right of the petitioner. The second point of the defendant is, that the vice complained of, is not a redhibitory one; that the stealing must be accompanied with force, to constitute this defect. If this construction be the true one, it will lead to the most inconvenient results, and open the door to great and numerous frauds. This consideration, we are aware, is not of much importance, if the law be clear and free from ambiguity; but if otherwise, it is entitled to much weight in aiding our conclusions as to the purport and true meaning of the statute. The words of the law in the French text, are "si l'esclave est adonné au vol;" in the English "if he is addicted to robbery." Vol is the generic term, in the French language, for theft of every kind, and, it is admitted, embraces larceny. Robbery, it is said, means the offence known to our criminal law, as such. And it is urged, that the English version shows, that the word vol in the French was used in the restricted sense of taking the property of another by force. Our code was passed previous to the enactment of the constitution, and the legislature in adopting it, directed that the French and English texts must be taken together; and that they should mutually serve for the interpretation of each other. 2 Martin's Dig. 98. Whenever, therefore, the expressions can be reconciled, and made to harmonise with each other, it is the duty of those on whom the task of construing them is devolved, to do so. When they cannot, such a construction must be adopted as does violence to neither, and gives effect to both. Thus, if the French part of the law made epilepsy alone a redhibitory defect, and the English had provided only for leprosy, we should hold, that both these diseases constituted vices for which the sale could be annulled; because both were provided for; and because at that time the legislative will expressed in either language, became a law. In the case of Touro v. Cushing, decided at the last July term, this principle was applied to the 122d article of the code, 369. The text there presented two distinct ideas to the mind, and we thought a compliance with either, sufficient on the part of him who claimed the benefit of the law; otherwise, as was there said, the statute in relation to that provision, would be a decoy, instead of a beacon. And where they are not entirely different, as in the case before us, where the word in one text includes the meaning used in the other, and means something more, we must, on the same principle, take that which presents the most enlarged sense, because, in doing so, we give full effect to both clauses. (C.) OF THE WARRANTY OF CAPACITY. 1. STRAWBRIDGE v. WARFIELD. April T. 1832. 4 Louisiana is not the a contract. Per Cur. Porter, J. The question is, whether warranty on the part of the owner of the property sold (slaves) be of the essence Warranty of the contract of sale; and this question the law requires us to essence of answer in the negative. Warranty is in the nature of the contract of sale. That is, the law, implies it, if a contrary agreement be not made. But it is not essential to such a contract. The vendor may stipulate, he will not warrant at all; or he may covenant that his warranty shall be restricted; or he may contract that his vendee shall accept the warranty of a third person.* 2. PILIE V. LALANDE et al. April T. 1829. 19 Martin's Louisiana Rep. 648. This is an action The In a redhibitory action the plaintiff The evidence Porter, J., delivered the opinion of the court. of redhibition. The defendant pleaded the general issue. slave was sold as a washer, ironer, and cook. shows, that she possessed these qualities, very defectively, if at all. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, reducing the price $170. The defendants have appealed, and the plaintiff has required that the judgment be amended by the court decreeing a recision of the sale. The evidence is contradictory, and does not authorize us to disturb the verdict. The only questions which require our particular attention are those presented by the two bills of exceptions, taken on the trial by the defendants. The plaintiff offered evidence to prove that the slave had run away after he had purchased her, and the court admitted it. We think there was no error in doing so. The proof in itself would not be sufficient to establish the fact, without showing that the slave had run away An express warranty does not guard against that which can be discovered by sight; as if a horse be warranted perfect, and he wants an ear or a tail, Butterfield v. Burroughs, Salk. Rep. 211. But an express warranty extends to every kind of soundness known and unknown to the seller. 15 Petersdorff's Abr. 374. Upon the sale of a ship advertised as copper fastened, with all faults, the court held, that these faults meant, faults of a ship, which might have been consistent with that description of vessel; and that not being a copper-fastened ship at all, it was a breach of the warranty. Shepard v. King, 3, B. & A. 240. may prove the slave ran away after he was pur chased. while in the possession of the vendor. But if the facts in regard to the absence of the slave antecedent to the sale were in any way equivocal, subsequent acts might aid in ascertaining their true character. The evidence, too, might be important, in showing a continuance of the habit which existed at the time of the sale. It has been the constant practice in actions of this kind, to admit such proofs. 7 Martin's Rep. 43.; 10 Ibid. 659. Judgment affirmed. (D.) OF THE WARRANTY OF TITLE. 1. COWAND et al. v. REYNOLDS. Feb. T. 1832. 