Cleary for one year unexpired at the death of the tenant for life, as that event happened after the first day of March, the lessee Cleary had a right to hold the slave against the remainderman, until the last day of December, according to the 47th § of the act concerning executors and administrators. 1 Dig. 532. And as the fact of hiring by the tenant for life was in issue, parol evidence of the declarations of the tenant for life, of his having hired the per evislave, is competent evidence against the remainderman. As an As an gainst the example to illustrate the rule put, the case of a similar question claims of of evidence between one in possession under a tenant in fee of a remainder. slave, claiming by hire or gift of the tenant in fee, in an action. against one claiming as heir, devisee, or executor, and the mind of the profession assents at once to the admissibility of the declarations of the tenant in fee, as competent evidence for the plaintiff against the heir, executor, or devisee, to explain the character and duration of the possession so delivered, whether as a letting to hire or as a gift. Because the act of the tenant in fee is obligatory on those claiming under him, as heir, devisee, or executor. those in The act which the 1st of any year, to remain finish the hire to the man, but their servi of the year 11. WILLIAM LEVERETT et al. v. JOHN LEVERETT et al. 1827. 2 Temperance Leverett, by a deed from Ann Floyd, was entitled re- during her life to certain slaves, and after her death they were quires the slaves on given over to the complainants. The tenant for life died on the the plantation of a 25th day of March 1824. Her executors, the defendants, kept tenant for these slaves on the plantation until they finished the crop of that life, who dies after year, under the authority given to them by the act of Assembly of March of 1789, Pub. Laws, 494., which is in the following words: "If any shall die after the first day of March in any year, the slaves person thereon to of which he or she was possessed, whether held for life, or absocrop, does lutely, and who were employed in making a crop, shall be connot give tinued on the lands, which were in the occupation of the deceased, remainder- until the crop is finished, and then be delivered to those who have confers the right to them; and such crop shall be assets in the executor's ces for the or administrators' hands, subject to the debts, legacies and distriburemainder tion, the taxes, overseer's wages, expenses of physic, food and to the es- clothing being first paid, and the emblements of the lands, which shall be severed before the last day of December following, shall in like manner be assets in the hands of the executors or administrators; but all such emblements growing on the lands on that day, or at the time of the testator's or intestate's death, if that happen after the said last day of December, and before the first day of March, shall pass with the lands. And if any person shall rent or hire lands or slaves of a tenant for life, and such tenant for life dies, the person hiring such lands or slaves shall not be dispossessed until the crop of that year is finished, he or she securing the payment of the rent or hire when due." The complainants contended that the defendants, the executors of Temperance Leverett, should pay them for the hire of the negroes from the death of their testatrix, on the 25th of March, 1824, till the 10th day of January, 1825, when the crop was gathered. tate of the deceased tenant. Dessaussure, Chancellor. The first exception depends upon the construction of the statute of 1789, which exacts, that on the death of a tenant for life of any estate which may determinate at an uncertain time, such death occurring after the first of March, the slaves of the estate are to be continued on the estate to the end of the year, or as the exception expresses it, "the estate is continued to the end of the year." The complainants contend, and the commissioner has decided, that though the property be so continued under the statute, it is subject to hire. The statute does not say so, and never to my knowledge, has been so construed. I do not think it the sound construction, for I believe an essential benefit was intended, and not an illusory one. The exception must be sustained, and so much of the report overruled and corrected. The complainants appealed. Per Cur. Colcock, J. This court concur with the Chancellor in his construction of the act of 1789; and I can safely say, that I never heard a doubt expressed as to the correctness of such construction. It is in furtherance of the common law doctrine of emblements, that he who has a right to sow shall be entitled to reap; which cannot be done in this country unless the negroes employed in making the crop are permitted to remain to the end of the year. It would often be of little advantage to the person taking, to remove the negroes after the crop is planted; whereas it might operate as a total destruction of the crop. The appropriation of the crop, as assets in the hands of the executors, certainly negatives the idea of allowing compensation by way of hire to the person entitled to the negroes. Decree affirmed. 12. BACOT V. PARNELL. Jan. T. 1831. 2 Bailey's Rep. 424. The action was brought upon a promissory note for the hire of a slave, for one year. The slave died within the year, and the defendant claimed an apportionment by way of discount, which was allowed by the court below. Where a slave was hired by the year and died within the time, held that apportion The Court, O'Neall, J., after referring to Byrd v. Boyd, the wages 4 M'Cord's Rep. 246., George v. Elliot, 2 Hen. & Mun. 5., Rip- should be ley v. Wightman, 4 M'Cord's Rep. 447., observed, that a contract ed. of hiring was generally an entire contract, but in certain cases an apportionment is allowed, and this was one of those cases. In this case the act of God (the death of the slave) has ended the contract of hiring. The owner is entitled to receive, and the hirer is bound to pay, only so much as the hire was worth from the commencement of the hiring until the slave's death. A refusal without co T. AND N. Scudder v. Seals. 13. June T. 1824. Walker's Mis sissippi Rep. 155. Per Cur. Ellis, J. After the death of Nathaniel Scudder, his by a person wife administered upon the estate, and at the sale of the personal lor of a title property, Margaret Scudder, daughter of the deceased, purchased slaves upon Diesy and Daniel, the negroes in controversy, for which she executed her promissory note. After the purchase she intermarried with one Thomas Seals, who reduced the negroes into possession, to restore the demand of the true owner to his posses a fraud as Habeas sion, is such and worked them on the old lady's plantation, but separate and brings the distinct from her crop. In July, 1822, Mrs. Thomas Seals died, case within and her husband sold the standing crop, and hired the negroes to the provi sions of the Thomas Scudder, one of the present defendants. The negroes corpus act. were hired twice to Scudders, and finally came into the possession. of T. Seals, who carried them to the house of James Seals, the plaintiff below, who purchased said negroes. The petition of James Seals, supported by the oath of D. Muse, states that Diesy and Daniel were either stolen or enticed out of his possession, some time in September last. Upon the hearing of the evidence on both sides, the judge had the property restored to the petitioner. From the evidence introduced on the trial below, there cannot be a doubt in relation to the right of property. The only question for our consideration is, whether the petitioner has brought himself within the provisions of the 19th section of the habeas corpus act, which says: "If any slave or slaves for life shall be taken or seduced out of the possession of the master, owner or overseers of such slave or slaves, by force, stratagem, or fraud, and unlawfully detained in the possession of any other person," &c. The fact of the detention of the negroes by Scudder, when he must have known they did not belong to him, was an imposition upon the rights of the plaintiff below, and will bring the case within, not only the letter, but the spirit of the statute. It was a trick, a stratagem, to deprive the owner of the possession of his property, otherwise they never would have been detained after legal demand being made. Diesy and Daniel being in the possession of Scudder, is evidence they were taken by him, until the contrary appears; and a refusal to deliver them over to the owner, is conclusive that he wished to hold the property without even the color of title. This amounts, (as I have before stated,) to imposition, trick and stratagem, presenting a case liable to the operation of the statute, in |