3 Louisiana Guaranty of the title of a mulatto boy purchased by the plaintiffs. It being ascertained the boy was free, the present action was brought, to recover the amount of expenses incurred by the plaintiffs while the boy was in their possession. The Court. Mathews, J. The surety of the vendor of a slave who warrants only the title, is not liable for expenses to which the vendee is put in consequence of the slave being affected with the redhibitory vice of running away; but he is responsible for damages incurred in case of eviction. * It was held, in Mackbee v. Gardner, 2 Har. & Gill's Rep. 176, that it was a familiar principle, that there exists, in every sale of personal property an implied warranty of title. And the same principle was recognized in Chism v. Woods, Hard. Rep. 531.; Osgood v. Lewis, 2 Har. & Gill's Rep. 495. In Defresne v. Trumper 1 Johns. Rep. 274, it appeared the defendant sold the plaintiff a horse, which was recovered of the plaintiff by a third person. The defendant contended the plaintiff could not recover, as there was no warranty, or fraud in the sale. But the court said, we are of opinion that an express warranty is not requisite; for it is a general rule, that the law will imply a warranty of title on the sale of a chattel. The rule is laid down in 2 Black. Com. 451., that by the civil law, an implied warranty was annexed to every sale, in respect to the title of the vendor; and so too, in our law, a purchaser of goods and chattels may have satisfaction of the seller, if he sells them as his own, and the title proves deficient without any express warranty for the purpose. And the same rule prevails in Great Britian. In contracts for the sale of personal property, the vendor impliedly warrants his title to the article he sells; and if he has no title, he is liable for a breach of this implied promise. 15 Petersdoff's Abr. 372. And the rule applies whether the seller is in possession of the thing sold or not, Ibid.; 3 T. R. 15.; Rew v. Barber, 3 Cowen's Rep. 272. The Oneida Manufacturing Society v. Lawrence, 4 Cowen's Rep. 440. 2. STRAWBRIDGE V. WARFIELD. April T. 1832. 4 Louisiana Of a sale by Per Cur. Porter, J. The question is, whether the fact of the vendor of the slave having concealed from the purchaser, no mat- a broker. ter with what intention, the fact of his being the real owner, makes him responsible in warranty? We think not. It is clear, that the plaintiff could not now have the contract avoided on the ground that the defendant was acting merely as a broker, and was not the owner, as plaintiff supposed. For error in person with whom he contracted could not enable him to do so; the consideration of the person not being the principal cause of the contract. If the plaintiff could not have the contract set aside, we can discover no legal grounds on which it can be changed, and a subsiduary warranty granted to the buyer, for which he did not contract. 3. SCOTT et al. v. SCOTT'S ADM'R. Spring T. 1820. 2 Marshall's On the sale by a person having no title, and Plea, without of a slave It appeared the slave was sold to the plaintiffs more than five years before the commencement of the action, but that within five years Robertson had recovered the slave of the plaintiff. warranty, no recove ya third person is ne cessary to give the vendee his tion; the right to sue originates from the The circuit court instructed the jury, that if the defendant's in- right of actestate had no title to the slave when he sold him to the plaintiffs, the statute of limitations began to run from the time of the sale and delivery. But the jury found for the plaintiffs; and the court deceit of granted a new trial, and the plaintiffs excepted. On the second the seller. trial the jury found for the defendant, and the plaintiffs brought error to this court. Per Cur. The Chief Justice. It is certainly true, that the statute could not have begun to run until the cause of action accrued; and if, as was contended on the part of the plaintiffs, a recovery under an adverse title was essential to give them a right of action, it would follow, as a necessary consequence, that the instruction given by the court to the jury was erroneous. But it cannot be admitted that the recovery was necessary to the plain There exists in eve property warranty of tiffs' right of action. In the case of Payne v. Rodden, 4 Bibb's Rep. 304., it was held by this court, that the declaration against the vendor of a chattel upon his implied undertaking that he had title, was sufficient without an averment of a recovery by the right owner. We are of opinion, that the plaintiffs' cause of action accrued on the sale and delivery of the slave, and that the circuit court correctly instructed the jury, that the statute of limitationsbegan to run from that time. Judgment affirmed. 4. MOCKBEC'S ADM'R. V. GARDNER et al. June T. 1828. 2 Har. & Gill's Rep. 176. Trover for a slave. The plaintiff offered to prove by one Dury sale of vall, that the plaintiff's intestate purchased of the witness, as the personal administrator of William Warfield, the negro, and that at the time an implied of the death of the intestate, was his property, and at the time of title-the the sale was part of the assets of the said intestate. The defendexceptions are trustees ant objected, that the witness was incompetent to prove that the negro at the time of the death of Warfield, was his property and at the time of sale was part of the assets of the intestate's estate. The objection was sustained by the court. Dorsey, Ch. J. And the plaintiff excepted. and executors. Or per public a Per Cur. Archer, J. It is a general and familiar principle, that there exists in every sale of personal property an implied warranty of title, and that the vendor cannot be a witness to sustain the title of the vendee. But here the witness was a mere trustee; and in that capacity sold the property. Executors, administrators, and other trustees, are exceptions to the rule; and a sale by them does not imply a warranty of title, unless there be fraud or an express warranty and eviction. Judgment reversed. 5. FORSYTH V. ELLIS. July T. 1830. 4 J. J. Marshall's Rep. 298.; M'GEE v. ELLIS & BROWNING, 4 Little's Rep. 244. ; PEPPER V. THORNTON, 6 Monroe's Rep. 27.; HEAD V. M'DONALD, 7 Monroe's Rep. 206. M'Gee obtained judgment against Browning, and delivered a fi. haps any fa. to Forsyth for levy, which was executed upon two negroes in gent. the possession of Browning, and sold them to Ellis, he being the highest bidder. Browning sued Ellis in detinue, and recovered the |